


PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND

THE ONLINE JOURNAL OF THE RESEARCH CENTRE IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCES OF THE PERSON



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MIND,
HABITS
AND SOCIAL
REALITY

Edited by Matt Bower and Emanuele Carminada



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INTRODUCTION

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Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

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The present volume of *Phenomenology and Mind* is dedicated to the topic of habit, especially in its personal and social aspects. The phenomenological tradition has produced a number of interesting and fruitful reflections on habits, importantly challenging the often too sharply drawn distinction between nature and culture. The notion of habit is crucial in understanding Husserl's phenomenology. The ante-predicative framing of types in perception and the felt movement of the lived-body, the framing of position-takings in logically, evaluatively, and practically formed judgments, the rational stances one can adopt, e.g., in interpersonal discourse, or the attitudes shaping one's conceptual grasp of the world – in all these instances conscious life decisively involves elements of habit (types, positions, stances, attitudes, etc.).

The notion of habit, of course, does not first emerge within the intellectual milieu of the phenomenological movement. Indeed, the discourse on habit in phenomenology's precursors may prove quite helpful in making sense of certain currents in (especially Francophone) phenomenology. It has been a significant subject of discussion and controversy throughout philosophy's history, ranging from Aristotle's treatment of *hexis* and its reception as *habitus* in Thomas Aquinas' psychology, to Hume's critical analysis of 'powers', and further on to the French vitalists and Bergson, who had an important role also in Merleau-Ponty's transformation of Husserl's phenomenology of the lived-body. In the 20th century the concept was imbued with great social relevance. Gehlen's philosophical anthropology, for instance, gave a foundational role to 'habits' in the stabilizing of social institutions. Schütz and some of his followers, like Berger and Luckmann, analyzed habits in relation to the life-world. But it was perhaps Bourdieu's sociology that really made the concept of 'habitus' prominent within the social sciences and the humanities.

We think that phenomenology has far from exhausted its potential to clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion further. To that end, the current volume, on "Mind, Habits and Social Reality," brings together a number of contributions in an attempt to put on display both the profound depth, systematic import, and the thematic breadth that a phenomenological treatment of the notion of habit can possess. Session I introduces genetic phenomenology with an overview of Husserl's

broad and differentiated understanding of the habitual self (**Moran**) and offers a specific focus on the phenomenology of types, with an eye to Hume's account of induction (**Lohmar**), as Husserl's most original account of habits, as well as on the quasi-existential application of genetic phenomenology to situational intentionality (**Ferencz-Flatz**) and also to the social structure of the life-world (**Da Costa**). In Session II, habit is elucidated ontogenetically (**Sheets-Johnstone**) and its peculiar teleological sensitivity to circumstances (**Zhok**) is brought to the fore. The history of the concept of habit is also mobilized to engage the problem of the naturalization of the mind (**Efal**), while Marleau-Ponty's and Ricoeur's phenomenology are shown to assuage certain problematic assumptions about habit (**McGuirk**), and, lastly, habit is argued to be pertinent to the current debate on extended mind. Session III is dedicated to the social and normative character of habit, critically taking stock of Bourdieu's seminal sociological theory of habit (**Crossley**) and enhancing it phenomenologically to make room for social creativity (**Kokoszka**). On the other hand, from a non-Bourdieuian point of view, a reciprocal habitual influence of individual and society on values is posited (**Scalambrino**), and, turning toward the individual, we are given an analysis of the intertwining of passive and active habits in personal position taking (**Arango**). Finally, in Session IV we offer two further resources for understanding habits: the English version of **Rochus Sowa's** article on episodic and non-episodic intentionality ("Episodische und nicht-episodische Intentionalität Zur konstitutiven Funktion der epistemischen Habitualitäten des Wissens und Glaubens bei Edmund Husserl", published in *Fenomenologia*, Vol. 12, 2014) and an annotated bibliography on habits edited by **Marco Cavallaro**.

Returning now in a little more detail to the present volume's contents, **Session I** introduce genetic phenomenology, focusing on its most characteristic contribution to our understanding of the realm of habits: its theory of habituality and types.

Dermot Moran's contribution "The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of the Habitual Self" analyzes and contextualizes many different terms Husserl uses to theorize about the domain of habit. Although Husserl rarely gives an explicit methodological reflection on its operative value, habit appears to be the key concept of genetic phenomenology. **Moran** collects therefore the main occurrences of terms related to habit in the Husserliana volumes and elucidates their systematic relevance, showing how phenomenology reveals habit as present

at all levels of human behavior, from the lower drives, bodily intentionality right up to rationality in theoretical, practical and emotional life. The transcendental clarification of epistemic attitudes relates methodologically to the role of scientific habits and their sedimentation. Convictions, decisions and sentiments are all habits “layered over on each other in very complex intertwined ways” that constitute selves as stable and abiding egos, giving them their “weight” in individual and social life. Disclosing the operative concept of habit in Husserl’s disparate phenomenological analyses and juxtaposing the latter with (among others) Heidegger’s, Gadamer’s and Bourdieu’s own developments, **Moran’s** article clears the ground for further in-depth studies on the phenomenology of habits.

In his article “Types and Habits. Habits and their Cognitive Background in Hume and Husserl”, **Dieter Lohmar** explores Husserl’s most original development of genetic phenomenology. The concept of type refers to pre-predicative forms of knowledge. Lohmar defines ‘type’ as a form of pre-knowledge of singular objects or events (individual types) or of a class of objects or events (general types). Types are contrasted with empirical concepts of everyday life, respectively as a similarity group bound to a finite number of experiences and as the result of idealizations that grasp what is common to an infinite manifold of possible objects. Types show a unique aspect of mental life characterized by preservation of knowledge and gradual adaption to changing circumstances. Despite this conservatism, types, as leading and guiding operations in perception and action, are quite flexible frameworks of sense, being powerful and effective tools of pre-knowledge. Lohmar underlines their role in various pre-predicative realms of cognition, which, as he claims, the human mind shares with other animals, too. Finally, he sketches some systematic comparisons between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and Hume’s understanding of habits.

Against the background of Husserl’s theory of types, **Christian Ferencz-Flatz** gives a phenomenological account of the notion of ‘situation’ in his paper “A Phenomenology of Automatism: Habit and Situational Typification in Husserl”. Moving from the existential tension between situational facticity and the demand of free decisions, the author discusses the details of Husserl’s genetic-phenomenological understanding of situation as a peculiar form of total-configuration (*Gesamtkonfiguration*). The apperceptive unity of situational typification is treated both in its noetic as in its noematic character, stressing the dynamic role of expectations and embodied potentialities. Thus, situation is defined as the “intentional

living unity of horizontal context and subjective potentiality”. Ferencz-Flatz focuses his attention on three main aspects of the phenomenology of situation: the role of interests in the shaping of experience, periodicity, and the emergence of a secondary normativity. Situations are organized through complex processes of time patterns contingent on subjective and environmental constraints and rhythms. They are structured by habitual interests which commit the subject to forms of ‘secondary normativity’, i.e. the “secondary passivity of practical preference in an intersubjective, generative context.”

Intersubjective types or ‘stocks of knowledge at hand’ are the core topic of **Tomas Da Costa’s** “Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: Alfred Schutz on Habitual Possessions”. Da Costa contextualizes the concept of type in the work of the founder of Phenomenological Sociology, Alfred Schutz. Schutz’s notion of type lies in between Weber’s sociological tool of ideal-type and Husserl’s genetic account of typical presentation. Because of this twofold source, Schutz’s understanding of types is related both to forms of idealizations (typifications) and to an empirical concept of generality (typicality). Typicalities and ideal-types are at the generative core of Schutz’s description of the structures of the life-world and are conceived in his account as essential social features of both mind and environment: even more, they are the instruments through which the social world becomes real. In this regard, the pragmatic turn of Schutz’s phenomenology slightly modifies the terms of Husserl’s understanding of types, stressing more the role of higher-order idealizations, such as the interchangeability of standpoints and the congruency of the system of relevancies, rather than focusing on the basic genetic operations that lead from previous pre-predicative levels of cognition to the disparate realm of idealizations.

The suite of papers comprising **Session II** of this volume takes on the general themes of how habits figure in our mental constitution and mode of access to the world. Fittingly, **Maxine Sheets-Johnstone**, in her article “On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of Habit,” opens up the section by tackling the question of the mind’s beginnings. Her concern is the relation of genesis to *ontogenesis*. More specifically, the aim is to gain clarity about the phenomenon of habit by taking into account precisely the relation of habit to ontogenetic development. The investigation is inspired by her observation that in the analysis of conscious life nothing may be taken for granted, or, positively, that every minute detail has its origin and history

in past experience. This is precisely what the notion of habit suggests – no habit is given, all habits are acquired. In her analysis, which focuses on habits as patterns of movement, Sheets-Johnstone highlights the individuality of habit-acquisition by describing the phenomenon's relation to the related phenomenon of style. The specifically ontogenetic dimension of habit is then related to instinctive behaviour, where Sheets-Johnstone stresses, following Husserl, the character of persons both as free agents and natural beings comes to light.

In light of that analysis, Sheets-Johnstone takes issue with recent phenomenological work on embodiment and the sense of self, arguing that it misconstrues its phenomena of interest by unwittingly assuming an adultist stance. If one instead recognizes the primacy of felt bodily movement – something easily overlooked by phenomenologist who, as a matter of fact, occupy the standpoint of adults while carrying out their investigations, but filling the awareness of the infant at every moment – one can avoid such pitfalls. Lastly, Sheets-Johnstone indicates how her ontogenetic approach to habit might connect with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social understanding, inasmuch as we understand others so often by recognizing their habitual style.

While the importance of habit for our mental constitution is widely recognized, there is a current within philosophy that nevertheless sees habit in a somewhat negative light. This is even apparent in the word's semantic often negative associations with words like “rote,” “mechanical,” “blind,” etc. **Andrea Zhok** devotes his article, “Habit and Mind,” to tackling this issue and defending habit's dignity in our mental economy. Indeed, since habits are necessary for learning, and we can follow no rule, i.e., master no concept or meaning, without learning, a great deal is at stake with habit. In his mission to put on display habit's merits, Zhok marshals the philosophical resources of Peirce and Husserl to show how an urge to repeat makes habit possible in the first place.

Though it is thanks to Peirce's notion of abduction that we can recognize the need for such an impulse, it is Husserl who presents in more detail the shape it might actually take. Zhok locates this impulse in Husserl's account of time-consciousness and the process of “temporalization.” Consciously retained past experience is transformed and projected in protention, which seeks out the same in the further course of experience. What emerges in this analysis, Zhok claims, is the purposive and intelligent character of

habit. Indeed, habit has its own logic, being both sensitive to circumstances (and so not mechanical) and purposive (and so not blind). Having redeemed the notion of habit, he notes that the conception of habit he develops resists any thoroughlygoingly reductive naturalization because of its teleological elements. Nevertheless, in stressing its embodied and embedded character, Zhok admits that his view is amenable to a more liberal take on the project of naturalizing the mind.

Habit is also pertinent to the discourse on naturalization in a more historical register, as **Adi Efal's** work, titled "Naturalization: habits, bodies, and their subjects," shows. Efal charts the conceptual geography and philosophical lineage of the notion of habit prior to and leading up to its appropriation in the phenomenological tradition. Indeed, the work undertaken by Efal is essential genealogical work providing important background information for understanding how Francophone phenomenologists have conceived of habit. Her task is to relate, in particular, how the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of habit that keeps the material body at a relative distance is overturned in the 19th century discourse on habit among such figures as Biran, Ravaisson, and Bergson. Despite their nuanced differences, the latter, she explains, conceive of habit as essential to life precisely as its material presupposition. She contends that this idea opens up the possibility to think of habit in a unified way as both material and moral, rather than prising these aspects apart as in the Aristotelian-Thomistic strategy, an idea that is in need of further exploration.

James McGuirk, picking up near where Efal's article leaves off, represents the post-Husserlian phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur in his article "Phenomenological considerations of habit: reason, knowing, and self-presence in habitual action," in which he maintains along with Zhok that any conception of habit as *merely* blind, automatic, and mechanical is mistaken. Indeed, to put it positively, habit can be a genuine form of knowledge. McGuirk conceives it as containing both the potential for authentic self-expression and a sensitivity to circumstances, *pace* the negative allegations advanced by Ryle and Heidegger against habit. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology makes prominent the deft, even creative, manner in which habit allows one to navigate through the world, while Ricoeur, especially when he views the phenomenon in *hermeneutic* terms, explains for us how habit can be both opaque (i.e., at least in part beyond our conscious grasp) and authentic at the same time.

The specifically Merleau-Pontian view of habit may also be relevant to current debates over the extent of cognition and the so-called extended mind hypothesis (EMH), namely, the proposal that some cognitive processes may be partially constituted by what lies beyond a cognizer's boundaries as an individual organism. **Richard Strong** connects the dots between Merleau-Pontian habit and EMH in his article "Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology." His goal is not to alter or expand upon the thesis in any way, or even to suggest that habit itself extends the mind in any way. Rather, he argues that the classic presentation of EMH in Clark and Chalmers (1998) and its subsequent elaboration in Clark (2011) overlooks an important way in which *embodied* habits might figure in the kinds of examples used to support EMH. One need not address this problem beginning *ex nihilo*, Strong shows, because Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology already illustrates the way embodied habit, in the form of the "body schema," facilitates the acquisition and employment of extended cognitive accessories. This does not end the discussion, Strong suggests, but rather brings into view the variety of real strategies subjects may make use of in co-opting their environment to better pursue their cognitive ends.

Session III offers phenomenologically driven insights into the methodological debate of the social sciences about the tensions between individual agency and the social structures.

Nick Crossley approaches the concept of habit from a sociologist's point of view. After having given a historical introduction on the relevance of the concept of habits in sociology and in related phenomenological accounts, he aims to clarify the proper validity and the conceptual limitations of the term as the main explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction. In this regard, the concept of habits is in Crossley's account both crucial and limited. He explores the methodological strength and the conceptual limits of the term contrasting it with concepts which have been often presented as alternative accounts: rules and conventions. In the context of 'theory of practice' habit is coined by Bourdieu's understanding of it as 'structuring structures' that gives the enculturated subject a 'feel for the game'. With this understanding of habit, one nowadays quite familiar in social sciences and humanities, Crossley compares Winch's theory of social rules and Lewis' conception of convention.

INTRODUCTION

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According to Crossley, in contrast to rules and conventions, habit cannot grasp the relational nature of social structures, provided it is understood as the sedimentation of individual instantiations of social actions in dispositions of discrete individuals. Therefore, social structures, if conceived only through habits, are methodological fragmented and individualized in the collection of individual dispositions for social tasks and skills. On the other hand, Winch's account can elucidate the fact that rules refer to rational normativity, since social practices governed by rules can (and ought to) be viewed in terms of their rightness or wrongness. Thus, this peculiar aspect of social rationality can be captured by rules, not by habits, which tends to reduce it to matters of fact. The same goes for Lewis' definition of convention as coordination and agreement for social action. Both Winch and Lewis underline aspects of social reality that are intrinsically relational and cannot be reduced to individual dispositions.

Crossley shows, moreover, how habits can lend stability to both rules and conventions and durability by anchoring them within the embodied subject, beneath the level of reflective decision. Habits both enable the naturalisation of behaviour and put them outside of the realm of discourse, as embodied knowledge of something taken-for-granted. Finally, he concludes his conceptual clarification showing how habits, rules and conventions need to be considered not as key concepts of alternative accounts, but as related conceptual tools within an all-compassing frame for a future theoretical sociology.

While Crossley gives a sociological clarification of the concept of habit as an explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction, i.e. for social structures, **Valérie Kokoszka** enhances Bourdieu's concept of habitus phenomenologically by elucidating how social creativity (therefore agency in a strong sense) is linked to, but not exhausted by habitual dispositions. She refers to Bourdieu's understanding of habitus as a "generative scheme of practices adapted to objective circumstances" as a means to give an account both of social regularities without reducing them to inanimate mechanism and of creativity in social interactions without taking recourse to a powerful, rational subjectivity capable of decoupling itself from social structures. She calls Bourdieu's rejection of structuralism and subjectivism into question. On one hand, his concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked to a strong "noetisation" of habit, i.e. internalisation of all its performativity as a form of Kantian schematism, and, on the other hand, the objectivity of the social environment is presupposed as a static field and never analysed in its structural relation to

the dynamic life of the bearer of habits. Kokoszka's suggested enhancement moves from her original interpretation of Husserl's genetic phenomenology.

Kokoszka suggests a terminological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes. In her original account, she distinguishes genetic phenomenology from static phenomenology by decidedly sublating the static tendency "to noeticize" the intentional field, drawing it into the immanence of the transcendental ego. She then applies this phenomenological innovation to Bourdieu's account where the concept of habits replaces the role of transcendental consciousness. Since the systematic correlation of habits as subjective dispositions and of types as objective dispositions of the life-world stresses the intertwining of embodied subject and environment, the social environment can no longer be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual dispositions, but as an enactively framed habitat. Inhabiting the life-world, the bearer of habits is not only intertwined with its environment, but also called to reply to its affordances and to cultivate it by creating material correlates that make it habitable. Thus, she subtly describes the intertwining of passive and active habits, showing how in taking a stance in relation to its own cultural environment the hiatus between disposition and disposed subject provides the latter the leeway of a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, something absent in Bourdieu's account. Finally, she addresses Sartre's description of social institutions as material devices for incorporation and embodiment of goals, as well as their tendency to degenerate in goal-blind devices for self-conservation.

As Crossley's and Kokoszka's contribution already suggest, there is a rich field of phenomenological research having to do with the sociality of habits. **Frank Scalambrino**, in his article "From a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature of habits and values to an intersubjective ground of normative social reality," approaches the same matter from a non-Bourdieuian perspective, taking as his primary philosophical resource a phenomenological appropriation of Aristotle. There is, Scalambrino shows, a challenging problem concerning the place of the individual and the place of the social with respect to normativity, namely, about whether the validity of values (in their basic experiential, proto-rational form) has its source in the former or the latter. He negotiates this dilemma by pursuing a phenomenological analysis that ultimately doesn't force one to take sides (i.e., in favour of the

individual or the social). One can, instead, strike a balance by conceiving of a reciprocal interrelation of the individual and the social insofar as these co-contribute to the validity of values. This is made possible by locating the ground of values in habit, which is at the same time an individual and a social affair. Only in interpersonal intercourse, Scalambrino argues, can we come to an adequate evaluation of the value of a given situation, provided that the habitual background of all the individuals involved mutually serve as evaluative constraints. In that way, Scalambrino presents a complex picture of habit as the site where the individual and the social come together to engender the norms that bind social subjects together in interpersonal encounters.

Shifting focus to theorize more specifically about the place of habit in the constitution of an individual subject, **Alejandro Arango's** paper, titled "Husserl's concept of position-taking and second nature," contains a treatment of the notion of second nature. He views the latter not as comprised of habits *per se*, but more specifically of those dispositional tendencies termed "position-takings" [*Stellungnahmen*]. Arango first takes pains to carefully distinguish between pure passivity, e.g., in the form of instincts, acquired habits, and, more narrowly, active position-takings. He argues that only position-takings are suitable elements for comprising a second nature based on their peculiar motivational character. The latter gives one a kind of self-consistency that is integral to a person's unity, yet a consistency that is not some kind of natural given but which, rather, requires active self-formation. Hence, Arango concludes, position-takings, as acquired principles of self-unification, are precisely what the notion of a second nature is meant to capture. Despite this distinction between second nature as comprised of position-takings over against one's more "natural" or passive tendencies, Husserl's phenomenology, Arango notes in closing, weaves the active and the passive together into a non-dualistic, multi-stratum whole.

With **Session IV**, the present volume closes with the inclusion of a translation into English of an article by **Rochus Sowa**, titled "Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: On the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl." The article seeks to clear up some problematic aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, to which end a renewed reflection on the domain of the habitual figures importantly. Sowa begins by explaining the difference between the project of a static and

of a genetic phenomenology. The difference can be cashed out in terms of a development in Husserl's theory of intentionality: Static phenomenology concerns discrete episodes of particular conscious intentional acts, while genetic phenomenology concerns non-conscious habits, i.e., horizons consisting of empty intentions in which intentional acts are contextualized. In particular, Sowa shows, habit, in the form of *knowledge*, is not an occurrent moment within the complex of lived-experiences that comprise one's conscious life. It is, rather, a way one is disposed. One doesn't know, truly, by executing a one-off intentional act, but only inasmuch as something *holds good*, i.e., is accepted as valid. This is a condition, a disposition, exceeding conscious awareness, thanks to which one tends to produce appropriate acts (empty intentions in perception, judgments in knowledge) in appropriate circumstances.

The threatening consequence emerges, then, that the phenomenologist is cut off from these putatively noetic "phenomena," as they do not properly *appear*, and accordingly cannot be *described*. Indeed, the threat is, as Sowa sees it, to the very idea of intentional correlation. His solution comes with the notion he introduces of "*Gewusstsein*," for which the best we can do in English is "knownness." So explains that nothing new is thereby added to the contents of conscious awareness. Rather, knownness follows from the recognition that our acts have motivational antecedents of which we are not aware. Prior experience, belief, or knowledge may fall into complete obscurity for consciousness. Yet it remains "present" and even "in view" inasmuch as our acts in the present continue to have it for their motivation, though without its coming to conscious awareness. This is how, moreover, our belief in the world functions, Sowa argues, as something that holds good beyond our awareness.

The last piece in the volume is an extensive, lightly annotated bibliography of literature on the topic of habit, generously compiled by **Marco Cavallaro**. For ease of use, the bibliography is divided into four main parts. The first part covers Edmund Husserl's engagement with the topic of habit, which, in turn, is grouped into three categories: His primary published works; the published manuscripts, lectures, and essays; and references to yet unpublished manuscripts. The second part of the bibliography lists primary works by other authors working in the phenomenological tradition, and the third covers the secondary literature dealing with the notion of habit in phenomenological terms. Lastly, the fourth part presents a sampling of

INTRODUCTION

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work on habit exemplifying perspectives beyond phenomenology, including figures in the history of philosophy, more recent philosophy (analytic and continental), and some offerings from outside of philosophy altogether (e.g., psychology, neuroscience, sociology, aesthetics, literary theory).

In that spirit, we hope this collection of papers will be of service in ongoing phenomenological and philosophical research. Its value will lie not in settling disputes or definitively answering questions concerning habit, but in opening up avenues for further research and discussion. This is possible, in part, due to its systematic import, i.e., in clarifying the major fault line within Husserlian phenomenology demarcating static and genetic phenomenology in a way that makes the notion of habit indispensable. The phenomenon of habit is also made to appear in this volume in its concreteness, i.e., in the broad range of topics that it can help shed light on, whether in the way habit relates to the temporal depths of an individual life in its development, or in its constant presence as what enables individuals to creatively and authentically navigate their surroundings and negotiate their interpersonal relations in ways that have cognitive, practical, and ethical significance. Additionally, in their analyses of habit, several contributions in this volume not only offer an expansive take on phenomenology's domain of research, but also draw attention to points of contact, e.g., between phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and alternative philosophical outlooks (e.g., analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science) and theoretical paradigms (e.g., praxeological sociology), sites in which we would like to see much more interdisciplinary dialogue on these themes.

1

SESSIONS

SESSION 1

HABITS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TYPES

Dermot Moran (University College Dublin)

The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl's
Phenomenology of the Habitual Self

Dieter Lohmar (Universität zu Köln)

Types and Habits. Habits and their Cognitive Background in
Hume and Husserl

Christian Ferencz-Flatz (Alexandru Dragomir Institute for Philosophy, Bucharest)

A Phenomenology of Automatism. Habit and Situational Typification
in Husserl

Tomas da Costa (Bergische Universität Wuppertal)

Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: Alfred
Schutz on Habitual possessions

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THE EGO AS SUBSTRATE OF HABITUALITIES: EDMUND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE HABITUAL SELF

abstract

Husserl's phenomenology offers a very complex treatment of the full conscious person as constituted out of its capacities and habitualities. Human existence develops itself habitually through its intentional meaningful practices both individually and communally. Habit can be found at all levels in the constitution of meaningfulness (Sinnhaftigkeit), from the lowest level of passivity, through perceptual experience, to the formation of the ego itself, and outwards to the development of intersubjective society with its history and tradition, to include finally the whole sense of the harmonious course of worldly life. Husserl uses a range of terms to express his concept of habit including: Habitus, Habitualität, Gewohnheit, das Habituelle, Habe, Besitz, Sitte, and even Tradition. Husserl's account deeply influenced Ortega Y Gasset, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Pierre Bourdieu, among others. This paper will give an overall analysis of Husserl's conception of the habitual self.

keywords

Husserl, phenomenology, habit, self, sociality, tradition

Each individual has his or her habits.

(*Jedes Individuum hat seine Gewohnheiten*, Husserl, Hua XIV, p. 230).

The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities.

(*Das Ich als Substrat von Habitualitäten*, *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl, Hua I, §32, p. 100/66;)¹

1. The Genetic Phenomenology of Habituality

In general, Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is an extraordinarily rich source of insights and analyses concerning the nature of the self and its relation with others approached from the phenomenological point of view, that is, from the point of view of intentional sense-making by and between conscious subjects. His phenomenological investigations over many years explore the rich and multi-layered life of intentional consciousness and experience from the lowest levels of what might be described as a kind of Humean "pre-egoic" passive association, where experiences hang together and are clustered in an orderly harmonious way temporally, prior to explicit conscious organization, right through the formation of a stable and abiding self with its capacities and abilities and then again, on to the highest level of cultural cooperation, living together (*Mitleben*) and "being-with-one-another" (*Ineinandersein*) in what he terms the "life of spirit" (*Geistesleben*). In *Cartesian Meditations* § 34 Husserl locates this discussion of the habitual ego within a new area of phenomenology which he names "genetic phenomenology":

With the doctrine of the Ego as pole of his acts and substrate of habitualities, we have already touched on the problems of phenomenological genesis and done so at a significant point. Thus we have touched the level of genetic phenomenology. (Hua I, § 34, p. 103/69)

Husserl even speaks of the possibility of an overall genetic "phenomenology of habitualities" (*Phänomenologie der Habitualitäten*) (Hua XV, p. xxxviii)².

The mature Husserl always thinks of individual conscious selves as being in entangled correlations with other selves in what he somewhat misleadingly terms "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) and its cognates, *Miterleben* ("co-experiencing"), *Nacherleben* ("reliving"), *Einempfindung* ("sensing-in"), and *Hineinversetzen* ("projection" or "introjection")³. Indeed, one could say, without exaggeration, that Husserl's mature phenomenology is primarily a phenomenology of communal and intersubjective life, a phenomenology of spirit that effectively re-invents Hegel although with any pretense at dialectical progression but with a sense of appearance, negation, cancellation and sublation (*Aufhebung*), as we shall see.

1 Hereafter cited as Hua I with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

2 Hereafter cited as Hua XV.

3 See Moran (2004).

2. Habit as an Operative Concept

Habit is one of Husserl's operative concepts, concepts on which he does not offer an explicit methodological reflection. Moreover, Husserl's analyses of habituality do not appear frequently in his published works, but may be found scattered through the *Nachlass*, especially in the volumes on intersubjectivity (Hua XIII, XIV and XV) as well as in *Ideas II* (Hua IV)⁴. For instance, Husserl's *Ideas I* (Hua III/1) mentions "*Habitus*" only once at § 96 (Hua III/1 224), where Husserl speaks approvingly of the phenomenological "habit of inner freedom". Indeed, the term *Habitus* does not appear at all in the *Crisis of European Sciences*⁵ although *Habitualität* occurs about a dozen times. The term *Gewohnheit* has only a few occurrences there. In terms of the works published in his own lifetime, Husserl's readers initially encountered the concept of "habit" and "habituality" primarily through a few key references in the *Cartesian Meditations* (Hua I, especially §27, and §32) and later in *Experience and Judgment* (Husserl 1938). *Habitus* appears only twice in the *Cartesian Meditations* although the term *Habitualität* is somewhat more frequently found.

Habit is discussed quite frequently in the posthumously published Husserliana volumes such as *Ideas II* (Hua volume IV, especially §§29 and 56), Husserliana volumes XIV and XV on intersubjectivity, *Phenomenological Psychology*⁶ lectures of 1925 (Hua IX), and in Husserliana volume XI on passive synthesis⁷. Husserl frequently employs the phrase "abilities and dispositions" (*Vermögen und Habitualitäten*). This in his *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures (1925), he speaks of the personal ego as having various "abilities and habitualities" (Hua IX, p. 136; see also §41, p. 206, where he speaks of the 'ego as a pole of activities and habitualities', [*Das Ich als Pol der Aktivitäten und Habitualitäten*])⁸. Habituality, in this sense, usually combined with human personal abilities and activities to form what Husserl calls, in *Cartesian Meditations* and elsewhere, an "overall personal style" (*Stil*).

Central to Husserl's analyses of spirit is his understanding of habitual life in the familiar world. This is always a life where meanings are encountered or lived

4 Hereafter cited as Hua IV with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

5 Hereafter cited as Hua VI with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

6 Hereafter cited as Hua IX with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

7 Hereafter cited as Hua XI with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

8 He speaks positively of the "personal subject of habits" (Hua IX, p. 286). Similarly, in *Crisis of European Sciences* Husserl speaks of the specific "activity and habituality of the functioning ego" (*Aktivität und Habitualität fungierenden Ich*) (Hua VI, p. 109); and of the "peculiarities of human life and human habitualities" (Hua VI, p. 141n). Every ego has to be considered as an ego pole of acts and habitualities (*als Ichpol seiner Akte und Habitualitäten und Vermögen*) (Hua VI, p. 187).

through as “always already there” (*immer schon da*) or “pregiven” (*vorgegeben*). The everyday world of experience has a deep degree of stability, commonality, normality, familiarity, and even comfort. It is the common context and horizon for our collective concerns. It is indeed both constituted out of and forms the intentional counterpart to our habitual lives. In this regard, Husserl has a phenomenology of the self in everyday life, even if, because of the demands of his transcendental point of view, he methodically suspends commitment to this everyday life through the transcendental *epochē*. Precisely because everyday life has a pre-given, taken-for-granted character, it is invisible in the analyses of the positive sciences. The operations of this hidden intentionality need to be made visible and Husserl gradually realized this required a major suspension of our naïve worldly-commitment or *Seinsglaube*, belief-in-being. For Husserl, everyday life is natural life, life in the natural attitude. This is a life lived in obscurity, the unexamined life, life lived according to everyday habituality, life lived “with blinders on” as Husserl often says.

Husserl’s phenomenology of habitual life discovers habit as present at all levels of human behavior from the lower unconscious instincts and drives (that have their own peculiar individuality or idiosyncrasy), bodily motility right up to the level of autonomous rational life in culture⁹. Thus he speaks not just of bodily habits or traits of character but of peculiar and abiding “habits of thought” (*Denkgewohnheiten*) (Hua IX, §24, p. 142¹⁰; and Hua III/1¹¹, p. 5/xix, see also §108). These habits of thought include scientific habits of thinking (Hua III/1, §33) that are accepted without question and that it is the function of the transcendental *epochē* to disrupt and thereby expose.

The life of habit, what Husserl often simply abbreviates to the Latinate term *Habitus*, moreover, is not just a matter of intellectual attitude or conviction (*Überzeugung*), it can also be a matter of perceptual tendencies, desires, feelings, emotions, even peculiar moods. Husserl recognizes the complex character of our “feelings” (*Gefühle*), as well as our intertwined emotional and affective “states” (*Zustände*), acts of empathy, sympathy, love, fellow feeling, and so on, as well as acts of willing (important for our ethical lives). In this sense, personal love, for Husserl is described as a “lasting habitus” (*dauernder Habitus*) (Hua XIV, p. 172). All of these can have a habitual character, a particular style of being lived through, and as a result they can be sedimented into layers that encrust the psyche and form the “abiding style of the ego” (*der bleibende Stil des Ich*) (Hua XIII, p. 400).

9 For a fuller treatment of the classical treatments of habit (Aristotle, Hume) as well as for a discussion of Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, and others, see Moran (2011).

10 See also Hua IX, §5, p. 55, where Husserl speaks of the “habits [*Gewohnheiten*] of natural scientific thinking”.

11 Hereafter cited as Hua III/1 with page numbers from the German text followed by those of the English translation.

Husserl employs a wide range of terms to express his concept of habit and the habitual, including: *Gewohnheit*¹², *Habitus*¹³, *Habitualität*, *das Habituelle* (Hua XIV, p. 195). Occasionally, he even uses the Germanized version of the Greek *Hexis* (Hua XIII, p. 400; Hua XIV xxiv) and he often speaks quite generally of “possession” (*Besitz*), or “having” (*Habe*, Hua XIII, p. 400), of a skill, a routine, or a decision, a point of view, anything that can become literally incorporated in one’s body or confirmed as an abiding trait in one’s character—even one that perhaps is now cancelled out¹⁴. Most frequently, Husserl deploys adjectives (*gewohnheitsmäßig*, *habituell*) that connote the “habitual”. Generally speaking, and I am really basing this on my own reading of the Husserliana volumes, Husserl employs the familiar German term *Gewohnheit* to refer specifically to habits of thought, ways of thinking influenced by science, psychology and so on (see also Hua VI, p. 145). In line with his overall discussion of habit and of human capacities, Husserl deploys a number of words including “dispositions” (*Dispositionen*), and “abilities” (*Vermögen*). Habit is thereby intimately connected with powers, capacities, disposition, the ability to exercise a skill, execute routines, embody successfully a range of activities, such as playing a musical instrument, dancing, driving, reading, and so on. Habit, for Husserl, is also connected with higher activities of the ego involving knowledge, moral practical wisdom and the formation of a stable character, as well as the overall achievement of a stable intersubjective life with others. In this regard, Husserl says that the word ‘*Sitte*’ (custom) summarizes this idea of habitual action and behavior in the social sphere (Hua XIV, p. 230)¹⁵. Husserl is deeply aware of and attempts at least to sketch in outline, in his research manuscripts, as we shall see, some of the collective social practices that contribute to the constitution of custom and culture. In this regard, human existence involves not just bodily, psychic and personal habits of the individual but more collective habitual states such as the use of language, involvement in games and social practices, and the overall capacity to belong to a “sociality” (*Sozialität*), the capacity to recognize, appreciate and follow the norms and values of one’s culture—all these are outcomes of habituality. It is through habituality that one becomes acculturated and can live in attunement with cultural norms. Nevertheless habituality is not a

12 The term “*Gewohnheit*,” for instance, does not occur at all in *Cartesian Meditations*.

13 The Latin term *Habitus* is found in ordinary German with the meaning of “manner” in the sense of mannerism, e.g. in phrases such as “he has an odd manner” (*Er hat einen komischen Habitus*).

14 On Husserl’s use of the word *Habe* and its etymological connection with “*habitus*”, see Cairns (1976), p. 7.

15 Hua XIV, p. 230: “Jedes Individuum hat seine Gewohnheiten. Wie steht individuelle Gewohnheit und bleibende Entschiedenheit (bleibende Urteile, Werte, Entschlüsse für das Individuum)? Sitte ist ein Titel für sozial gewohnheitsmäßige Handlungen, ebenso hat die Sprache ihre sozial gewohnheitsmäßige grammatische Form, und zu allem sozial Gewohnheitsmäßigen gehört ein Sollen, das des ‘Üblichen,’ des Normalen, sich Gehörenden. Aber Wissenschaft und Kunst? Ist Sitte an sich schon Kultur? Sie kann in Kultur genommen werden, möchte man sagen.”

set of blind or unconscious processes, it is intentional through and through.

3.
The Starting
Point: The
Psychic
Subject as a
Unified Flow of
Experiences

Especially in his *Ideas II*, Husserl considers the constitution of the human being, progressively, from a number of standpoints that he normally divides into the physical (the purely natural), the psychical and the spiritual. Human beings as physically embodied belong to nature and are subject to natural laws, causation, and so on. But human beings are also psychophysical, living organisms or what Husserl calls *Leibkörper* that have animation, motility and so on, as directed by psychic states and acts. Human beings are also personal subjects who interact on the “spiritual” or cultural plane.

According to Husserl, *habit*, along with association, memory, and so on, belongs to the very essence of the “real psychic subject” (Hua IV, §30), which is treated as a subject of properties and not to be construed as identical with the “pure ego” (*das reine Ich*). According to Husserl, to this psychic subject belong every personal properly, the intellectual character of the human individual and the totality of his or her intellectual dispositions, his/her affective character, practical character, every one of his/her spiritual capacities and aptitudes, mathematical talent, logical acumen, magnanimity, amiability, self-abnegation, etc. (Hua IV, p. 122/129). Following the older tradition of descriptive psychology, Husserl is happy to call this psychic subject “soul” (*Psyche*) in so far as it is understood as having a body but not being identical with its body.

The psychic subject is essentially and by its nature in constant flux, it cannot be considered – unlike strictly material objects—as a static entity with unchangeable properties:

Every lived experience leaves behind itself a wake of dispositions and creates something new as regards psychic reality [*Jedes Erlebnis hinterläßt Dispositionen und schafft in Hinsicht auf die seelische Realität Neues*]. Hence this reality itself is something constantly changing. (Hua IV, §32, p. 133/140)

Husserl always emphasizes the importance of thinking the psychic subject as a flow (*Fluß*) (Hua IV, p. 133) in its totality and interconnection with other subjects. Thus he writes:

Moreover, it has to be noted in this connection that what belongs to the full psychic unity as manifold [*als Mannigfaltiges*] (in analogy with the schema or the material thing) is the current *total state of consciousness*, whereas the singular, abstracted out, lived experiences are, in this respect, “states” [*Zustände*] of the soul in its fullness only

insofar as they fit within the total consciousness and are, in their total nexus [*Gesamtzusammenhang*], transitional points for particular avenues or manifestation. (Hua IV, §32, p. 133/141)

Human beings are layered and formed by their lived experiences. If we begin by considering the individual human being in its flowing life of consciousness, there is a corporeal or bodily *habitus* that invokes a person's overall 'bearing', 'form', i.e., how they physically present themselves. In this regard, Husserl speaks of a person's bodily *Habitus* (see Hua XIII, p. 76, for instance, where he criticizes the Munich psychologist Theodor Lipps' understanding of human bodily expressions and talks about expression as a "bodily habitus")¹⁶. Memories, skills, practical abilities are literally *incorporated* in the body, in the way we hold ourselves, move our bodies, walk, sit, eat, look weary, adopt a defeated air, and so on¹⁷. Some people have a more or less 'innate', 'natural' or 'given' sense of balance, an ability to feel their way through water when swimming, a joy in hearing sounds (Husserl speaks of this as belonging to sheer facticity, *Ideas* II §61, in that different people simply enjoy different kinds of sounds, colors and so on, i.e. one's favorite color), and so on. Training can build on and amplify these nature abilities and capacities. For Edith Stein, for instance, who follows Husserl in this regard, capacities can be strengthened through "habituation"¹⁸. One can practice sitting up straight, not slumping one's shoulders, and so on. Nevertheless, there is an extremely deep inalienable individuality to human experiencing. Each of us has a familiar gait or a specific tone of voice, set of facial expressions, even favorite strings of words.

Some babies just are attracted to certain sounds or colors; some prefer one kind of movement over another. Gradually distinctive tastes and inclinations in food, color, smell, taste, emerge, and these last through life. Husserl here speaks of certain attractive stimulus or allure (*Reiz*) that comes to prominence and elicits an individual response. Husserl even says: "We may even allow originally instinctive, drive related preferences" here (see Hua XI, p. 150/198). Each individual has his or her own "style" (*Stil*) (Hua IV §61), and indeed the natural world also runs along its own "total style" (*Gesamtstil*). To describe reality and human beings as running along in a harmonious course is not to see it as something automatic or mindless. Habit for Husserl is connected with rational deliberation and intellectual scrutiny but this is not its primary characteristic. The key characteristic of habit in Husserl's analysis is its

16 In this sense, certain gestures, facial expressions, mannerisms of various kinds exemplify an individual's style.

17 See for instance, Young (1990) and Sheets-Johnstone (2003).

18 Stein (1917), p. 56/51.

“lasting” or “continuous” (*dauernd*) character, the fact that it attaches to the ego and modifies it permanently.

There are, of course, *intellectual* habits as well as corporeal or bodily habits. Intellectual habits in particular are initiated by acts of the ego—specific position-takings or decisions. Habits need to be initiated. They also need to be ‘bedded down’ or burned in through practice and repetition. One swallow does not make a summer. Developing or changing a habit, moreover, may require deliberation and alert self-scrutiny. Giving up or resisting a habit, e.g. smoking, requires the development of *new habits*, new overriding and deflective routines. It also requires a certain second-order stance towards my first-order instincts, I experience a strong and unshakeable desire to smoke; at the same time, I perhaps desire to stop smoking; I desire to curb my desire to smoke. I stand in a judgment of negation in front of my compelling desire and hence it is now an altered desire. As Husserl writes in *Ideas II*:

[T]he personal Ego constitutes itself not only as a person determined by *drives* [...] but also as a *higher, autonomous, freely acting* Ego, in particular one guided by *rational motives* [...]. Habits are necessarily formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behavior [...] as with regard to free behavior. To yield to a drive establishes the drive to yield: habitually. Likewise, to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist a drive establishes a tendency (a “drive”) to let oneself be determined once again by such a value-motive [...] and to resist these drives. (Hua IV, §59, p. 255/267; with translation change)

One can desire to fulfill, negate or enhance another desire. There are higher levels of self-awareness here. One can embrace a desire (the desire for another person, for instance) and make it not just a project (in the Sartrean sense) but as filled with the meaning of being a central characteristic of my own existence and character. Desires and stances towards them are all caught up in the complexities of meaning-investment or sense-constitution.

4. **Husserl on Convictions (Überzeugungen) and Their Sublation (Aufhebung)** The Fourth Cartesian Meditation contains an important Section (§32) entitled ‘The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities (*Das Ich als Substrat von Habitualitäten*)’ (Hua I, §32, p. 100/66) which treats of the formation of a stable ego through its habits. It is this Session that originally attracted the attention of Pierre Bourdieu, who went on to make a major theme of habit¹⁹. Here Husserl primarily talks about the manner in which a conscious decision (a freely performed act of judging, e.g. “I become thus and so

19 See Bourdieu (1990), pp. 52–65. See also Bourdieu (1985) and Bourdieu (1977).

decided”) can become sedimented down into a habitual property attaching to one’s character such that the original decision can even be forgotten. But nevertheless, it can be re-activated if I return to it again. Husserl writes:

[I]t is to be noted that this centering Ego is not an empty pole of identity, any more than any object is such. Rather, according to a law of “transcendental generation”, with every act emanating from him and having a new objective sense, he acquires a new abiding property. For example: If, in an act of judgment, I decide for the first time in favor of a being and a being-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now on am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so decided, “I am of this conviction”. That, however, does not signify merely that I remember the act or can remember it later. This I can do, even if meanwhile I have “given up” my conviction. After cancellation [*Durchstreichung*] it is no longer my conviction; but it has remained abidingly my conviction up to then. As long as it is accepted by me, I can “return” [*zurückkommen*] to it repeatedly, and repeatedly find it as mine, habitually my own opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego who is convinced, who, as the persisting Ego [*als verharrendes Ich*], is determined by this abiding habitus [*diesen bleibenden Habitus*] or state. (Hua I, §32, pp. 100-101/66-67).

This is not a new thought for Husserl. He says something very similar much earlier in his *Ideas II*:

If I acquire anew [*neu gewinne*] an old conviction, while executing the appropriate judgement, then the acquired conviction (a lasting acquisition [*ein bleibender Gewinn*]) “remains” [*verbleibt*] with me as long as I can assume it “again”, can bring it again to givenness for me in a new execution. I may also abandon the conviction, now rejecting the reasons for it, etc. Then again I can turn back to the “same” conviction, but in truth the conviction had not been the same throughout. Instead, I have two convictions, the second of which restores [*wiederherstellt*] the first after it has broken down [*niedergebrochen war*]. (Hua IV, p. 114/121)

These very interesting passages indicate how, for Husserl, transient episodes of belief actually can turn into stable and even unconsciously held convictions. Husserl is always interested in the way these convictions can be re-awoken, re-affirmed, or even cancelled or negated, yet, as he says in a way nothing gets lost. Thus, in a similarly most interesting and

important passage in *Experience and Judgment*, § 25, Husserl emphasizes that no experience is ephemeral but rather every leaves some kind of lasting “trace” (*Spur*). Even a conviction repudiated is still a conviction-that-once-was believed. This “trace” becomes accommodated into a habituality which eventually has the character of an “empty” practical possessing. These habitualities are precisely not memories; they lie somewhere deeper in the ego’s character itself. Indeed, they may even have been *forgotten as convictions*; certainly the original foundational moments, *Urstiftungen* that gave rise to them and inaugurated them can be forgotten. I may have forgotten what led me to my conviction or resentment. I cannot remember the incident that motivated me to dislike someone. Nevertheless, a new sense or meaning has been acquired, an object (substrate) is perceived with certain properties (explications). Thus he writes:

No apprehension is merely momentary and ephemeral. To be sure, as this lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an explicate, it has, like every lived experience, its mode of original emergence in the now, to which is adjoined its progressive sinking [*Herabsinken*] into corresponding non-original modes: retentional reverberation and, finally, submersion [*Versinken*] into the totally empty, dead past [*leere, unlebendige Vergangenheit*]. This lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become “forgotten”; but for all this, it in no way disappears without a trace [*spurlos*]; it has merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a *possession in the form of a habitus* [*ein habitueller Besitz*] ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association [...]. The object has incorporated into itself the forms of sense [*Sinnesgestalten*] originally constituted in the acts of explication by virtue of a knowledge in the form of a habitus [*als habituelles Wissen*]. (Husserl 1938, §25)²⁰

In all of these discussions Husserl has most interesting things to say about the peculiar process that he calls *Durchstreichung*—a term more usually associated with Heidegger and by Derrida. The concept of *Durchstreichung*, crossing-out or cancellation, is actually quite common in Husserl (see Hua XIII, p. 367; Hua XIV, pp. 124; 142, 153, etc.). For Husserl, moreover, in relation to intentional life, what is cancelled and crossed out is still retained as that which is crossed out. I can say that I used to have such and such a conviction but then I abandoned it. Nevertheless, I am now both the person

²⁰ Husserl (1938), §25, p. 137/122.

who (a) had the conviction (b) cancelled it and now (c) hold a different perhaps opposite conviction. One never really leaves anything behind in the sphere of the person; everything is taken up and carried on even in a cancelled or modified manner. Everything is *aufgehoben*, to invoke Hegel's term that is often translated as "cancelled" or "sublated" but which Cairns renders as "revoked". Indeed Husserl uses this exact term when he writes in *Cartesian Meditations*:

If it aims at a terminating deed, it is not "revoked" [*aufgehoben*] by the deed that fulfils it; in the mode characteristic of fulfilled decision it continues to be accepted: "I continue to stand by my deed". [*Tat gerichtet, so ist er durch diese Erfüllung nicht etwa aufgehoben, im Modus der Erfüllung gilt er weiter — ich stehe weiter zu meiner Tat.*] (Hua I, §32, p. 101/67)

In this recognition of cancellation, modification, taking-up-again, and re-validation, Husserl thinks of the formation of the ego almost like an onion. It is made up of layers that cover and include lower layers, except that the layers interact and modify each other. One could also use the analogy of a snowball rolling downhill and taking up new layers of snow that it integrates into itself. When the self makes a decision, this decision attaches itself to and marks out the self as a whole. The self is permanently changed or marked even by the things it abandons and rejects. Through these indelible convictions, I have the constituted sense of being a "fixed and abiding personal ego [*als stehendes und bleibendes personales Ich*]" (Hua I, §32, p. 101/67).

Decisions and beliefs form into convictions and these convictions become sedimented into dispositions or even marks of character. These convictions become possessions or "havings" of an ego. Having a conviction is not at all the same as *remembering* that one once decided something. A conviction indicates a more permanent psychic state; it is a mark of one's character. Furthermore, what was decided can be returned to and *reactivated* without having to run through the associated judgments of evidence. As Husserl puts it in his *Intersubjectivity* volume *Husserliana XIV*:

I am not only an actual but I am also a habitual ego, and habituality signifies a certain egoic possibility, an "I can" or "I could", or "I used to be able to", and this being-able-to become actual refers to actual ego-experiences, even an actualization of ability. In a word, I am (and without this there would be no I, I can not think of myself otherwise),

an ego of abilities (Hua XIV, p. 378, my translation)²¹

Notice that Husserl includes “I used to be able to”. In other words, we retain past achievements in sedimented form: I used to be able to run a five-minute mile or whatever. Even if I can no longer do it, I remain the person who could do it at one time.

Like Max Scheler, who discusses the stratification of our emotional life in his *Formalism in Ethics* (1913), Husserl is deeply aware that our whole character with its convictions, values and emotional stances are layered over on each other in very complex intertwined ways. To offer one example, in *Ideas II*, Husserl writes with some subtlety about the attitude involved in nursing a grudging or harboring a resentment:

We still need to examine more closely how the persistence [*Verbleiben*] of “the” lived experience is to be understood. I have a lasting conviction, or I “nurse a grudge” [*Ich “hege einen Groll”*]. At different times I do have different lived experiences of the grudge (or of the judgment), yet it is only “the” grudge coming again to given ness; it is a lasting grudge [*ein bleibender Groll*] (or a lasting conviction). The judgment of determinate content *as lived experience* lasts a while (immanent duration) and then is irretrievably gone. A new lived experience of the same content can subsequently emerge—but not the same lived experience. It may emerge in such a way, however, that it is only the former conviction returning again, the former conviction that had been carried out earlier and is now again being carried out, but it is the one lasting conviction, the one I call mine. (Hua IV, p. 113/120)

There are very complex structures of identity in question here. What constitutes the identity of a mental state? How do we know that the grudge or resentment is the *same* one? Husserl puts quotation marks around “the” lived experience. In one sense, each experience occupies a unique place in the temporal flow of conscious processes, but we also have a sense of the *same* experience returning. I constitute the feeling as the *same* feeling as before. Husserl is aware that we can constitute a feeling or a conviction in different ways. Thus people can re-awaken an old anger and again be

21 The German reads: “Ich bin aber nicht <nur> aktuelles, sondern auch habituelles Ich, und die Habitualität bezeichnet eine gewisse ichliche Möglichkeit, ein ‘ich kann,’ ‘ich könnte,’ ‘ich hätte können,’ und das Können wieder sich verwirklichend weist hin auf Ichaktualitäten, auf aktuelle Icherlebnisse, eben als Verwirklichungen des Könnens. Mit einem Worte, ich bin (und ohne das wäre ich kein Ich, ich kann mich nicht anders denken) ein Ich der Vermögen.”

angry or one could revisit the anger with a degree of embarrassment or discomfort. Or I could get trapped in reliving the same old emotion over and over again without resolving it, cancelling or sublimating it. Husserl here is developing a phenomenology that could contribute greatly to psychological or psychoanalytical discourse. Of course, we cannot go into it here, but the inner temporality of the emotion is at stake here. Some people know when to let go of a grief, grudge, or an anger; others live it in a manner which is characterized by what Kierkegaard called repetition. There is no growth only going back over and over the same grievance. Managing the temporality of emotional life could call for a deep phenomenology of the inner temporality of habit.

As we have seen, Husserl recognizes that convictions, decisions, etc., attach to the ego and give it a lasting, permanent character despite the flow. *Habitus* has to be understood as an enduring “state” whereby I can be said, in Husserl’s language, to “abide” by my decision. The decision *inhabits* or *informs* me. Through these acquired decisions that become convictions I constitute myself as a stable and abiding ego, someone with, Husserl says, “a personal character” (Hua I, §32, p. 101/67). Overall, as Husserl writes in his *Intersubjectivity* writings, the ego is stabilized by its fixed habits and possessions:

I with my firm habitus, with determinate habits of self-having, acting, thinking and speaking, and so on. [*Ich mit seinem festen Habitus, mit bestimmten Gewohnheiten des Sich-gehabens, Wirkens, des Denkens und Redens, usw.*] (Hua XIII, p. 244)

Husserl often compares the formation of a stable sense of ego with the perceptual formation of a stable sense of the perceived object. In perception, we glimpse only profiles and adumbrations (*Abschattungen*) nevertheless we constitute the perceived object as having a stable existence independent from our perceivings. Similarly in rememberings or in forming of resentments or grudges there is the noetic dimension and also the noematic dimension (the grudge itself, Hua IV, p. 115). In many of his analyses Husserl is primarily interested in what one might call the noematic dimension of the experience—what makes a particular habit or disposition the same one as before. But at other times he is interested in the noetic dimension, how the grieving or grudging is constituted as such, how it relates to the ego, and so on. Let us now consider how habit is related to the concept of “attitude” (*Einstellung*).

4.
Habit as Mind
Set or Attitude
(*Einstellung*)

In an even larger sense, habit is also understood by Husserl as the manner in which an overall ‘attitude’ or ‘stance’ or ‘collective mindset’ (*Einstellung*) is lived through. *Einstellung* is a term that Husserl took from the psychological tradition but he gave it a unique sense. There are any number of attitudes that humans can freely adopt but he usually talks about the natural attitude and the personalistic attitude (see Hua IV, §62). Elsewhere he talks about “the subjective attitude” (*die subjective Einstellung*) Hua XIII, p. 91). In the 1935 *Vienna Lecture* Husserl defines an attitude as a style of life:

[A] habitually fixed style of willing life comprising directions of the will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, the cultural accomplishments whose total style is thereby determined (Hua VI, p. 326/280).

Interestingly, “habit” in terms of an overall attitudinal stance is discussed by Husserl already in his 1910/1911 *Logos* essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”²². There, Husserl’s writes of ‘habitus’ (he uses both terms: *Habitus* and *Gewohnheit*) as an overall disposition of, for instance, a natural scientific researcher:

In keeping with their respective habits of interpretation [*herrschenden Auffassungsgewohnheiten*], the natural scientist is inclined to regard everything as nature, whereas the investigator in the human sciences is inclined to regard everything as spirit, as a historical construct, and thus both thereby misinterpret whatever cannot be so regarded. (PRS, p. 253/294/Hua XXV, pp. 8-9)

This essay is one of the key texts that introduces the idea of the natural attitude – which of course gets its canonical formulation in *Ideas I* §27. In “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” he writes

It is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit [*die urwüchsige Gewohnheit*] of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus of naturalistically falsifying the psychical. (PRS, p. 271/314/Hua XXV, p. 31)

And again:

²² Hereafter cited as ‘PRS’ with English pagination followed by pagination of the German original and then the pagination of the German edition in the Husserliana series.

Experience as personal habitus is the precipitation of acts of natural, experiential position-taking that have occurred in the course of life [Erfahrung als persönlicher Habitus ist der Niederschlag der im Ablauf des Lebens vorangegangenen Akte natürlicher erfahrender Stellungnahme]. This habitus is essentially conditioned by the way in which the personality, as this particular individuality, is motivated by acts of its own experience and no less by the way in which it takes in foreign and transmitted experiences by approving of or rejecting them. (PRS p. 284/329/ Hua XXV, p. 48)

There is, furthermore, a difference between the habit (*Habitus*) of the natural human in his or her daily living and that of the phenomenologist. The mature Husserl has a sense of habitus as forming an essential part of the character or attitude of natural life and also of expressing the self-consciously adopted stance of the phenomenologist. Husserl regularly speaks of the “theoretical habitus” (Hua XXVIII, p. 402) of the scientist and philosopher and even of the “*habitus of the epoche*” (Hua XIII, p. 208). In a supplement written around 1924 to the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Husserliana volume XIII), Husserl writes:

The habitus of the phenomenological epoche is a thematic habitus, for the sake of obtaining certain themes, the discoveries of theoretical and practical truths, and to obtain a certain purely self-contained system of knowledge. This thematic habitus, however, excludes to a certain extent the habitus of positivity. Only in its being closed off to the latter does it lead to the self-contained unity of phenomenology as “first” philosophy, the science of transcendental pure subjectivity²³.

He contrasts the ‘phenomenological habitus’ of personal self-observation to the more usual habitus of anonymous and unquestioned living in the natural attitude. In this sense, *habitus* expresses the manner in which stance-taking is informed by a certain discipline or practice of viewing and considering. In the phenomenological reduction, the habitual survives but

23 See Husserl (2006), p. 123; Hua XIII, p. 208: “Der Habitus der phänomenologischen Epoche ist ein thematischer Habitus, um gewisse Themen, Wahrheitserkenntnisse, theoretische und praktische, zu gewinnen und ein gewisses rein in sich geschlossenes Erkenntnisssystem. Dieser thematische Habitus schliesst zwar in gewisser Weise den der Positivität aus : nur in seiner Abgeschlossenheit gegen den letzteren führt er zur abgeschlossenen Einheit einer Phänomenologie als der ‘Ersten’ Philosophie, als der Wissenschaft von der transzendental reinen Subjektivität.”

in altered form. As Husserl puts it in his *Intersubjectivity* volume XIV:

But through the phenomenological reduction, I put the world out of validity, only my world-experiencing, my world-believing, my world-vouching, my corresponding habituality and so on, remain available but now as purely subjective. (Hua XIV, p. 399, my translation)²⁴

The key point is that Husserl believes that human beings have the capacity not just to live within certain overall attitudes but to alter them through an act of will. Attitudes can be changed (*Einstellungwechsel*) or altered or switched (*Einstellungsänderung*). As a result of these alterations of attitude, new objectivities come to light. This is the key to Husserl's "correlationism". Let us now turn from the individual to the social.

5. **Social Habituality**
(*Gemeinschaftshabitalität*),
Custom and
'Tradition'

As we have been insisting, Husserl talks of habituality not just in relation to the formation of an individual person and his or her character but also in relation to the social and cultural spheres, the sphere of "spirit" (*Geist*). Husserl often speaks of *Geist* to mean generally culture. He talks of *Gemeingeist* (Hua XIII, p. 92) which means literally "common spirit" but which in ordinary German has something more of the meaning "common sense". Already in 1910, Husserl is emphasizing that human beings are not just beings in the natural world, but seen from the right attitude also spirits, belonging to the "world of spirit" (*Geisteswelt*). He writes:

All lived bodies are not only bearers of sensations, etc., and "organs" of the mind, but also are "expressions" of the mind and of the life of the mind, and as such they are bearers of significance; they are beaers of meaning for all interpretations, which is the condition of the possibility of social life, being the life of the community²⁵.

In this regard, in a text from 1921/1922, Husserl speaks not only of the habituality that belongs to the "single ego" (*Einzel-Ich*), but also of "a social habituality" (*eine Gemeinschaftshabitalität*), which may also be called

24 See Hua XIV, p. 399: "Aber durch phänomenologische Reduktion setze ich die Welt ausser Geltung, nur mein Welterfahren, mein Weltglauben, -ausweisen, meine entsprechende Habitualität usw. bleibt erhalten, eben als rein Subjektives".

25 Husserl (2006), pp. 168-69; Hua XIII, p. 93. The German reads: "Alle Leiber sind nicht nur Träger von Empfindungen etc. und 'Organe' des Geistes, sie sind 'Ausdrücke' des Geistes und Geisteslebens und als solche sind sie Bedeutungsträger, Bedeutungsträger in jeder Eindeutung, die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des sozialen Lebens als eines Gemeinschaftslebens ist."

a“tradition” (*eine Tradition*, Hua XIV 230)²⁶. Husserl recognizes that both individuals and social and ethnic groupings have their own habitus. Thus he writes about shared physical similarities: “we count races [*Rasse*] in this way in so far as the commonality of outer physical habitus goes hand in hand with social characteristics” (Hua XIV, p. 183)²⁷. We recognize people on the basis of familiar patterns, family resemblances (including physical traits), social typicalities, and so on, precisely those schemata, sometimes called “stereotypes” (not necessarily in a prejudicial sense) by psychologists and “types” (*Type*) by Husserl, Weber and Schutz. In *Ideas II*, Husserl writes: “Personal life manifests a typicality, and each personal life manifests a different one” (Hua IV, p. 271/284). I come to understand others initially through these types—what kind of typical motivations are at play, and so on. Husserl speaks about the self-constitution of the ego but it is important to stress that the ego does not constitute itself solely through active stance-taking (*Stellungnahme*) and being a self-reflective *cogito*. The ego constitutes itself in the unity of a history and hence it is understood as living a life. The ego arises out of ‘life’:

I am the subject of my life, and the subject develops by living; what it primarily experiences is not itself, but instead it constitutes objects of nature, goods, instruments, etc. What it primarily forms and structures as active is not itself but things for work. The Ego does not originally arise out of experience—in the sense of an associative apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds of a nexus—but out of life (it is what it is not for the Ego, but it is itself the ego). (Hua IV, §58, p. 252/264)²⁸.

Husserl is describing a dynamic conception of selfhood lived out through

26 Hua XIV, p. 230 (1921/1922): “Verflechtung des Einzel-Ich und seiner Positionalität in die Gemeinschaft: Konstitution einer Gemeinschaftshabitualität, der Tradition, die immer schon besteht mit dem Momente der Stiftung der Gemeinschaft, da sie selbst nur ist durch Stiftung einer intersubjektiven Habitualität oder Tradition. Das Parallele natürlich für das Einzel-Ich, es ist nur in fortgesetzter Stiftung von Habitualität (seine individuelle Tradition) und [hat] also auch seinen wesensmässigen Anfang (schöpferischen Ansatzpunkt) in einer ersten Stiftung, durch die sie es selbst als habituelles Ich stiftet.”

27 See Hua XIV, p. 183: “Die Rasse rechnen wir hierher, sofern die Gemeinsamkeit des äusseren physischen Habitus Hand in Hand geht mit derartigen Gemeinschaftscharakteren.”

28 Hua IV, p. 252/58: “Ich bin das Subjekt meines Lebens, und lebend entwickelt sich das Subjekt; es erfährt primär nicht sich, sondern es konstituiert Naturgegenstände, Wertsachen, Werkzeuge etc. Es bildet, gestaltet als aktives primär nicht sich, sondern Sachen zu Werken. Das Ich ist ursprünglich nicht aus Erfahrung — im Sinne von assoziativer Apperzeption, in der sich Einheiten von, Mannigfaltigkeiten des Zusammenhanges konstituieren, sondern aus Leben (es ist, was es ist, nicht für das Ich, sondern selbst das Ich).”

its habitual activities: “The Ego exercises itself; it habituates itself, it is determined in its later behavior by its earlier behavior, the power of certain motives increases, etc.” (Hua IV, §58, p. 253/265), it acquires capacities, sets itself goals. It settles into a style of life, surrounds itself with what makes it feel at home, comfortable, secure. There is, to paraphrase St. Augustine’s phrase *pondus meum amor meus* (*Confessions*, Book XIII, ch. 9. Para. 10), a certain “weight” to habitual experience, it settles the ego down into a stable course of living. Habit gives a person *gravitas*, as it were. As Husserl writes:

I am the subject that is used to being pleased by such and such matters, that habitually desires this or that, goes to eat when the time comes, etc., i.e. the subject of certain feelings and of certain habits of feeling, desire, and will, sometimes passive [...] sometimes active. (Hua IV, p. 256/269)

Moreover, personal development is intrinsically influenced by others. Husserl describes the human being as a *socius*, a member of a community, a citizen. He writes in *Ideas II*: “Others’ thoughts penetrate into my soul” (*Fremde Gedanken dringen in meine Seele ein*) (Hua IV, §60c, p. 268/281). Husserl says that one acquires the habitus of others, more or less as one takes over a habitus in the area of individual experience. There is an instauration and then in some form an assimilation. I may first experience the feelings of others as a demand on me – but later I can submit to that demand and assimilate it so that it becomes in some way my own feeling (Hua IV, p. 269). We live always in a communalized world. Thus members of a family may display common habits. People in a certain area develop similar accents, and so on. They also experience their communal context as a set of determinations and also as a set of norms that govern them. They experience this network of customs and social institutions as powers, as Husserl writes around 1910:

The human being lets “himself” be influenced not only by particular other humans (actual or imagined) but also by social objectivities that he feels and apprehends as effective objectivities in their own right, as influencing powers. He is afraid of “the government” and carries out what it commands. He views such and such individuals, for instance, the police officer, etc., as representatives of the government only; he fears the person who is an official representative. The customs, the church, etc., he feels as powers, too [*Er empfindet auch die Sitte, die Kirche*

etc. als eine Macht]. (Hua XIII, p. 95)²⁹

Husserl expands his account of communalization and life in tradition to the full sense of human cooperation in the formation of a common history. Husserl frequently speaks of the complex interweavings of human subjects in collective social life in its concreteness and historicity. Thus in the “Origin of Geometry” text, Husserl writes:

We can now say that history [*Geschichte*] is from the start nothing other than the vital movement [*die lebendige Bewegung*] of the being-with-one-another [*Miteinander*] and the interweaving [*Ineinander*] of original formations [*Sinnbildung*] and sedimentations of meaning [*Sinnsedimentierung*]. (Hua VI, p. 380/371; trans. modified)

Husserl speaks of intentional life as an intersubjectively interwoven life lived in history and in tradition. We are subjects, or what he calls “intersubjective for-itselfes”. Husserl writes already in 1910:

[M]inds are present to me as addressed or addressing me, as loved or loving me, etc. I do not live in isolation; I live with them a common, integrated life, in spite of the separation of subjectivities³⁰.

Husserl’s analysis of cultural tradition and the manner it is transmitted, preserved, distorted and renewed was later taken both by Heidegger (in his analyses of the relation between arts and world) and by Hans-Georg Gadamer with his concept of the effective working out of history. For Gadamer, as for Heidegger, all understanding (*Verstehen*) requires an initial presumption concerning what is being understood. Understanding requires “pre-judgement” (*Vorurteil*) and our prejudgements are formed by what Gadamer calls “effective history” or the “history of effect” (*Wirkungsgeschichte*, the historical working out of the effects of actions in which we are inevitably involved: “[T]hat in all understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work”)³¹. Gadamer writes in *Truth and Method* (1960):

The illumination of this situation—reflection on effective history—can

²⁹ Husserl (2006), p. 172.k

³⁰ Husserl (2006), p. 168; Hua XIII, p. 92.

³¹ Gadamer (1960), p. 284/300. Here and in subsequent citations the page numbers of the German edition precede those of the English translation.

never be completely achieved; yet the fact that it cannot be completed is due not to a deficiency in reflection but to the essence of the historical being that we are. To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete. All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call “substance,” because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity. This almost defines the aim of philosophical hermeneutics: its task is to retrace the path of Hegel’s phenomenology of mind until we discover in all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it. (Gadamer (1960), pp. 285–86/301)³²

Whereas Gadamer refers to Hegel, he could also have invoked Husserl’s meditations on historical communal life in tradition. For Husserl, human beings live subjective and intersubjective lives, in the subjective or personal attitude. But Husserl differs from Gadamer in believing it is possible, through the radical application of the transcendental *epochē* to gain the position of the disengaged transcendental spectator which allows the intentional workings of this engaged life to be uncovered and understood. At least in its essential necessities such a life can be understood and its intentional character displayed by transcendental phenomenology. Or, at least, that was Husserl’s dream.

32 Gadamer: “Auch die Erhellung dieser Situation, d. h. die wirkungsgeschichtliche Reflexion, ist nicht vollendbar, aber diese Unvollendbarkeit ist nicht ein Mangel an Reflexion, sondern liegt im Wesen des geschichtlichen Seins, das wir sind. *Geschichtlichsein heißt, nie im Sichwissen Aufgehen*. Alles Sichwissen erhebt sich aus geschichtlicher Vorgegebenheit, die wir mit Hegel >Substanz< nennen, weil sie alles subjektive Meinen und Verhalten trägt und damit auch alle Möglichkeit, eine Überlieferung in ihrer geschichtlichen Andersheit zu verstehen, vorzeichnet und begrenzt. Die Aufgabe der philosophischen Hermeneutik läßt sich von hier aus geradezu so charakterisieren: sie habe den Weg der Hegelschen Phänomenologie des Geistes insoweit zurückzugehen, als man in aller Subjektivität die sie bestimmende Substantialität aufweist.”

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TYPES AND HABITS. HABITS AND THEIR COGNITIVE BACKGROUND IN HUME AND HUSSERL

abstract

The paper begins with a brief characterization of the function of types in the process of perception before discussing their different possible degrees of generality. Some similarities in the function of habits and types are then thematized, similarities based on the fact that each is the compact result of some set of prior experiences. Following these clues, both parallels and important differences between types and concepts are discussed. The second part of the paper investigates the function of types in the perception of concrete objects, the arousal of types in sensibility and the ongoing competition of different types striving for fulfillment. It is shown that the selection, collection, interpretation, and synthesis of sensible elements in perception are guided by the pre-knowledge that is sedimented in types. In the third part some very basic forms of cognition are shown to be based on the use of a type in a new cognitive context. Finally, a close connection is drawn between Hume's investigation of association and habit and Husserl's concept of types.

keywords

Habit, type, perception, cognition, concepts

1. Everyday- Interpretations of Habits and their Cognitive Aspects

We have habits of performing actions, of valuing and perceiving, attending and expecting. They can be modified and they are sometimes overgrown by other habits. Thus if we are speaking of habits – or, as Husserl prefers, *habitualities* – we are dealing with a broad field of very different, lower- and higher-order activities that can occur in different realms of experience¹. There are trivial habits of acting and behaving, and there are also habits that make up a certain extent of our knowledge. In this regard, it becomes apparent that we have acquired habits of expectation concerning the properties of certain things and kinds of things. For example if we see a lemon, we expect a fruity smell, etc. These expectations reflect a kind of pre-knowledge or familiarity we already have before we are able to perceive the respective object in a full sensible way. And it turns out to be a pre-knowledge that usually does not concern, for instance, this individual lemon alone, but rather concerns, as we say, “objects of this kind”, e.g., all lemons. Such habits of expectation, entailing and expressing a pre-knowledge about the kind of object we have in front of us, arise out of experiences we have had either of this individual object or other members of the class of similar objects (objects of this kind).

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl names this pre-knowledge of an object or class of objects (or events) its “type” (*Typus*)². The function of a type is best seen in the process of perception, which in genetic phenomenology is often termed a “typifying apperception” (i.e. an apperception with the help of a type, *typisierende Apperzeption*). Types are essential for the performance of perception, in each instance functioning through the entire process. The contents of a type rest extensively on the pre-predicative forms of gaining “knowledge” that Husserl consistently tried to differentiate from knowledge in the strict sense, i.e., formulated in predicative judgments, by calling them a kind of acquaintance (*Kenntnis, Bekanntheit*)³. The formation of types

1 Concerning habits of actions we can even attempt to change our habits, for example, to quit smoking, and we can try to acquire new habits. If I tend to be halfhearted in public conflicts, I can try to become more courageous. This reveals our ability for self-education and shows that we can be responsible for our habits because they depend partly on my own influence. This is part of the notion of *hexis* developed by Aristotle. Here I will not discuss this aspect of habits, but concentrate rather on the cognitive aspects of habits.

2 We must observe the difference between a type for a singular object and a type for a group of similar objects. We may speak in the latter case also of a general type. Cf. Lohmar (2013), 147–167.

3 Cf. Husserl (1971), 31–35, 140 f. on the difference between type and concept cf. Husserl (1971), 394–403.

takes place across a multiplicity of perceptions of similar things and events. The result is sedimented in a person's types, with the result that types may differ slightly from person to person.

Everything affecting us, if we apperceive it as an object, is interpreted by us as something-to-be-determined and moreover - already following the pre-knowledge of a special type - as something which we are acquainted with in advance, just as in the case of the lemon we expect that peculiar fruity smell, even if we only see it from a distance. Husserl tries to express this strange form of pre-knowledge in numerous places in the following terms: We apperceive the unknown in terms of the already known⁴. The function of a type, e.g., the type for a dog, is the form of an intentional anticipation revealing for us something not yet directly given of the object, but in a vague mode. (One "knows" ahead of time what a dog's features are like, e.g., its fangs; and the same is true of its behaviour, e.g., its sniffing, barking etc.). The content of these concrete expectations is quite precisely determined but remains flexible and always contains a degree of vagueness, so that the expectations can adjust to an actual sensible perception, for example, by a perspective redrawing of our expectations. Hence, our expectations are revisable, they may be refigured in the course of experience. If I see a student sitting at a desk I expect his legs to be under the table, if he hides behind a bush I expect his legs to be bent, etc.

The degree in the generality of a type varies. There are very general types, like "object" or "living being", which have a very broad extension and a lot of sub-types. The usual case of a perception with the help of a type begins with a very general type, for instance, an extended and real object, and end up with a quite narrow type, like an apple or a rubber band. Starting with the type "living being", I may realize that it is a dog and moreover it is a shepherd's dog, perhaps it is even a dog I know well individually. Even typifying perception of a single object is possible. *Types for singular objects* differ from *general types for objects* in many important aspects, and beside this the reference of single objects to other specific and also individual objects nearby and in a close relation to the first object is characteristic of them. But even types of singular objects still allow one to apperceive a particular object in different modes of givenness. Moreover, such types also entail the series of a singular object's states and some part of its historical development in a sedimented form.

But in typifying apperception things may also unfold in the opposite

⁴ We always apperceive the known in the mode of the known. Cf. Husserl (1971), 34; Husserl (1976), 126 ff. This general rule is often criticized with the argument that it implies that there could simply be nothing "completely new" in our experience. I do not think so. See Lohmar (2011), 120-134.

direction. That is, starting with the type of a concrete, singular object we may then realize that it is not the individual object I supposed it to be “at first glance”: It is not Peter but someone else! Thus I moved on to a more general type that allows for a successful apperception in this case: “someone”. The most general type, “something”, designates objects insofar as they are substrates of determinations⁵. Yet even this high degree of generality does not give such types the generality of a concept, because a type corresponds to the features shared by a certain group of things with which I have some prior experience. The most general types, like “something”, divide themselves into less general types (with narrower extensions) and, ultimately, to types for singular objects, and all of them belong to a “typical totality” (*Totalitätstypik*)⁶ entailing the whole horizon of our world.

Habits in a very trivial sense and types for singular objects are closely connected. This will be more obvious based on the following reflection. Singular objects’ types do not exclusively concern things’ cognitive aspects. They govern, moreover, a significant part of our everyday life and make it much more economic. Because the activities of persons usually are guided by certain ideas, it makes sense that the basis of the organization of life is experience - experience that is incorporated into habits and - as we will see in a moment - into types of singular objects. Habits sometimes appear to be quite conservative and inflexible because they adjust only very slow to changing circumstances. At the same time, exactly this conservative tendency sheds light on an important cognitive aspect of habits guiding our low-level everyday activities, i.e. activities performed without special attention. This often leads to specific uncertainties: Did I turn off the oven just now? Did I lock the door? Sometimes this might be annoying, but it proves that in most cases we are able to perform everyday activities without making their aims explicit in our consciousness, and we usually proceed successful without further control or troubling uncertainty. In this way habits facilitate our everyday practice⁷.

Yet the conservatism of habits is only one side of the coin. Our types also change slowly in the further course of experience. Consider an example of this gradual modification of a type’s contents that takes place in everyday circumstances. I have the habit of using a certain burner on my stove while making myself coffee, using an old-fashioned Italian style coffee maker in the morning. It happens one day, let’s suppose, that the preferred burner

5 Cf. also for the following Husserl (1971), 34 f.

6 Cf. Husserl (1971), 33.

7 There are also habits that can counterbalance the weak side of other habits. For instance, we might start with the habit to control the lock of the door when we leave our home.

stops working, and I, naturally, make up my mind to call for a service man. The next morning, *I behave as usual*, i.e. I follow my habitual routine and put the coffee maker on the customary, but now broken, burner. After some minutes, I realize that it will not start, and in recognizing that the burner is defective yesterday's experience, which I had forgotten, is called to mind again. I may even reprimand myself: You should have known better! It was only yesterday that you discovered the defect! Each of us has experienced similar situations. The important point is that only after a series of similar disappointments do I change my *habits* and avoid the use of the defective burner. This shows that a singular object's *type* not only includes information about the usual way the object will appear, but also contains intentions concerning its *value* and about its *functional qualities*, e.g., the plate is helpful for heating the coffee machine. Now suddenly the latter quality changes and it becomes apparent (upon a little reflection) that my usual orientation in the world is based on a non-linguistic way of preserving my experiences in types of singular objects. This way of preserving experience is quite conservative, but it changes gradually as habits do, in a series of similar experiences. This preservation of "knowledge" in our types gives it a kind of life of its own, since, although in principle my expectations may change, this change is sluggish and conservative.

But let us now come back to the more general characteristics of types and discuss what we know about the emergence and function of types. What we expect while we perceive with the help of a type is always anticipated in a vague generality (*unbestimmt allgemein*) so that we have always a kind of "room of possibilities" (*Spielraum von Möglichkeiten*) where different intuitive fulfilments of, e.g., sensory experience can fulfil the same typical expectation⁸. Different colours can fulfil an expectation about a coloured surface, and different shades of a particular colour, e.g., red, can fulfil the same expectation. This vague indeterminacy of types corresponds the "extension" or the range of objects that can be perceived successfully with this type⁹. With the help of one and the same general type we can apperceive different individual objects.

Besides that, the vagueness or "generality" of a type enables one to expect different modes of presentation of the same object (or objects of this kind), such as the different postures a living being might assume or distortions in the spatial appearance of objects due to perspective. Therefore even an individual object's type has this vagueness and generality

⁸ Cf. Husserl (1971), 32.

⁹ Husserl speaks about an „Um fang' der unbestimmten Allgemeinheit der Antizipation“, cf. Husserl (1971), 32.

in its expectations, leaving room for their transformation (preserving similarity)¹⁰. Because of this, no type has an exhaustively determined sense or content. Its flexibility offers a kind of “empty” frame of sense (*leerer Sinnesrahmen*)¹¹.

Every perception of a previously unknown object (helicopter, bumble bee etc.) starts with a quite general type, and in the explication of the sensible given object the type used becomes more and more determinate, resulting in the constitution of a new special type¹². Thus the constitution of new types is an everyday experience not only for children, but for adults as well. For example, we get to know new people all the time. With a new type of this sort we are able to apperceive a person in different ways of his sensible givenness¹³. In the constitution of a new type corresponding to something’s general character there is also entailed a new ability to act: I can perceive other objects of the same similarity group as something like the one I have come to know before.

Now we have already considered that types and language’s informal concepts have a lot in common, but it is also important to know where the differences lie. On the first view, types may look like empirical concepts, since they have a specific *content* related to the essential properties of the object (or the set of objects) they are types of, and they have an *extension*, i.e. a set of objects that can be constituted in perception with the help of this type. In that respect, there is some similarity to concepts. Yet there are also differences. The type is related to a relatively narrow group of objects that up to now I was able to constitute in perception with the help of precisely this type. So the relation of sense based on my experience is quite small and it is a group of similar objects, a *similarity group*. But this similarity group is bound to my own experience and it is limited. That means: We do not conceive of it as “fitting” infinitely many possible objects in the future course of experience, like we do with the sort of concept employed in ordinary language. And the extension of the type is not comparable to the extension of a concept, which is, in principal, unlimited. The type constitutes its object as a member of a finite group of similar objects. Nevertheless there is a path stemming from the type to the full-blown empirical concept, though it demands an overcoming of the type’s limitation due to the limited experience of its possessor. In short, it requires an act of idealization.

¹⁰ Cf. Husserl (1971), 33 and 141.

¹¹ Cf. Husserl (1971), 141.

¹² Husserl writes: „Mit jedem neuartigen, (genetisch gesprochen) erstmalig konstituierten Gegenstand ist ein neuer Gegenstandstypus bleibend vorgezeichnet, nach dem von vornherein andere ihm ähnliche Gegenstände aufgefasst werden“ (Husserl (1971), 35)

¹³ Cf. Husserl (1971), 35, 140.

In types we may already find a kind of predelineation of further, yet unknown objects that might turn out to be similar. Thus we may be able to use a type as the experiential basis for building a truly general concept out of it. But to take this step we have to change our attitude toward the object completely, i.e. we have to generalize all partial intentions bearing on the perceived object; now they are thought of as being all general concepts. The transition from a type to a concept is not trivial, because the concept is an idea of something common to infinite many objects¹⁴.

2. The Function of Types in Perception

Now let's consider the function of types in everyday perception. A general type contains or has sedimented in it (as Husserl would prefer) what we know about this kind of object, e.g., about the way an object of a peculiar type will typically present itself in sensory experience. This is how the type "car" helps us in perception, for instance, when we see a car to our left speeding up, but we see it through a closed window, while at the same time we hear the noise of the motor from an open window to our right. Even if we hear the noise coming from a different direction we know that it must belong to the object we see speeding up in front of us.

We already know that the most important performance of a type is to guide and enable perception. The type provides the answer to one of the most central questions that arises in the entire process of perception: Which sensory elements can fulfil our intention, which sensory element can represent successfully the object I expect to perceive? The type therefore guides the activity of *collecting* the elements of given sensibility useful for representing the object. But, moreover, it also helps to decide the sense in which these intuitive elements of sensation are to be *interpreted*. We have realized this function already in the case of the noise from the window at our right, where we interpret it not as something that is located at the right but as the noise from the car in front of us. This interpretation changes the "sensory sense" (or sensory meaning) of this sound. We will have to return below to the matter of the full range of a type's possible functions in perception. In the discussion of the functions of types, I will not be able to treat the questions of the origin of types and the nature of their possible modifications in subsequent experience¹⁵. I take for granted here that we already have a type, e.g., corresponding to Peter (a singular person) and another corresponding to a banana, and we are able to use such types in perception. Types contain in sedimented form the experience of several perceptions of Peter and of different bananas. This "knowledge" in the form

¹⁴ Cf. Husserl (1971), 401.

¹⁵ I have treated this in another place, cf. Lohmar (2008), Chap. 7-8.

of a type is readily activated and I can make use of it in a variety of situations. For example, I am able to perceive different bananas, and with the help of the type for Peter, I am able to perceive Peter in many poses, postures, etc. The very first stage of the process of perception starts with stimulus given in sensation that may only be, e.g., a colour, a smell, a strong contrast in the different sensory fields, or perhaps already a small fraction of some perceptual *Gestalt*. On this basis, the intuitive sensory givens provokes the arousal (*Weckung*) of a type corresponding to an object of a certain kind, so that this type will be put to work, i.e., guiding the collection of elements useful for a representation of such an object.

The arousal of a particular type is motivated by sensibility, though there are usually - due to the very multitude of motivating factors of arousal - different types aroused at the same time that step into a kind of competition to become fulfilled in the further course of perception. The process of perception is in this manner constantly accompanied by the arousal of alternative types. Some of them are very nearby the type that is now guiding the perception, i.e. they are only slight variants of some broader, overarching successfully guiding type, whereas some are directed to quite different things¹⁶. The success of a type in competition with others depends on its greater usefulness in making the present elements of sensibility into a representation of what the type intends. In the functioning (respectively working) of the successful leading or “dominant” type we find different activities, for example collection, combination, and interpretation of sensible elements. The type functions in the latter activities insofar as they are all guided by the contents of the type.

The dominant type guides all parts of the complex process of apperception. Let’s begin considering the different functions of a type with the *selection* of elements out of sensory givens. The type “lemon” entails a fruity smell, which becomes manifest when we are nearby the object and which - if it is present - is useful for the full intuitive representation of this lemon there. A faint smell of gasoline or coffee, our slight toothaches, a gently played melody in the background - all of this is also intuitively given in sensibility, but because of our knowledge about how a lemon might present itself to us we *do not integrate these elements in the function of representation of the object*. The type “car” entails in certain circumstances the idea of the engine’s sound, and so sounds like this can be interpreted as part of this object’s presentation in sensibility. The pre-knowledge contained in types concerning the way objects of this kind will show

¹⁶ There are different forms of motivation that lead to the arousal of a special type. What matters in this regard is not only the relevance of the object to be perceived but also a kind of topology of objects that are most probably in this part of my every-day world. Beside this, there are different forms of association and also factors more related to an individual person’s history. Cf. on this topic Lohmar (2008), Chap. 8.

up guides the *choice* and *collection* of representing sensory elements, and might also motivate a search for particular sensible elements not yet present, such as a certain sound, smell or shape.

Additionally, the *interpretation* of sensory elements is influenced and motivated by types. When hearing the sound of a car speeding up coming from my right through an open window, I interpret it as the sound of the car I see in front of me slowly speeding up. Even if the acoustic sound has another sense of direction it is reframed with a new sense of direction so that it fits what I can see. – Although this interpretation may turn out to be mistaken, it is nevertheless a way of enriching the representation of the car beyond simply relying on our visual sense. What also becomes apparent here is that the interpretation of what we really have in sensory experience is a very strong tool for our world-constitution, and it may therefore also be misleading in some cases.

The fulfilment of a perceptual intention is based on the fulfilment of all or at least the most central partial intentions that are aroused by the type. Accordingly, in a successful act of perception there is a coincidence of the (at first empty) expected intentions with corresponding parts and properties of the object that are covered or fulfilled by intuitive intentions in sensation. For example, I may expect the lemon's fruity smell while in fact only viewing it from a distance, and then, upon approaching it, this partial intention may be fulfilled and coincide with my prior expectation.

Types are very powerful and effective tools of our pre-knowledge, as can be seen by reflecting on the different phases of the process of apperception. Beside the guiding operation of perception, there is another striking form in which the contents of types appear. Sometimes we experience the contents of our expectations in vivid "phantasmata" – and this is even possible before we are able to have those contents fulfilled by intuitive sensory givens. Consider again the case of the lemon seen at just enough of a distance to elude our sense of smell. Sometimes the fruity smell appears to my conscious awareness as a briefly occurring phantasma, a phantasma that is nearly as vivid as the sensory intuition. In this peculiar way, our pre-knowledge about the object is manifested to me "as though it was already sensibly given". And these properties that we expect of the object appear in situations where the object is lacking this property in fact, e.g., because it is a plastic lemon or because the object is still too far away to really smell it¹⁷.

17 Such effects of the empty intentions in the form of vivid phantasmas of experienced sensory data have already been studied in empirical psychology. If you show an animated film of a bouncing steel spring and ask the experimental subjects afterwards whether they heard the characteristic "boing boing" sound of the bouncing spring, around 30% of all subjects will answer in the affirmative (which in fact was not there). Empty intentions present themselves in our sensory fields in the form of phantasmas. Cf. Biocca, Frank / Kim, Jin / Choi, Yung (2001), 247-265 and Lohmar (2008), Chap. 3.

These are clues pointing in another important direction, namely, to the fact that having a vivid intention about a particular property of an object does not require the use of concepts. Empty intentions can be realized instead by means of a phantasma directed to the pertinent intuitive sensory givens we expect on the basis of the operative type. Therefore we are allowed to suppose that many animals can make use of types in the same way as we do and that they can emptily intend the properties of the object of perception with the help of such anticipative phantasmata, which *are*, as it were, the empty intentions. If it happens that sensory givens can fulfil the empty intentions, then the vivid sensory givenness overwrites and pushes out the empty intentions presented by phantasmata. Phantasmata seem to be useful provided there is no sensory co-occurrence; but if there is sensory co-occurrence, the phantasmata show themselves to be weak by comparison. Of course, there is also a deliberate use of fantasy, and this fantasy goes beyond the weak phantasmata that arise in the framework of a typifying perception. If I imagine my friend Peter, then I experience a kind of pictorial memory presenting his face, his characteristic body posture, his size, perhaps also acoustic phantasmata of his voice, etc. This ability is also based on our type for Peter, because the type is an instrument that enables us to imagine and to perceive all possible postures and different ways of appearance of an object. We need this ability of imaginative free variation of the way a particular object may be appear in order to be able to perceive it. I must be able to “redraw” in imagination the familiar postures and appearances of the object (as I have come to know it up to now), even into the unknown ways in which it may possibly appear. This does not imply that I really have to be able to redraw the object like an artist with the use of pencil and paper. What I am speaking of is more basic. It is my expectations that have to be modified, thereby adjusting themselves to the particular situation in which the object appears.

But even this performance is not yet the complete realm of possibilities we can realize with the help of types. They enable us also to imagine in our fantasy lively scenes of Peter and other persons, even if we have in fact never seen these imaginary scenes. We can imagine them in a natural speed, with all the details, with the appropriate mimics and the usual rhythm of his movements as we know from other situations¹⁸.

Up to now our examples are limited to what we are able to do with *types of singular things* in perception and imagination. Now it will turn out that we can do much of this holds also for more general types. But first let’s consider some details of the use of a very peculiar type, one based only on the

18 We might ask why we are able to act like this and what good sense there is in this ability. The ease in performance of such a complex activity hints to the fact that we need these imaginative scenes sometimes. This might be related to a prominent non-linguistic system of thinking in our consciousness, cf. Lohmar (2012), 377–398.

experiences of a singular thing, e.g., a certain tree in the woods that serves as a landmark for our orientation¹⁹. Going through the woods we might believe that we have found this characteristic tree or site, yet with some central property or part fails to appear in perception. That is, the landmark tree is nearly as we had it in mind, but there is missing something. In situations like this our belief weakens, we become *uncertain* because the up-to-now reliable interplay of concrete expectations and following fulfilments in the constitution of objects based on sensibility is disturbed. Our usual practice is disrupted, we stop and try to orient ourselves again, taking a more precise look at the tree in question with a newly aroused interest: We want to discern whether it is really the that singular tree that we know will guide our way.

It appears that we have just passed a threshold. The concerns just raised occur already within the framework of *cognition*. The newly raised interest calls for a new form of synthesis and a new active, conscious performance. The previously undisturbed practice itself becomes a theme and a problem. Up to now there was fairly narrowly bounded change within a certain range in degrees of certainty. Anything in that range would be sufficient to allow us to carry on as usual, but now we have to *make sure* that what we are perceiving is really the landmark we sought. To reinforce our certainty we have to go back to the same place and actively restage the perception of the object, but with the novel emergence of an interest to “make sure”. It is obvious that this newly initiated perception is no longer a simple perception, but rather a *cognitive process of gaining knowledge* of whether this object is really the sought-after landmark. Now the partial intentions concerning the object as expected are performed with a higher degree of attention, and the activity of checking whether or not these intentions can be fulfilled is much more critical than in the usual circumstances of perception.

I do not arbitrarily choose the example of a landmark in the form of a particular tree. We know from empirical studies in comparative cognitive psychology that there are many animals that orient themselves with very simple methods, such as those used in seal colonies that make use of seal pups’ scent or cry to locate them. Even seemingly much more complex performances of orientation, like those carried out by migratory species of birds, are sometimes based on sensory feelings, e.g., a sense for the magnetic field of the earth. But there are also many animals that use visually discernible markers in difficult and complex sites. These “markers” include not only things like colour and shape, but include as well fully individualized objects like a particular tree. Most mammals and many

19 As in most other situations of perception and cognition, there is no absolute certainty.

birds with (relatively) highly complex brains use the second method just mentioned. They are able to recognize individual objects and use them as landmarks.

We know from our own experience what happens when we become certain about the landmark. It is not merely an individual object surrounded by other individuals, but is also a guide for our further practice. When all is well, we know how we have to proceed. But if perception is uncertain, then we have only one strategy to overcome the difficulty. We have to deliberately engage in an explicit re-enactment of the perception by performing each step in a conscious exercise of will. We try to answer the question, "Can I find here exactly what I was waiting for, is it precisely the constellation that I bore in mind, is it exactly the same as what I expected?"

3. From Perception to Cognition

Usually perceptual type is amenable to certain possible differences in the way an object can appear to us. As long as I am able to interpret a particular object as the same object, that singular thing's type is successfully deployed in relation to its object. If the type in question is one for a general class of objects, any variation within that type that may emerge serves to individualize particular objects, and I can nevertheless see the latter as objects of the same kind. Not all trees look alike, of course. Yet they are alike at least in being trees, members of a class that admits degrees of similarity among its members. But there is a great difference between precisely this case and that of the type for a particular object. What can we do if there is persistent divergence of experience from our expectations?

Will we perhaps have to go a further step and look for some accidental or causal influence that can make the discrepancies comprehensible? Could it be that a characteristic branch of the tree has broken off due to wind? But then it would be laying here on the ground. Could it be that the leaves have all fallen from it because it is fall or winter? These sorts of questions framed in terms of causal influences often relieve us from our uncertainty.

Nevertheless, we should be more patient. If we skip to the level of causality we are treating problems of perception on the level of cognition, and this level is considerably higher than that of perception. It is nevertheless true that in everyday affairs we sometimes solve such problems of identification on the higher level of cognition. But before we begin to treat problems of perceptions with the means of cognition, there is a vivid process within the level of perception that is best described as a kind of struggle and competition on the level of typifying perception. A tree in autumn surrounded by fallen leaves is a quite typical situation for deciduous trees as well as the thick leaves in summer. Thus, to solve the difficulty of uncertain

perception we might also use a tool that is on the level of perception. In short, we can switch between a given type's alternative variants. All types have such variants due to circumstances. This has nothing to do with causality. It is rather our knowledge about the usual appearance of objects as it is incorporated into our types. And this is true not only for types for singular objects, but it is also true of more general types of objects, i.e., for groups of similar objects well known to us. There are "laws" for the familiar ways in which appearances change that hold for both kinds of types. Now we see how to solve the difficulties concerning appearances that deviate from expectation by the using the technique of switching out competing variants of a given type, e.g., the type for a tree in summer or a tree in winter. Importantly, this change of type in perception does not yet call for a deliberate striving for knowledge or an overcoming of uncertainties by the use of the idea of causality. Even if we ordinarily solve such uncertainties by shifting to cognition, the change of types is a more basic strategy that remains within the realm of perception. We have already learned that on the level of perception with the help of types there is a vivid competition between types that are aroused in the usual course of ordinary perception, and each of them strives for fulfillment- all the time. The quick change between variants of the same type is therefore by no means an exceptional case. Nevertheless there are some disappointments in perception that are not to be resolved with such a change in type. What shall we do if a characteristic trait of a particular object is missing, e.g., the branch of a tree is broken and has vanished? In cases like this, we realize that the task at hand exceeds the play of variants in the realm of typifying perception and instead ask for a causal explanation that exceeds perception and ventures into the realm of cognition. At this point we take a first step up to the level of cognition, which is closely related and motivated by problems of perception²⁰. Even the deliberate reenacting of the partial acts of perception, which are taken up into the process of cognition, are guided by the singular object's type, i.e. of all details we "know" about this special thing in advance. With the type "*causal change*" bearing on certain things, we know about the more or less probable changes this object may undergo. And if we are able to recognize this particular object with the help of causal change we perform a cognition that will henceforth guide our practice, we now know how to carry on. It is a wide-spread opinion that cognition can be identified with propositions, with judgments that can be true or false. This claim must be weakened if we take into consideration the result of the preceding analysis about the role of types in the process of overcoming uncertainties

20 Cf. the further discussion in Lohmar (2013), 147-167.

in perception. It has to be realized that cognition is already underway when we - in a moment of uncertainty and doubt - overcome this uncertainty by using a singular thing's type in a deliberate reenactment of this perception with a new *cognitive* interest. In this context, cognition is characterized by the mode of activity and interest in the performance of a complex reenactment guided by our pre-knowledge. Such cognition is further characterized emotionally and pragmatically by the release of our uncertainties and by the enabling of further practice, respectively. In relation to this, the form of a judgment is a subsequent development. We began our investigation with everyday varieties of habit and became attentive to the sort of habits that incorporate certain pre-forms of cognition, i.e., pre-knowledge by means of types. Types entail "knowledge" about objects, like trees, that takes shape in expectations about the concrete ways in which an object of that type can be given to us. With the help of this pre-knowledge, the type guides the constitution of objects in perception and - as we learned - also in recognizing these objects at the level of cognition. Thus, types turn out to be basic for our practical relation to the world, and they also enable us to grasp and manage the many changing properties of everyday things without using higher-level cognitive performances. We might therefore say about types what Hume once mentioned about associations: They are to us the "cement of the universe".

4. **Habit and Pre-forms of Knowledge in Hume** This last point sets us up for a first look at a possible connection with the philosophy of David Hume. Hume is not only well known as a skeptic, but also as an empiricist who offers brilliant analyses of the process of cognition. And in their systematic concern, his analyses are very near to Husserl's genetic-phenomenological concept of cognition. Hume highly esteems habit and contributes in particular the idea of there being different forms of habit in cognition. He calls habit the great guide of life, a claim that is related to the idea of our belief in the uniformity and constancy of the course of causal events in nature. This uniformity in the course of nature is one key presupposition for all of our judgments resting on experience: Similar causes will always have similar effects. The problem with this central conviction is that we cannot prove its truth. It is obviously not what Hume calls a *relation of ideas*, such that we would run into a contradiction if we were to deny it. We can think without contradiction, e.g., that the sun will not rise tomorrow. On the other hand, we cannot prove the truth of the uniformity thesis with the help of experience either, because in every judgment of experience we must already make use of this presupposition. So an attempt to prove uniformity

on experiential grounds would be circular. Nevertheless Hume was realistic enough to concede that, although it is not demonstrable, we are compelled to accept this presupposition if we want to survive at all. As Hume is unwilling to declare it to be a part of our *ratio* - like the rationalist of his time - he interprets it as a kind of *instinct*, an immutable habit or custom, and a *natural operation of the mind*.

The concept of habit he uses in this characterization is obviously not the everyday concept, because these everyday habits (of action, of expectation, of evaluation, etc.) are alterable in further experience. In view of the very foundational function of the idea of a uniform causality for the constitution of reality, and in the light of Hume's interpretation of this presupposition as a *natural operation of the mind*, we might better speak of this presupposition as a "grand-scale" habit.

But Hume also recognizes "small-scale" habits, namely the sort of habits that arise and are modified in a single person's experience, i.e., what he calls the "associations of ideas". Associations, too, have an exceptionally important function in obtaining cognitive acquisitions. It is by means of the association of ideas that our experiences with certain objects and events is retained (sedimented). This is a first apparent parallel of Hume's associations to Husserl's types. Concerning their relation to experience, two forms of association become more prominent: Associations of contiguity and causality. With a view to the problem of how to go from a stream of atomized impressions to the experience of unified things and connected events in our everyday world, associations are an empiricist's critical resource for gaining access to the nature of cognition. Associations are a means of recovering the missing connections among sensory givens. Therefore, associations can be regarded for us, in agreement with Hume, as *the cement of the universe*. They make possible the accretion of unordered and unconnected impressions, presenting unified objects and reliable connections of events that make sense for us. As the Latin verb for "growing together" (*concrecere*) indicates, and as we can also see in the relation of our own words "cement" and "concrete" associations serve as that which enables the elements of our universe of sensibility, perception and knowledge grow together. Hume's analysis of cognition draws out attention to four elements or phases in the process of cognition. We begin with an intuitively given object like smoke. Then we realize that we have a habit of connecting this idea with another idea, say fire. Using the *natural operation of the mind* incorporated in the presupposition of a uniformity of nature, we then arrive at a belief in the existence of fire at this place. What we realize in the overview of the process is that such mutable associations of ideas are already a preform of cognition. This is yet another point of contact with Husserl's types.

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A PHENOMENOLOGY OF AUTOMATISM. HABIT AND SITUATIONAL TYPIFICATION IN HUSSERL

abstract

This paper tries to document Husserl's reflections on the problem of "situations" in his later manuscripts of the 1930s. These reflections are centered on the phenomenon of "typification", which plays an important part in Husserl's genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts by sketching out a general presentation of "typification" in its relation to expectation and habit. By defining situation as "the intentional living unity of horizontal context and subjective potentiality", the paper then tries to follow Husserl's exposition of three essential aspects of situational typification: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) normality and c.) periodicity.

keywords

Situation, typification, habit, genetic phenomenology, normality

In several of his early Freiburg lectures, Martin Heidegger analysed the concept of “situation” as a basic structure of factual life, claiming that: “The problem of situation was until now never actually posed in philosophical literature without being objectified.”¹ His critique, primarily aimed at Karl Jaspers’ *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, also touched upon his own treatment of the issue in one of his very first lectures, as it ran the risk – in Heidegger’s own opinion – of regarding situations merely as a “spatio-temporal order” to be charted in light of a “typology of situations” (*Typik der Situationen*). Obviously influenced by Heidegger’s early lectures, Günther Anders defended his dissertation in 1923 with Husserl under the title: *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den “Logischen Sätzen”*. The dissertation was, as Anders recalls, driven by the intention to criticize Husserl from a Heideggerian perspective, by focusing on a concept that was ostensibly lacking in Husserlian phenomenology, namely, “situation”. The following paper tries to give a detailed account of Husserl’s attempts to catch up with this phenomenon in his later work of the 1930s. The reference to Heidegger and Anders proves relevant not so much because Husserl might have been directly inspired by them in his treatment of the subject matter, but especially because his analyses focus exactly on the question of “typification”. I will start by offering a general presentation of “typification” in its relation to expectation and habit (1.), then I will try to work out a more comprehensive concept of “situation” based on several of Husserl’s writings (2.), after which I will follow Husserl’s exposition of various aspects of situational typification (3.).

1. Type, Expectation and Habit

“A cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pregiven for the very first time, as some completely undetermined substrates.”² According to this abrupt statement in Husserl’s *Experience and Judgment*, nothing we encounter in our experience actually presents itself as completely novel, given in an absolute first impression. On the contrary, even if the object is entirely unfamiliar as such, it is always still perceived as *something*, as an individual object, e.g., as a living being or as a strange piece of machinery. It is always experienced in the light of some pre-cognition, while it is precisely this aspect that

1 Heidegger (1993), p. 258 (my translation).

2 Husserl (1999), p. 26 (English translation: p. 31).

Husserl most often addresses with his concept of “typification”. In Husserl’s view, “typification” thus designates the epistemic process by which the acquisitions from prior experience determine our ongoing encounter with things: “With each new kind of object constituted for the first time (genetically speaking), a new type of object is permanently prescribed, in terms of which other objects similar to it will be apprehended in advance.”³ On several occasions, “types” are defined by Husserl as empirical generalities⁴. Also termed as „morphological essences“, such generalities are – already in the *Ideas I* – contrasted to the “ideal essences” of mathematics, stemming from a quite different process of ideation⁵. According to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, these empirical generalities are fully constituted – as general conceptual cores – only by means of an active performance of judgment⁶, and it is of course only at this superior level of conceptual expression that we actually recognize, for example, a dog as a “dog”, a phone as a “phone,” and a toy as a “toy”. However, this intellectual performance is itself, as Husserl shows, primarily grounded in a layer of passive, experiential *pre-constitution*. To be more precise, types as empirical concepts require as their foundation individual objects encountered in perceptive experience with *typical characters of acquaintance or familiarity*⁷, while in Husserl’s notations these characters are themselves also often referred to as “types”. Thus, we can generally distinguish between a *predicative* and a *pre-predicative* acceptance of “types”, while our following reflections will focus mostly on the latter.

When considered in this primary, experiential acceptance, types are above all a *phenomenon of expectation*. To be typically acquainted with an object thus actually means to anticipate it according to an earlier experience. Therefore, it is precisely in the course of a genetic theory of expectation that Husserl comes to elaborate on the problem of types in his famous lectures on “passive synthesis”⁸. Certainly, in Husserl’s view expectations are not related to future events alone, as they can also refer to aspects of present objects not yet fully given in experience or even to aspects of the past⁹. For instance, when we approach an unknown crossroad, we only see a part of our path ahead, while we do not yet know in detail how the rest will be. However, this unseen part of our path is, as Husserl stresses, anticipated

3 Husserl (1999), p. 35 (English translation: p. 38). For Husserl’s concept of type, see also Lohmar (2003).

4 See Husserl (1999), § 81.

5 Husserl (1976)², p. 155 (English translation: p. 166).

6 Husserl (1999), p. 382 (English translation: p. 386).

7 Husserl (1999), p. 382 (English translation: p. 386).

8 Husserl (1966), pp. 184–191 (English translation: pp. 235–242).

9 Husserl (1966), p. 185 (English translation: p. 235).

in a “typical” fashion: we generally expect there to be houses, roads, cars, people, etc. This “generality” – that motivates Husserl to regard such expectational characteristics of typical acquaintance as “preliminary forms of concepts” – is itself by no means yet of a conceptual nature, as it merely indicates the vagueness of such expectations, i.e., the fact that they can be intuitively individualized with equal justification in manifold variants¹⁰. It is precisely this aspect that Husserl indicates when defining experiential types as open “ranges of manifold possibilities”¹¹. Concepts are in Husserl’s view essentially rooted in the vagueness of our expectations.

On several occasions, Husserl formulates the *a priori* law governing the formation of expectations as follows: “Something similar recalls something else that is similar, but it also allows something similar to be expected in coexistence as in succession.”¹² Due to this “apperceptive transfer,”¹³ every object of our present experience simultaneously 1) recalls similar past experiences and 2) is itself anticipated in analogy with them. This double movement of evocation and anticipation, characterizing our typified experience of objects, is determined by Husserl as an “assimilating apperception”¹⁴ (*assimilierende Apperzeption*). And it is indeed a process of typical assimilation that accounts for the fact that, as Husserl expresses it, “the future always leads us back to the past”¹⁵, since all expectations necessarily echo implicit horizons of recollection. Often enough, Husserl considers this process of passive assimilation to be the most original, experiential form of “induction”¹⁶, while it is precisely at this point in the lectures on passive synthesis that he also establishes an essential connection between typification and habit. For, if the concept of “typification” primarily refers to the inductive anticipations that continuously arise within our ongoing experience determining our recognition of all encountered objects and persons, than these expectations can themselves obviously become gradually stronger or weaker depending on how often they are confirmed or disconfirmed by experience: “the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of ‘instances’ – or with habit [*Gewohnheit*], which amounts to the same thing.”¹⁷ Thus, the problem of typification is generally to be regarded as an integral part of

10 Husserl (1999), pp. 31–32 (English translation: pp. 35–36).

11 Husserl (1966), p. 41 (English translation: p. 79).

12 Husserl (1966), p. 185 (English translation: p. 235).

13 See for instance Husserl (2008), p. 431.

14 Husserl (2008), p. 436.

15 Husserl (2006), p. 285, (my translation).

16 Husserl (1999), p. 28 (English translation: p. 33).

17 Husserl (1966), p. 190 (English translation: p. 240). For a more detailed and contextual reading of Husserl’s conception of habit, see also Moran (2011).

Husserl's theory of habituality: types are the correlates of epistemic habits.

2.
What is a
Situation?

Surely, according to Husserl's use of the term "typification", these observations should apply not only to individual substrates of experience, but also to "situations". But what exactly is a "situation"? In a notation from 1931 – first published under the title "*Die Welt der lebendigen Gegenwart und die Konstitution der ausserleiblichen Umwelt*" – Husserl discusses situations beforehand as *configurations*. The latter are, in short, examples of complex intentional pluralities. Such pluralities were already touched upon in the *Ideas I* as products of an active "articulated" or "polythetic" synthesis, which – as Husserl discovered – was not specific to the sphere of judgement alone, but could also be found in the lower spheres of perceptive, emotional or practical experience¹⁸. Moreover, as Husserl shows in his later genetic work, synthetic articulations already occur in the sphere of passivity, for instance in the primary constitution of the sensuous fields out of which individual objects later on emerge¹⁹. Defined as "configurations of sensual data", these fields are initially produced by means of an "associative genesis" following the similarities (homogeneities) and dissimilarities (heterogeneities) of sensuous affectation. However, in Husserl's view, configurations are not constituted passively on the ground of affective pairing and contrast alone. On the contrary, in the lectures courses on "passive synthesis", their constitution is also linked to the question of assimilative apperceptions and expectations. Thus, the nexus that binds together the terms of a configuration, Husserl here claims, "is not merely a nexus with respect to content [...] but rather apart from affective motivation, which governs selectively in the configuration. (Various figures could have been formed out of the chaos, and could still be formed, but the path of awakening that was privileged favored the path of special unifications of a lower and higher level up to the entire configuration in question.)"²⁰ In Husserl's view, every configuration that was once constituted in our earlier experience motivates us in our ongoing experience to apperceive similar configurations:

If a plurality of data emerge in the same present as it continues to develop, data that can go together with the configuration in question, then the entire configurations in question will be awakened by the awakening that reaches back and that issues from the particularities. And these configurations radiating ahead in a protential-

¹⁸ Husserl (1976)², § 118.

¹⁹ Husserl (1999), §16.

²⁰ Husserl (1966), p. 191 (English translation: p. 241).

expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored once more as fulfillment. In this way, the anticipation is at work ‘apperceptively,’ it is co-productive in the configuration of the coexisting objects.²¹

These observations could also be applied to situations which Husserl often addresses as typically repeatable configurative phenomena. However, it is important to notice here that, when generally speaking about the apperceptive recognition of configurations in his *Analyses concerning passive syntheses*, Husserl is referring solely to individual “self-contained configurations given to consciousness”²² – that is: to mere particular sets of objects or data grouped within a wider frame of consciousness – whereas the situation is not an individual configuration among others but a “*Gesamtconfiguration*”²³, a totality-configuration encompassing the ensemble of a subject’s lived circumstances in a given moment. This totality is often also termed by Husserl as “the living present”. “Each present is a situation”, he claims in his aforementioned notation from 1931, adding just a few lines further down: “all that is experienced together as coexisting in the unity of a living present has as its unity the situation”²⁴. Certainly, such a unity is, as several thinkers have pointed out²⁵, not really “self-contained” (except perhaps in hindsight, when the formerly lived situation is narrated to others as an anecdote), but necessarily elusive and open. Moreover, by generally defining the situation as a “configuration”, Husserl also seems to neglect an important aspect of situations that he himself stumbles upon in a marginal note to his lectures on passive synthesis, i.e., our own freedom of action. In his brief note, Husserl draws attention to the fact that, when analysing the constitution of the “living present”, one should not forget the correlation between a subject’s momentary field of consciousness and his kinesthetic possibilities of movement²⁶. This idea is expanded upon in a brief addendum to the lecture, introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proper “*expectations*” (here defined as the line of prefigurations that follows the trajectory of the subject’s actual kinesthetic movements) and mere “*potential expectations*” (conceived as simple associative intentions that would

21 Husserl (1966), p. 190 (English translation: pp. 240-241).

22 Husserl (1966), p. 187 (English translation: pp. 237-238).

23 Husserl (1946), p. 336.

24 Husserl (1946), p. 334, (my translation).

25 See, for instance, Jaspers (1932), pp. 202-203.

26 Husserl (1966), p. 185, n. 1 (English translation: p. 236, n. 1).

become proper expectations if the subject would assume the corresponding kinesthetic trajectory).²⁷ Thus, if one really wants to discuss situations as apperceptive unities of typification, it is by no means sufficient to regard them merely as configurative totalities of circumstances, but – by focusing on the essential connection between apperceptive expectations and subjective potentialities – one has to correlatively address them as totalities of potentiality. On several occasions, Husserl touches upon these intuitions in his various writings on kinaesthesia, starting from the lecture course of the summer semester 1907, *Thing and Space*. Most often here, he uses the concept of “kinesthetic situation” to designate the totality of a subject’s momentary possibilities of bodily movement. In this sense, the term “situation” is employed mostly – as becomes apparent in one of the supplements to his 1907 lectures – to designate the practically charged noetic correlate to the noematic “orientation” of objects.²⁸ In the *Crisis*-work, however, Husserl uses the term “situation”, while discussing the phenomenon of kinaesthesia, alternatively, to designate both the noetic system of our kinesthetic possibilities (that is: the “kinaesthetic situation”²⁹) and their corresponding noematic configurations of circumstances (the “situation of appearances” [*Erscheinungssituation*]³⁰, as he terms it). This ambivalence is telling. For, if we consider that, 1) already in his earliest notations on kinaesthesia, Husserl repeatedly draws attention to the “apperceptive unity” (*Auffassungseinheit*) binding together our possibilities of movement, on the one hand, and the corresponding configurations of phenomenal circumstances, on the other³¹, and 2) if we also consider that – while situations are indeed, as “totality-configurations”, products of apperceptive expectations – expectations themselves are, as Husserl shows, functions of our free possibilities of movement and action, then 3) we can legitimately identify precisely in this “apperceptive unity” the key to a more accurate and complete phenomenological concept of “situation”. *A situation would be in this sense the intentional living unity of horizational context and subjective potentiality.* Significantly, this acceptance of the term would not only correspond perfectly to the classical concept of “situation”, as developed later on in “existentialist” and hermeneutic philosophy (by Jaspers, Heidegger, or Sartre), where it is regarded as a unity of subjective and objective elements, but it could actually help give this (often quite vague) concept a more

27 Husserl (1966), pp. 428–429 (English translation: pp. 534–536). Thus, we have actual expectations concerning the content of our mailbox when we reach out to open it, while we have mere potential expectations when we pass it with no intention of looking inside.

28 Husserl (1973)¹, p. 299.

29 Husserl (1976)¹, p. 108.

30 Husserl (1976)¹, p. 109.

31 Cf. Husserl (1973)¹, p. 187 et. al.

precise interpretation. “The situation,” Sartre writes in a famous passage of *Being and Nothingness*, “is the common product of the contingency of the in-itself and of freedom”³². Husserl himself reaches a similar concept of situation in several of his notations of the 1930s, by explicitly conceiving it as the concrete lived “horizon of the practical agent”³³, wherein meaningful circumstances and momentary possibilities of action are concatenated.

3. The Typifications of Praxis and Situational Typification

Now, certainly, there is nothing bewildering in saying that, in our normal practical experience, we encounter typically similar constellations of circumstances, such as the supermarket, the elevator, the postal office, the airport, the hospital, etc. However, if one defines “situations” as functional concatenations of noematic circumstances and noetic potentialities, the idea of a “typification of situations” might appear somewhat more problematic. To this extent, it is crucial to point out that, indeed, in Husserl’s view, the process of typification does not refer solely to objects and configurations, but in a similar fashion also to practical interests, actions and possibilities. In fact, the very genesis of “practical possibilities” – a term Husserl uses to designate the subjective phenomena of the “I can” – is grounded in such a process³⁴. For – as Husserl shows with regard to kinaesthesia, the most elementary potentiality of bodily movement – such possibilities are from the onset formed as acquisitions from prior experience. Every infant has to “learn” not only how to walk, but also how to move his head, hands and eyes, movements that gradually become his “practical possibilities”. In several notations of the 1930s, Husserl discusses the formation of such possibilities by showing how they emerge from a prior stage of merely instinctive, uncoordinated movement. In this context, concepts like “instinct” and “drive” designate a yearning “that still lacks the representation of its target”³⁵, while it is precisely through their crystallisation as practical possibilities that such movements become controllable as actual targets of the subject’s will. Husserl describes this process in more detail by referring to the example of a baby learning to nurse: while the scent of his mother’s breast elicits an “originally adapted kinaesthesia”³⁶, his instinctive movements gradually come to acquire – once they are periodically repeated – “the unity of an oriented intention”³⁷. Husserl offers similar

32 Sartre (1992), p. 488.

33 Husserl (2008), p. 543.

34 With regard to Husserl’s concept of “practical possibilities” see also: Mohanty (1984), Aguirre (1991) and Ferencz-Flatz (2012).

35 Husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).

36 Husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).

37 Husserl (2006), p. 327, (my translation).

reflections in relation to feet-kicking (*Strampel-Kinästhesen*)³⁸. In Husserl's writings, this entire development is often regarded in perfect *analogy* to the apperceptive typification of objects. For, if epistemic apperceptions are generally conditioned by the repeated encounter of similar objects, practical possibilities are themselves similarly conditioned by the repeated execution of actions and movements. Husserl terms the latter "exercise" (*Übung*), explicitly considering it to be a practical equivalent of association³⁹. Of course, similar processes of practical association also lead to the formation of more complex practical possibilities, while Husserl himself often stresses their contribution to the articulation of kinaesthetic *systems*: "Here, one thinks of the remarkable associations, due to which kinaestheses are 'associated' not as mere immanent data, but as practical potentialities ('I can turn this or that way'), building a practical system."⁴⁰

Processes of typification, on the other hand, do not affect a subject's practical experience only by shaping the possibilities of his free activity out of the "primary passivity" of his instinctive drive responses. On the contrary, they also determine the manner in which this free activity itself constantly lapses back into a corresponding "secondary passivity"⁴¹. The repeated performance of an action, which Husserl calls "exercise", proves central in this respect as well, since, by being repeated as such, an action becomes more than a possible target of free will – it also and necessarily becomes an object of habit, allowing for its merely automatic execution: "Generally, the transformations which occur in the case of repeated actions in relation to repeated goals are the work of exercise and habit. Traditionalising is after all nothing other than a transforming of the originally explicit orientation towards a goal into an implicit one, and of the implicit one into a forgetfulness of the goal."⁴² As is well known, the problem of "habit" was already in Aristotle's view considered indispensable for the understanding of human action. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claimed that the manner in which a subject acts simultaneously determines his habit to act in that precise manner⁴³, while this habitual side of action was also supposed to account for his ethical behavior in dreams⁴⁴. Similarly, in the second book of his *Ideas*, Husserl claims – while generally designating free acts as "position takings" – that "with each position-taking, there develop

38 Husserl (2006), p. 327.

39 See Husserl (1952), p. 330 (English translation: p. 342); Husserl (2006), p. 328; Husserl (2008), p. 358.

40 Husserl (2008), p. 12.

41 See for this distinction Husserl (1999), § 67 b.

42 Husserl (2008), p. 890, note to p. 527, (my translation).

43 Aristotle (2009), 1103a-1104b.

44 Aristotle (2009), 1102b.

‘tendencies’ to take up the same position under similar circumstances”.⁴⁵ This statement does not refer, as one might think, exclusively to the sphere of judgments, assessing given objects in the light of earlier experiences, but also to practical and emotional acts, as Husserl explicitly speaks of “habits of feeling, desire and will”, especially insisting on the phenomenon of habitual behavior⁴⁶. In Husserl’s view, habitual action is not merely, as according to Aristotle, an action that conforms to the habitual dispositions of the practical agent, but primarily an action that tends to become unfree and “mechanical” by no longer requiring his conscious attention⁴⁷. To designate this specific type of action, Husserl was later on to coin the idea of an “action prior to attention” (*Tun vor der Zuwendung*)⁴⁸, that responds to impulses automatically, in reflex without paying any attention to them. Without yet using this term, Husserl already describes the very same phenomenon on several accounts in his *Ideas II* – in explicit reference to the reflex gesture of lighting a cigarette – by speaking of an “associative” or “reproductive” tendency of action⁴⁹.

Now, while Husserl’s earlier considerations thus regard the habitual typifications of praxis exclusively with regard to the *noetic* possibilities and tendencies of the practical agent, a long series of notations from the 1930s attempts to engage similar reflections by approaching the subject matter from the onset in the broader correlative perspective of a *typification of practical situations*. In the following, I will simply try to map out these considerations by following three key issues which seem to structure these efforts: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) normality and c.) periodicity.

3.a. The Habituality of Interest

If Husserl generally defines “interest” as the practical noetic engagement of the I⁵⁰, his later notations most often tend to approach this phenomenon by regarding practical interests in their correlation to the world as they noematically apprehend it. This correlation is from the onset considered in the perspective of a typical repetition of situations: “Situations repeat themselves as similar, while to the habituality of interests there corresponds the world passively apperceived as structured in significance.”⁵¹ To this extent, Husserl often distinguishes between the particular, momentary

45 Husserl (1952), p. 280 (English translation: p. 293).

46 See Husserl (1952), p. 256 and 277 (English translation: p. 269 and 289).

47 As an excellent illustration of how habitual action is generally performed one can think of the manner in which we normally run through a well-familiar path without paying any conscious attention to our surroundings.

48 Husserl (1999), p. 91 (English translation: p. 85).

49 Husserl (1952), p. 338 (English translation: p. 350).

50 Husserl (2008), p. 589.

51 Husserl (1973)², p. 55, (my translation).

interests of the subject and his universal, habitual interest horizons, illustrating this distinction on the example of professional interest:

During the actual work-life of the businessman ('in the company'), his particular business-interest is momentarily actual, while throughout his momentary interests we constantly find the unity of his "professional interest". The momentarily actual interest designates, in its relation to the grounding world of praxis, the *situation*; this applies for every waking man understood in his own situation, for the clerk in his office, for the member of Parliament in his parliamentary business, for the housewife in her business as a housewife, say on the market in a market-situation.⁵²

According to Husserl, the subject's momentary, particular constellation of interests is constantly determined by his enduring life-interests, be they directed, as in the earlier examples, towards one's profession, or on the contrary, towards one's family, nation and so on. In Husserl's view, interests of this sort are necessarily manifold, thus constituting the different layers of the subject's personality, while to each one of his habitual sphere of interest there corresponds a variety of *goals* (i.e. explicitly shaped out and willfully pursued "practical possibilities"), "more or less completely organised in the unity of one goal"⁵³. Certainly, this latter thesis might be somewhat problematic, but in the view of the present paper it is less important to see whether or not the subject's goals are indeed organized in a coherent fashion, as it is to notice that, according to Husserl's conception, goals are as such generally conditioned by a situation that guarantees their motivational basis: "Goals are goals only with respect to a motivating situation in which they have their apodictic validity."⁵⁴

Moreover, in Husserl's view, goals and interests always have corresponding noematic apperceptions of the world as their necessary correlate object. To this extent, Husserl often distinguishes between the scientific ascertainment of an object "once and for all" and its practical ascertainment, "serving only the purpose of transitory practical goals, in the perspective of a certain situation or a multiplicity of typically similar situations"⁵⁵. Husserl illustrates this by discussing the utility of a tool – apprehended as useful in anticipation of a recurring situation in which it comes handy – but the same also applies for any value-determination in

52 Husserl (1973)², p. 415, (my translation).

53 Husserl (1973)², p. 415, (my translation).

54 Husserl (2008), p. 774, (my translation).

55 Husserl (1999), p. 65.

general: “every ascertainment of values and practical characters of things is relative to the situation in which they are valuable and of practical use.”⁵⁶ Ascertainments of this sort – say, of a joke being funny – are for sure not universally valid like theoretical determinations, but they still transcend the sheer individual moment by referring to a typically repeatable situation of their possible verification. A similar observation is made with respect to significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*): “Characters of significance are habitual apperceptive characters pertaining to objects; they are apperceived enduringly as characters ascertained solely in a certain known context of interest and in corresponding situations, when they manifest this precise practical configuration”.⁵⁷ As the practical agent is thus engaged in his particular practical situation, his surrounding world is noematically apprehended by him, according to Husserl, as a typically prefigured and articulated ensemble of significance, with its different layers of situational circumstances corresponding to his manifold spheres of goals, interests and possibilities. From this perspective, the concrete structure of a practical situation is, in Husserl’s view, essentially determined by “relevance”: “When we speak about the changing circumstances of action and the ‘interests’ functioning within them (in the situations of the practical agent), we think of the agent in his experientially [...] given surrounding world, in which what is practically relevant for his intention is distinctly emphasized.”⁵⁸ This distinction – between what is relevant and what is irrelevant in a certain practical situation – represents an indispensable condition for any conscious human action and reaction within it, while it is precisely because, according to Husserl, such a distinction is essentially grounded on the typical recognition of the respective situation as, e.g., a “market-situation”, an “office situation” and so on, that the question of situational typifications proves central for a phenomenology of action as such. Practical possibilities and typically recognizable situations are co-constitutive phenomena.

3.b. Normality

As is well known, the concept of “normality” is initially used by Husserl in relation to what he terms as “psycho-physical conditionalities”⁵⁹: the conditional correlation between the physiological state of the subject’s body and the constitution of his perceived objects. In this context, Husserl contrasts the case of “ortho-aesthetic” (normal) perception, wherein the subject’s sense organs function concordantly, with the case of an

56 Husserl (1999), p. 65.

57 Husserl (1973)², p. 55, n. 2, (my translation);

58 Husserl (2008), p. 201, (my translation).

59 Husserl (1952), p. 62 (English translation: p. 67). For a more detailed account of Husserl’s concept of normality, see also Gyllenhammer (2009) and Taipale (2012).

abnormally functioning organ. Later on, this model of synaesthetic collaboration also serves Husserl as a paradigm for understanding the more complex processes of intersubjective experiential cooperation, leading to a wider use of the term “normality”. Following this implicit analogy between the synaesthetic and the intersubjective concordance and discordance of experience⁶⁰, Husserl often illustrates the question of normality and anomaly by addressing the intersubjective status of sheer sensory dysfunctions like colourblindness. Thus, he claims that “normality” primarily refers to an “optimal” standard of intersubjective experience and not to the mere contingencies of a statistical majority⁶¹. However, several of his later writings come to challenge this clear cut conception of “normality”, sketching out a more historically relative interpretation. Thus, in a notations from 1931, Husserl explicitly defines normality as “averageness” (*Durchschnittlichkeit*)⁶², while in another text he regards it as a voluntarily assumed “norm”: “Man in his normal existence doesn’t merely behave typically similar under typically similar conditions, like a mere thing apprehended in its empirical, inductive facticity; man lives under a norm, by becoming conscious of that norm. The normal lifestyle as a style of social life is not merely a fact for him, but something that ought to be”⁶³. This normative character of a “normal lifestyle” is, for sure, not grounded in an actual, rationally motivated choice or preference. Husserl himself explicitly refers it, in another note, to *tradition* and *habituality*⁶⁴, regarding normality in this sense as a correlative concept that comprises both the noetic customs regulating the personal life of the subject as well as the noematic customary determinations of his lived world.⁶⁵ Moreover, by interpreting tradition in general as a “socialized practical habit”⁶⁶, Husserl actually comes to claim that all habits hold as such a “secondary normativity”⁶⁷, since they are not experienced by the subject as plain facts, but on the contrary as actual commitments of the will, even if they are assumed by him only in a passive and unconscious manner. Habits are mandatory, and the “secondary

60 Husserl explicitly addresses this analogy in a notation from 1921, published as *Beilage LI*, under the title „Solitäre und intersubjektive Normalität“ in Husserl (2008), p. 649. The same analogy is also central for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of “intercorporeality”; see for instance Merleau-Ponty (1960), pp. 258-275.

61 Husserl (2008), p. 658.

62 Husserl (1973)², p. 231.

63 Husserl (1973)², pp. 143-144, (my translation).

64 Husserl (1973)², p. 143.

65 Husserl (1973)², p. 144.

66 Husserl (2008), p. 527.

67 “To every habit there pertains a secondary form of normativity [*Sekundärform des Sollens*], so that deviations from it are experienced from the onset as something that ‘ought not be’”. Husserl (2008), p. 527.

normativity” of normality is precisely the secondary passivity of a practical preference in an intersubjective, generative context.

It is precisely this latter acceptance of “normality” that also reoccurs in several of Husserl’s later manuscripts that attempt to address the “typification of situations” in the perspective of intersubjectivity. For indeed, according to Husserl, individual concrete situations are from the onset linked intersubjectively: “All situations stand in an intersubjective nexus, that implies an intersubjective simultaneity and succession, a concrete intersubjective time, understood as a form comprising everything as it is intersubjectively interlaced or better even: interfused.”⁶⁸ Already in his *Ideas II*, Husserl regarded the understanding of others basically as an understanding of their situation⁶⁹, conceiving the latter primarily as the horizon of their determinant motivations. Later notations, from the 1920s and 30s, shift the main point of interest from the empathic givenness of the other’s motivations to the typical similarities between one’s own and the other’s situation. In Husserl’s view, it is precisely this mutual correspondence between our individual situations that generally allows us to access the situation of others and to be grasped in our own by them, thus grounding a specific sense of *social normality*. In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, he explicitly considers that “the single subject’s and the community’s entire daily life” is related “to a typical specific likeness among situations [...], such that any normal human being who enters a particular situation has, by the very fact of being normal, the *situational horizons* belonging to it and common to all.”⁷⁰ Therefore, by being apprehended according to a *shared typology*, all normal individual situations are from the onset open to mutual understanding, even if this understanding can become factually problematic. Although Husserl terminologically distinguishes between “private” situations, pertaining to the individual alone, and “common”, social situations, in which “the situations of the participants are synthetically unified”⁷¹, he also illustrates their necessary linkage by again evoking the example of clerks in a company. For, indeed, the individual situations of such employees are, in their own perspective, enclosed in the broader situation of the company itself, while all individual situations finally share as their overarching common horizon the world regarded as the ultimate reference of their intersubjective connection: “The enduring style in which this world exists and its very being itself are actual only in the form of a temporality, in which socialized human subjects live alongside

68 Husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).

69 Husserl (1952), p. 275.

70 Husserl (1974), p. 207 (English translation: p. 199).

71 Husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation).

one another and with one another in situations, each in his own momentary situation as well as in the universal horizon of his life situation” – that is: the world.⁷² Following such assumptions, Husserl sees it as a chief task of phenomenology to explicate “the universal structure of this lifeworld as an invariant form for all”, “as an enduring unity that comprises all situations”⁷³, while the lifeworld is conceived in this context as “the world of normal citizens” [*bürgerliche Normalwelt*]. Within its scope, every other citizen is as such typically predetermined for me:

If I as a citizen [*als bürgerliches Ich*] analyse this situation of mine, it proves to be that of a citizen placed in the unity of a surrounding civil world. Thus the world has this sense as a horizon for me as it does for anyone else pertaining to it as a co-citizen, be it that he is given to me horizontally as someone familiar (my friend, my business partner, my faculty colleague etc.), if I know him individually, or else merely as part of the vast and open horizon of unknown co-citizens. The latter have their own predelineated personal sense of being, belonging just as well, in their own way, to this civil world of mine.⁷⁴

Such normality surely also implies a corresponding typical anomaly, and it is perhaps at this point that Husserl’s reflections become most problematic:

In my normal civil life there is emphasis on a certain style of normal civil life, belonging especially to my class, my profession, as this stands out among other professions of civil life, sharing, in the manner of a different horizon, the same common lifeworld, as one and the same world that is only given in a different mode. This again leads to different types of situations. At their outskirts there is the abnormal, the vagabonds, the rascals and so on, understood as personal types that place themselves outside the normal world.⁷⁵

3.c. Periodicity

In several of his notes from the 1930s, Husserl relates the specific time flow of situational life to the manner in which our dominant practical interests succeed each other and interfere with one another⁷⁶. Most frequently, such considerations are illustrated by following the alternation between the

⁷² Husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).

⁷³ Husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation).

⁷⁴ Husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).

⁷⁵ Husserl (2008), p. 198, (my translation).

⁷⁶ Husserl (1973)², p. 174.

professional interest that dominates our “work hours” and other interests – of play, leisure, or spontaneous curiosity – that interrupt and complete it⁷⁷. This alternation is from the onset characterized by a certain typical *periodicity*, a concept that becomes central in several of Husserl’s later, genetic considerations. According to these reflections, the periodicity of practical interests is, on the one hand, linked to the natural periodicities of the surrounding world (the alternation of night and day, of seasons in a year) as it is, on the other hand, primarily rooted in the biological periodicities of instinct. In the periodical succession of sleep and waking, for instance, both aspects – drive and a natural cycle – are obviously intertwined. However, in Husserl’s view, an instinctive drive like hunger doesn’t simply reoccur periodically, but it is also consciously apprehended by the subject in its periodical, typical repetition. By this, the drive itself is modified, remaining horizonally open for further reoccurrences with each of its momentary fulfillments and thus it helps constitute a broader practical horizon of the will: a “synthetic unity of need”⁷⁸. In Husserl’s view, this elementary periodicity of instincts actually represents “the necessary starting point for understanding all goal-orientation of human life”⁷⁹, and it is in such primary horizons of periodical repeatability that the very possibility of “foresight” – that is: of deliberate action and conscious planning – is generally rooted⁸⁰. This very conception of periodicity also becomes central in Husserl’s reflections on the typification of situations. For situations are indeed, above all, finite temporal sequences, subjected to complex processes of time-organisation. This aspect is explicitly sketched out in a manuscript from 1932, addressing situations from the onset in terms of their “normal” typical repeatability. Situations are, as Husserl claims, essentially apprehended as parts of normal, typically repeatable successions of situations, that is, of predictable sequential arrangements. He illustrates this in a striking description of daily *routine*: “I have just woken up, and the day, my day, is already present in front of me, without me having to represent it intuitively as such; the succession of its normal, usual, particular situations already occurs to me in the flow of their being actualized as such: bathing, getting clothed, breakfast, morning work in the office or in the shop, lunch break, afternoon work, evening leisure.”⁸¹ Thus, any normal concrete situation is as such horizonally integrated in a vaster temporal sequence that

77 See Husserl (2008), p. 307.

78 Husserl (2008), p. 581, (my translation).

79 Husserl (2008), p. 583, (my translation).

80 Husserl (2008), p. 585.

81 Husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).

predetermines it from the start: “Instead, the particular situation, for instance the situation of a particular morning of the week, already implies, with its mere apprehension as a morning situation, its precise sense as an introduction for the following: the work in the office with its familiar and articulated style, as well as the entire following flow of situations that normally constitute a day of the week.”⁸² Moreover, this entire sequence of situations is itself anticipated as belonging to an even wider timeframe, namely, the overall periodicity of world-time: “But moreover, according to its horizontal sense, the day of the week belongs to the overall order of the days of the week. Therefore, each week already implies, with its end of the week, the following Sunday, as well as the entire periodicity of weeks in a year, etc.”⁸³ Thus, according to Husserl, overarching periodical rhythms of succession constantly define and anticipate our ongoing normal situation in its concrete deployment as such. In this perspective, our practical future proves to be from the onset mapped out not only by our active planning and scheduling, but before all by *passive processes of routine formation* that automatically chart out all our practical intentions. And it is precisely these habit driven situational routines – as specific phenomena of a “typification of situations” – that offer, in Husserl’s view, the necessary experiential background for free, deliberate action and foresight.

4. Situational Automatism

For sure, the concept “situation” is most commonly associated with so-called “existentialist” philosophy, i.e. with the writings of Jaspers, Heidegger or Sartre, who emphatically relate it to the *question of freedom*. According to Sartre, for instance, the situation is “the contingency of freedom in the plenum of being of the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not to constrain freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as already illuminated by the end which freedom chooses.”⁸⁴ Similarly, Heidegger emphasizes, in *Being and Time*, the fact that a “situation” only persists as such for a subject that is capable of assuming the autonomous state of “resoluteness”⁸⁵. In this context, both Sartre and Heidegger tend to regard the situation as a primary limitation for freedom, in relation to which freedom is always bound to assert itself. As such, it delivers the very material out of which freedom can concretely shape its choices. Thus, Sartre claims: “empirically we can be free only in relation to a state of things and in spite of this state of things. I will be said to be free in relation to this state of things when it does not constrain me. Thus the empirical and practical concept of

82 Husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).

83 Husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).

84 Sartre (1992), p. 487.

85 Heidegger (1967), p. 300 (English translation: p. 276).

freedom is wholly negative; it issues from the consideration of a situation and establishes that this situation leaves me free to pursue this or that end. One might say even that this situation conditions my freedom in this sense, that the situation *is* there *in order not* to constrain me.”⁸⁶ Similarly, by conceiving the Dasein as a “thrown projection”, Heidegger explicitly regards the situation as an element of determinant facticity, that freedom has to take on: “When Da-sein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, as free for death it understands itself in its own *higher power*, the power of its finite freedom, and takes over the *powerlessness* of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, which always only *is* in having chosen the choice, and becomes clear about the chance elements in the situation disclosed.”⁸⁷

Husserl’s own considerations tend to focus on a quite different aspect of the phenomenon, namely: the inherent unfreedom of freedom itself, as it becomes manifest in the flow of practical situations. No doubt, the specifics of this perspective are already visible in the conception of freedom put forth in his *Ideas II*. For, in spite of Husserl’s recurrent attempts here to establish a clear cut distinction between the free acts of the subject, on the one hand, also termed “*cogitationes*”⁸⁸, and his unfree dimensions of sheer “nature”, as Husserl calls them, on the other hand, among which he also ranks habit, he nevertheless repeatedly arrives at relativising this differentiation, by speaking of the habitual, inertial tendencies that also govern the sphere of free acts. “[E]ach free act has it’s comet’s tail of nature,”⁸⁹ Husserl claims, and it is precisely in view of this comet’s tail of automatism – their “repetition compulsion” – that his later notes also seem to regard the phenomenon of practical situations by insisting on their typical repeatability. Thus, situations appear not only in view of a “primary passivity” that first challenges freedom, as in Heidegger or Sartre, but also in view of a “secondary passivity”, that affects the very interaction between freedom and its determinant circumstances.

86 Sartre (1992), p. 486.

87 Heidegger (1967), p. 384 (English translation, p. 351f.).

88 Husserl explicitly addresses acts of “striking” or “dancing” as *cogitationes*; see Husserl (1952), p. 218 (English translation: p. 230).

89 Husserl (1952), p. 338 (English translation: p. 350).

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BETWEEN RELEVANCE SYSTEMS AND TYPIFICATION STRUCTURES: ALFRED SCHUTZ ON HABITUAL POSSESSIONS

abstract

Alfred Schutz's characterization of the interrelationship between relevances and typifications includes an analysis of the phenomenon of habit that, in his theory of knowledge, clarifies some essential aspects of common-sense interpretations in the reality of daily life. In form of "habitual possessions", habit becomes in Schutz an element of knowledge, is characterized as a potential set of typical expectations to be actualized under typical circumstances. In this article, the constitution process of habitual possessions are analyzed considering its place in the interplay between relevance systems and typification structures in common-sense thinking – by pointing out that, for Schutz, habitual possessions must always be understood as habitual possessions of knowledge.

keywords

Habitual possessions, familiarity, typification structures, systems of relevance, Alfred Schutz

In his theory of the social distribution of knowledge, Alfred Schutz develops a concept of *habit* in order to clarify a specific aspect of the structuration of interpretative meaning in the reality of daily life. Within the framework of the action theory – specially in the Weberian tradition –, the term “habitual” is commonly used in contrast to the category of rationality. But, in Schutz, understood as “habitual possessions”, the phenomenon of habit becomes a central moment of the distribution of knowledge that functions as a binding notion between “familiarity”, “routine” and “interpretative meaning structures” or “systems of knowledge”. Schutz conceptualizes habit through an investigation of the interplay between emergence processes of systems of common-sense relevance and of structures of typification in the life-world. In the present study, the main interest is to show that habitual possessions must always be understood, from a Schutzian perspective, as habitual possessions of *knowledge*. In the first part, dedicated to a characterization of central functions of the habitual in Schutz’s phenomenology, the object of analysis is the way in which objects and behavior are *typically* interpreted. Then, the attention will turn to the results of processes of sedimentation, structuration and transmission of *relevance systems* involved in the *social* distribution of knowledge. After these two steps it will become clear in which sense, according to Schutz, habitual possessions make possible for interacting individuals to learn to recognize a specific typicality, as well as the sedimentation of familiarity and the structuration of relevance systems.

1. **Types as Instruments of Habitualization** In his analysis of how knowledge and experiences are applied and sedimented in everyday life, one of Schutz’s interest is the constitution of general *types* characteristic of the common-sense thinking – in contrast to the “nonessential” types of the social sciences. Following Edmund Husserl’s description of typification processes, Schutz considers the world of everyday life as constituted from the outset through typified experiences and expectations of the individual. According to Husserl, even in the first experience of a given object, we have a *pre-knowledge* of some of its aspects and a scope of anticipated possibilities that guide, at some level, the process of experiencing. In *Experience and Judgment* Husserl writes: “The factual world of experience is experienced as a typified world. (...) What is given in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been

genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience (...) and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. (...) To begin with, what is experienced about a perceived object in the progress of experience is straightway assigned 'apperceptively' to every perceived object with similar components of genuine perception" (Husserl 1976: 331). These anticipations are, in Schutz's words, "typically determinate by their *typical* pre-familiarity, as *typically* belonging, that is, to the total horizon of the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties of which show the same general *type*. Thus, it is the horizontal anticipations which predelineate the typical preacquaintedness and familiarity of the objectivity given to our apperception" (Schutz 1970: 94). Thus, to understand how these typifications are constituted and how they function, implies an understanding of the constitution of the *unquestioned*. In his article "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", published for the first time in 1953, Schutz speaks of how types must be formed in order to determinate what individuals consider natural, and indicates an important aspect of typification processes. As he points out: "in the natural attitude of daily life we are concerned merely with certain objects standing out over against the unquestioned field of pre-experienced other objects, and the result of the selecting activity of our mind is to determine which particular characteristics of such an object are individual and which typical ones (...). The construction consists, figuratively speaking, in the suppression of the primes as being irrelevant, and this, incidentally, is characteristic of typifications of all kinds" (Schutz 1962: 9; 21). Grasping the meaning of objects implicates, in other words, ignoring some particularizing traits, aspects or features of it that are not important for the specific context or purpose in which the object becomes *thematic*, in which is manipulated or arises for consciousness. Here lies the essence of typification: "Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable" (Schutz 1964: 234). In any typification process, qualities of the object are perceived in reference to a pre-conceived *type* of bundle aspects; a recollection of similar objectivities constitutes a ground of typicality for the experiencing as of an object of same type. Now, this selectivity or suppression shows that perception implicates choice, but, in this process, at the level of *passivity*, presupposing, as described by Schutz in "Types and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" of 1959, an apperceptive "automatism" which seems, for us, to underlie every process of *habitualization*: "No apperception is merely *instantaneous* and transient; any apperception becomes a part of habitual knowledge as a *permanent* result" (Schutz 1970: 96).

Indeed, as Lester Embree indicates, it is possible to identify different usages of the term “type” in Schutz’s phenomenology. In his theory of typification, Schutz speaks, following Max Weber, of “ideal types” as concepts or constructs of common-sense as well as of scientific thinking, since his interest, in many of his writings, is also of methodological nature. As Embree points out, Schutz uses “typification” and “typicality” in “broad significations that include both concepts of type, but with the former tending both as a noun and with reference to interpretation to express the narrower signification of ‘ideal type’ and the latter tending to express the narrower signification of Husserl’s ‘empirical type’” (Embree 2012: 126). Yet, as mentioned previously, Schutz’s concept of typification structures has also an origin in Edmund Husserl’s theory of types, where *the habitual can already be found as related to the notion of typicality*. For instance, in Husserl’s *Experience and Judgement*, as shown above, typicality is described as genetically pre-constituted in past experiences, forming, following Schutz’s interpretation, habits or “latent habitual possessions, and are called forth or awakened by a passive synthesis of congruence if we apperceive actually a similar object. At the same time, by apperceptive transference a set of anticipations is created which attach themselves to the givenness of a newly encountered objectivity of the same type” (Schutz 1970: 110). In *Krisis*, Husserl, according to Schutz, modifies and complements some aspects of his theory of typicality and stresses the typical regularity in the changeability of qualities and of the position of objects in space and time, it is to say that under typical circumstances some objects behave similarly (Husserl 1976: 22), or, as Schutz puts it, that they have *habits*: “The notion of typicality as used in the *Krisis* is the form in which the objects within our intuitive environment – the *Lebenswelt* – together with their properties and their changes are given to our natural attitude. This form is that of a vacillating approximation. All regularities, even the causal ones, belong to the typical ‘habit’ in which things behave, as it were, under typical similar circumstances” (Schutz 1970: 111). This problem of the different usages of the term “type” is also addressed by Ronald Cox, who suggests: “The automatic intending of typifications in perceptual experience founds the grasping of eidetic concepts (...). It is, then, genuinely the founding level of the actional processes. The usage of the term ‘typification’ should accordingly be restricted to the level of automaticity” (Cox 1978: 172). In any case, we always find “typification” referred, at first, to everyday understandings and to the constitution of familiarities; in this sense, also related to the dimension of automaticity and, therefore, to habitualities in a broader sense, that is, as habits of the

object and as habitual possessions of individuals – as elements of the stock of knowledge at hand of the subject which constitute a potential set of typical expectations.

2.
**Familiarity
 and Validity:
 Habitual
 Possessions as
 Elements of
 the Stock of
 Knowledge**

Schutz's theory of typification can be considered an effort to describe the structure of mundane experience by pointing out, following Husserl, that the phenomena constituting everyday life are given according to *typicalities*. As described above, we are given, in our everyday life, typified patterns of knowing and acting – our experience of objects in the world is defined through pre-acquaintedness. In other words: any object of interpretation is, from the outset, taken not only within a context of significance, but of a horizon of *familiarity*. States of affairs are grasped in reference to similar ones and to typical ways to deal with them. Experiences constituting this context are, in this sense – considering the familiarity involved –, unquestioned taken. This does not mean that the concrete, experienced object cannot show individual characteristics, only that these qualities will also assume, for the interpretation, the form of typically apperceived individual aspects. Even when objects are experienced as unique, this uniqueness is, thus, a typical character, the phenomena are of a determined kind, recognizable.

In an analysis of Schutz's application of eidetic methodology, Michael Barber shows that Schutz's critical attitude towards some aspects of the phenomenological reduction had consequences also for his theory of meaning formation in the everyday life: "Schutz's study of the meaning-structures of ordinary social life relies upon a form of eidetic analysis which aims at uncovering the invariant, unique, a priori meaning-structures necessary to any concrete social world. Thus (...), Schutz engages in a constitutive phenomenology of the entire natural attitude itself (...). The invariant structures which Schutz unearths – the structure of consciousness, the corresponding forms of interpersonal understanding, and spatio-temporal stratification of relationships – these invariant structures emerge out of concrete social worlds and carry their sociality as one of their essential characteristics" (Barber 1987: 111; 117). According to his "antireductionist turn", typifications, as instruments of the *habitual*, become a feature not only of our experience of things, but also of our experience of the *social*.

As mentioned previously, Schutz uses the Weberian term "ideal type" to characterize instruments not only of scientific analysis, but, at first, of interpretations in real life. These typified schemes or models of experienced motivations and purposes make possible the apprehension of the meaning

someone else's action. Ideal types can, in this sense, be understood as instruments through which the world becomes *intersubjectively* real. They are "ideal" since are constituted through abstraction. This abstraction makes possible his use in different situations. This is the reason why, for Schutz, typifications and typification structures are responsible for the *sedimentation* of the social and social in nature – their social aspect is invariant and essential. Typification and its structures are always shared, always transmitted and reinforced within intersubjective processes. In his book on Schutz's sociology of knowledge, Barber emphasizes that "there cannot be typifications that do not reflect the social milieu from which they originate and in which they are used. The social is not just accidentally affixed to necessary structures of typifications whenever they are concretely instantiated, but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world typifications pattern" (Barber 1989: 79). That's why, for Barber, Schutz's account of the social distribution of knowledge results from his effort to combine a concept of sociality – considered as a strand sedimented in the typification structure of daily life – with Husserl's theory of the intentional structures of consciousness.

In society, the distribution of knowledge refers not only to the differences between the content of what individuals know (considering their particular perspectives and biographical circumstances), but also to the different ways they know or have access to the same fact. With his contemporaries "consociates", the individual shares not only knowledge, but, in Schutz's terms, a community of space and time (of chronological and also of inner time) where the "vis-à-vis" relationship prevails. But the individual is never fully involved in this kind of interaction. In processes of everyday interpretation that concerns contemporary individuals, they also move away from the face-to-face interaction. Through a specific form of typification, the individual is able to grasp¹ his fellow-men beyond the vis-à-vis interaction or we-relationship "by forming a construct of a typical way of behavior, a typical pattern of underlying motives, of typical attitudes of a personality type" (Schutz 1962: 17). From this perspective, types configure a turning point between the intersubjective validity of the social world and the subjective access to this reality, between intersubjectivity and perspectivity. Typicality carries out the intersubjective *validity* of meaning in the everyday world, it maintains everyday knowledge in its *Geltung*. In daily life, individuals

1 In the common-sense thinking related to the social, ways of grasping this meaning is through (subjective) personal types – ideal types of personalities – and (objective) course-of-action types – ideal types of behaviors and course-of-action types. While the course-of-action type is based upon experience of acts of the same type, a personal type, as Barber points out, refers to "a point of reference where all his personal characteristics as they existed when he departed intersect. In this case (...) Naturally, such a type abstracts from the fullness of the individuality of the Other" (Barber 1989: 47). In the interpretative context, the Other becomes an ideal object, an ideal construct through typification constellations.

expect that what is been once verified as valid, will *remain* valid, in an idealization² that constitutes *an essential aspect of the phenomena of the habitual in the social sphere*: the familiarity. In his book *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, Schutz writes: “familiarity itself, and even knowledge in general (considered as one’s *habitual* and dormant possession of previous experiences), *presupposes the idealizations of the ‘and so forth and so on’ and the ‘I can do it again’*. (...) Familiarity thus indicates the likelihood of referring new experiences, in respect of their types, to the habitual stock of already acquired knowledge of a passive *synthesis of recognition*“ (Schutz 2011: 126). Familiarity has, therefore, a dual character. In an objective sense, familiarity means the aspect of the already experienced. In a subjective sense, it refers to *individual habits* in recognizing and choosing actual experiences considering the types at hand in his stock of knowledge. Moreover, Schutz shows that this *habitual* selection is also related to the *interest* and to the *relevance* implicated in the concrete situation. Schutz calls this situational background “system of relevances”; it is responsible to determinate the characteristics that are *selected as typical* and must, therefore, be considered in a necessary relation with typicality³. Thus, habits are not only results of sedimentations of social experiences, but also assume a constitutive function in their situational setting, supporting relevance structures.

3. Conclusion: Relevance and Recipe in the Origin of Habitualizations

In *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, Schutz defines habitual possessions as follows: “It is the main characteristic of habitual possessions, that is of the knowledge we take for granted as beyond question (whether it be familiarity of thinking or of practice which is involved), that they carry along with themselves expectations (...) that the same or the typically

2 The common-sense thinking exists despite the differences in the biographical situations and of “here-and-theres” between individuals in the social world. And this due to two kinds of idealization: the idealization of the interchangeability of the standpoints and of the congruency of the system of relevances. The presuppose in this idealizations – that actually configure a knowledge – is that the specificity of each biographical circumstances and of the different standpoints doesn’t interfere or are irrelevant for the interpretation. They constitute therefore what Schutz calls the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives and consist in typifying constructs “of objects of thought which supersede the thought objects of my and my fellow-man’s private experience” (Schutz 1962: 12).

3 For Schutz, relevances can be of three, interrelated types: topical, interpretational and motivational. Due to the topical relevance, things can, from the grounding field of familiarity, become problematic. The topical relevance is directly related to the object of attention. Everything else “is in the margin, the horizon, and especially all the habitual possessions we have called the stock of knowledge at hand” (Schutz 2011: 131). Interpretational relevance refers to the typifications that are decisive to the interpretation of an object or of a state of affairs. Motivational relevances, in the form of in-order-to and because-motives, are, on the other hand, always referring to future action, constituting the interest, here understood as “the set of motivational relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind” (Schutz 2011: 129). Relevances can, moreover, be *intrinsic* or *imposed*. Referring to the topical relevances, Schutz characterizes this contrast as follows: “Whereas in the latter [imposed] system the articulation of the field into theme and horizon is imposed by the emergence of some unfamiliar experience, by a shift of the accent of reality from one province to another, and so on, it is characteristic of the system of intrinsic topical relevances that we may or may not direct our attention to the indications implicit in the paramount theme – indications which have the form of inner or outer horizontal structurizations or forms of topical relevances – that is, we may or may not transform these horizontal surroundings into thematic data” (Schutz 2011: 111).

similar experiences will recur” (Schutz 2011: 132). In this sense, when an experience becomes part of our habitual possession, it becomes familiar. As soon as we acquire a habitual possession, we learn, in other words, to recognize a specific typicality. Moreover, we don’t know the exactly moment and why we possess a specific habit, in the sense that, in daily life, it doesn’t become topically relevant. For instance, considering fear as habitual possession, all we know is that it has its history and refers to a biographical situation. We learn typical ways to avoid what we fear and also to identify the characteristics of the object we fear, to identify its type: “The habitual possession of familiarity thus acquired is called our knowledge of this object of experience in respect of its type. *The type is therefore the demarcation line between the explored and unexplored horizons of the topic at hand and the outcome of formerly valid systems of interpretational relevances*” (Schutz 2011: 129). In Schutz’s social theory of knowledge, these “systems of relevance” are only another term for frameworks of alternative actions. In dealing with a specific situational arrangement in the world, the consciousness will always seek for interpretative solutions in sedimented experiences that shows a thematic relation with or are relevant to the problem at hand, to the setting it is confronted with. As shown, it is the typicality involved in this process that makes possible, according to Schutz, the *habit*, the emergence of common-sense recipes for action, since there is an increment in knowledge – which must be understood not only as knowledge of or about something, but also as knowledge of how to perform an action, to handle under typical circumstances – with every new experience. “To sum up”, writes Schutz, “we have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are guided by systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge which is dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated” (Schutz 2011: 130). As Ronald Cox points out, systems of relevances are items of stocks of knowledge at hand “along with the sedimentations of previous mental activities, all being habitual possessions (...)”. Hence, habitual possessions “also includes what Schutz has (...) called the ‘recipes’ of everyday action and knowledge in the world” (Cox 1978: 91).

For Schutz, our daily activities are performed through recipes reduced to “automatic habits”, through a knowledge referred to the regularity of events. In habits and in the routine in daily life, recipes of action are followed in an application of typification constructs. Typification and system of relevances determinate, *together*, according to Schutz, the emergence of constructs in common-sense thinking. Habits, on the other

hand, have their origin in the necessary typicality of daily life, they are only possible because *the world cannot be experienced in totality, but through the selection of relevances, through typifications*. Thus, by defining habit within the framework of a theory of distribution of knowledge, that is, as habitual possessions of *knowledge*, Schutz clarifies his concept of knowledge in an essential, constitutive feature. In his words: “it has to be kept in mind that our stock of knowledge at hand not only contains habitual possessions originating in our theoretical activities, but also it contains our habitual ways of practical thinking and acting (e.g., ways for solving practical problems), habitual ways and patterns of behaving, acting, working, and so on. The stock of knowledge at hand includes, therefore, the set of practical recipes for attaining typical ends by typical means (...)” (Schutz 2011: 134).

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SESSIONS

SESSION 2

HABIT'S ROLE IN MIND AND KNOWING

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (University of Oregon)

On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of Habit

Andrea Zhok (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Habit and Mind. On the Teleology of Mental Habits

Adi Eyal (Universität zu Köln)

Naturalization: Habits, Bodies and their Subjects

James McGuirk (University of Nordland)

Phenomenological Considerations of Habit: Reason, Knowing and Self-Presence in Habitual Action

Richard Charles Strong (Villanova University)

Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology

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ON THE ORIGIN, NATURE, AND GENESIS OF HABIT

abstract

This article details fundamental aspects of habits, beginning with the fact that habits are dynamic patterns that are learned, and that in coincidence with this learning, habits of mind are formed, as in the formation of expectations, thus of certain if/then relationships. It points out that, in quite the opposite manner of the practice of phenomenology, the strange is made familiar in the formation of habits. It shows how clear-sighted recognition of the seminal significance of movement and phenomenologically-grounded understandings of movement are essential to understandings of habits and the habits of mind that go with them. The article differentiates non-developmentally achieved habits from developmentally achieved habits, but elucidates too the relationship between instincts and habits. It elucidates the relationship in part by showing how, contra Merleau-Ponty, “in man” there is a “natural sign”—or rather, natural signs. By relinquishing an adultist stance and delving into our common infancy and early childhood, we recognize the need for what Husserl terms a “regressive inquiry” and thereby recover ‘natural signs’ such as smiling, laughing, and crying. At the same time, we honor Husserl’s insight that “habit and free motivation intertwine.” As the article shows, resolution of the relationship between habit and free motivation requires recognition of nonlinguistic corporeal concepts that develop in concert with synergies of meaningful movement, concepts and synergies achieved not by embodied minds but mindful bodies.

keywords

Dynamic patterns, habits of mind, kinaesthesia, tactile-kinesthetic body, instincts, infancy and early childhood, freely motivated and freely moving

Brushing one's teeth, tying a shoelace or knot, hammering a nail and not one's thumb, writing one's name, walking down stairs—each is a distinctive qualitative dynamic, a sequence of movements that has a distinctive beginning, a distinctive contour with distinctive intensity changes, for example, and a distinctive end. Each is a dynamic pattern of movement. We are born with none of these dynamic patterns, which is to say that they are not ready-made or innate in any sense. Each is learned.

There is a lesson to be learned from this existential truth, namely, that whatever habits we develop in what we do and the way we do things, they exist because we learn the dynamics that constitute them, whether by trial and error, by assiduous practice, by resting and taking up the challenge again at a later time, or whatever. The mode of one's learning may vary, but the formation of a habit in each instance is basically an enlargement of one's kinetic repertoire, which is to say that one can form a habit only by learning a new dynamic pattern of movement. In the beginning, the formation is ordinarily a spontaneous developmental given, i.e., infants are not told how to do such and such nor are they told they must learn to do such and such in the first place—they would not understand anyway if they were *told*, for infants are precisely “without speech.” Infants indeed initiate their own learning by first of all learning their bodies and learning to move themselves (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). They do so without an owner's manual as well as without instructions from others, a manual that would state, for example, ‘lift and move your right foot forward, then gradually take weight on it as you peel off your left foot-- the foot that is now behind you--from heel to toe,’ and so on, and so on. Infants learn quite by themselves to reach effectively, to grasp objects effectively, to walk, to feed themselves, and ultimately, to talk and thereby exceed their classification as infants. Habits of mind proceed in concert with these habit-formed and -informed accomplishments, most basically in expectations, i.e., in if/then relationships, of which more presently.

The formation of habits proceeds in just the opposite manner of the practice of phenomenology. In doing phenomenology, that is, in following its methodology, we not only make the familiar strange, but do so in part by disenfranchising our habits, i.e., by bracketing, by “renounc[ing] all erudition, in a lower or higher sense” (Husserl 1989, p. 96). Across the spectrum of human cultures, that is, in the most basic ontological sense

that includes every human, habits are indeed a matter of *having made the strange familiar*. That familiarity becomes ingrained in what Husserl terms the psychophysical unity of animate organisms and their ways of living in the world. In more precise terms, habits develop by bringing what was out of reach and/or beyond understanding effectively and efficiently into the realm of the familiar and into what are basically synergies of meaningful movement that run off by themselves. Habits are indeed grounded from the beginning in movement, that is, in the primal animation of animate organisms that gives rise to sensings and sense-makings that evolve into synergies of meaningful movement and habits of mind. It is hardly any wonder, then, that foundational understandings of habit, its origin, nature, and genesis, are rooted in a “regressive inquiry” (Husserl 1970, p. 354) into ontogenetic life, or what Fink terms a “constructive phenomenology” (Fink 1995, p. 63).

In the course of their learning their bodies and learning to move themselves effectively and efficiently, infants form certain ways of “doing” that generate an ever-expanding repertoire of “I cans” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011, Chapter 5). We might recall in this context Husserl’s and Landgrebe’s emphasis on the fact that “I move” precedes “I do” and “I can” (Husserl 1989, p. 273; Landgrebe 1977, pp. 107-108). Certain ways of “doing” are indeed constituted in and by certain qualitatively inflected movement dynamics that inform an infant’s “I cans,” dynamics that create particular spatio-temporal-energetic patterns. Just as infants nurse in distinctive ways and kick their legs in distinctive ways, so they ultimately learn to walk in distinctive ways, which is to say that the qualitative dynamics of one infant’s movements are different from that of another. Ways of moving are indeed individualized. Moreover qualitatively inflected movement dynamics feed into a certain *style*, of which more later. What is of immediate moment here is that self-generated dynamics are the foundation of developmentally achieved habits.

Developmentally achieved habits are to be distinguished from non-developmentally achieved habits, that is, habits that are not cultivated from the beginning through learnings of one kind and another. The distinction between walking and smiling or laughing is one such distinction. One does not learn to smile or laugh: smiling and laughter, like crying, are spontaneous movement patterns that arise on their own. Such spontaneous human movement patterns are in fact quite remarkable. As Darwin succinctly observed, “Seeing a Baby (like Hensleigh’s) smile & frown, who can doubt these are instinctive—child does not sneer” (Darwin 1987, Notebook M, No. 96, p. 542). Darwin’s observation is in fact of moment: the

relationship between instincts—what is “instinctive”—and habits warrants attention.

Instincts, like habits, are distinctive qualitatively inflected dynamic patterns. Those patterns, however, arise on different grounds. As specified and discussed in detail elsewhere with respect to infants and animate forms of life more generally (Sheets-Johnstone 2008, pp. 349-367), what Merleau-Ponty terms “natural signs,” including “the realm of instinct,” are part of the heritage of humans, Merleau-Ponty’s dismissal of them to the contrary. As noted in that discussion, “When Merleau-Ponty writes that ‘in man there is no natural sign’, and that ‘[i]t would be legitimate to speak of “natural signs” only if the anatomical organization of our body produced a correspondence between specific gestures and given “states of mind”’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 188-189), he is surprisingly oblivious of the dynamic congruity that binds movement and emotions, the kinetic and the affective (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/2009). A nervous laugh might simply burst forth, for example, when one feels less than full assurance about what one is doing or how one is to answer to a question, just as a free lower leg might begin swinging or jiggling when one is seated and feeling bored or eager to get up and leave a lecture or meeting of some kind. While such bodily happenings might not be countenanced as instincts, they are without doubt natural signs, instances of spontaneous, involuntarily produced movements--“specific gestures”--tied to affective feelings--“given ‘states of mind’.” Adult instances aside, with respect to infant life, smiling, laughing, and crying are clearly the spontaneous expression of human nature: they are natural signs. They are, as Darwin indicates, instinctive beginning forms of sociality that are spontaneously generated; they are neither self-taught nor other-taught. They may certainly be honed, however, and in habitual intentional ways, as when an infant cries because it has learned all by itself that crying brings its mother or caretaker to it, or, when as a child in later years, it learns to feign a smile when greeting a certain adult person it does not like, or, when as an adult in still later years, it learns to restrain a laugh at a child’s continuing awkwardness in order not to dissuade him or her from trying to do something. As is evident by such cries, feignings, and restrainings, humans can and do develop certain habits by choice on the basis of what was originally instinctive. Instincts may thus be the generating ground of habits, precisely as in crying to bring someone to you, in feigning a smile at someone you actually dislike, or in restraining a laugh in deference to embarrassing another. Moreover somatic responses (Johnstone 2012, 2013) such as shivering from cold are natural signs that may generate a habitual running to get a sweater or slippers, or to close

a window or turn up the thermostat, or in other words, to do something rather than nothing in fear that one might be catching a cold. In short, what is basically instinctive and thus involuntary becomes open to modulations in later years, that is, to voluntary implementations that may and often do become habitual in certain circumstances.

Wholly voluntary learnings have no such roots in instincts or instinctive dispositions. Indeed, when children and adults voluntarily take up a new skill and in the process form new qualitatively inflected dynamic patterns that become habitual—when they learn to write, to type, to jump rope, to play the clarinet, to drive, to make a surgical incision, and so on—their learnings have no underlying ‘natural signs’. In actual practice, however, their learned patterns are also modulated according to circumstance; they are open to variation depending on the particular situation of the moment and altered accordingly, as in making an abdominal incision or a spinal incision, or as in writing one’s name with a piece of chalk on a blackboard or signing one’s name with a pen on a house purchase contract.

There is a basic dimension of instincts, however, that warrants attention. In their pristine mode, i.e., before being possibly transformed by learnings of one kind and another, instincts are properly analyzed as self-organizing dynamics that flow forth experientially in spontaneous movement dispositions, thus basically, not just the spontaneous movement disposition of a fetus to move its thumb toward its mouth and not toward its ear or navel, for example, but *the spontaneous disposition to move in and of itself in the first place*, including movement of the neuromuscular system itself as it forms in utero. Such movement is not “action” nor is it “behavior.” It is the phenomenon of movement *pure and simple*—a phenomenon that in truth is not so simple when analyzed phenomenologically in descriptive experiential terms, that is, as a phenomenon in its own right. Indeed, this pure and simple phenomenon is incredibly complex, far more complex than the terms ‘action’ or ‘behavior’ suggest when they are implicitly and largely unwittingly used in its place, as in talk and writings of “action in perception” (Nöe 2004). Along similar lines, neither does “embodied movement” come close to a recognition of the phenomenological complexity of movement, even as in an attempt to abbreviate Husserl’s consistent specification of the two-fold articulation of perception and movement (Husserl 1989) by stating, “Our embodied movement participates in seeing, touching, hearing, etc., thereby informing our perceptual grasp on the world” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 109).

Husserl did not plumb the dynamic depths and complexities of movement, understandably so, however. His central thought certainly not exclusive

concern was cognition and the build-up of our knowledge of the world. He certainly did realize the complexity of what he consistently termed “affect and action” and the fact that he did not explicate them fully, terming them at one point simply “the root soil,” “*the background that is prior to all comportment*” (Husserl 1989, p. 292, p. 291, respectively). Moreover however briefly, he certainly did grasp the centrality of body movement to soul, to performance, to production, and to style. With respect to the integral connection of body movement and soul, he writes, “Each movement of the Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the standing and sitting, the walking and dancing, etc. Likewise, so is every human performance, every human production.” In a Supplement to this section of *Ideas II*, he observes that “products and works” such as wielding a stick or writing a book “take on the spirituality of the Body,” that products and works are “psycho-physical unities; they have their physical and their spiritual aspects, they are physical things that are ‘animated.’” (Husserl 1989, pp. 252, 333, respectively). Psychophysical unity and animation indeed go hand in hand (Sheets-Johnstone forthcoming 2014).

Precisely in his emphasis on *animation* and in his not just consistent but pivotal concern with *animate organisms* throughout his writings, Husserl’s observations are clearly a beginning entry into the complex phenomenology of movement and its relation to instinct and habit, and this both in recognition of, and in going beyond the fact that “I move” precedes “I do” and “I can.” In particular, Husserl notes that, “In original genesis, the personal Ego is constituted not only as a person determined by *drives*, from the very outset and incessantly driven by *original ‘instincts’* and passively submitting to them, but *also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting Ego*, in particular one guided by rational motives, and not one that is merely dragged along and unfree. Habits are necessarily formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of the force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to free behavior” (Husserl 1989, p. 267). In short, to yield to a drive establishes a habit just as “to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist a drive establishes a tendency . . . to let oneself be determined once again by such a value-motive (and perhaps by value-motives in general) and to resist these drives” (ibid.). He points out explicitly that “Here *habit and free motivation intertwine*. Now, if I act freely, then I am indeed obeying habit too” (ibid., pp. 267-68). In effect, what I freely choose to do and do again that leaves a natural disposition or instinct behind is itself a habit: my freely-formed movement itself in virtue of its repeated patterning is in a basic sense habitual.

This existential reality is of moment for it indicates a substantively significant cognitive dimension in the formation of habits and in habits themselves. In more explicit terms, the intertwining of habit and free motivation and movement implicitly suggests habitual patterns of mind--habitual ways of valuing and of thinking. Given the fact that "consciousness of the world . . . is in constant motion" (Husserl 1970, p. 109), these habitual ways can hardly be ignored. Habits of mind are surely spurred by expectations, for example, most basically by what Husserl terms 'if-then' relationships (Husserl, e.g., 1989, p. 63), and correlatively by what infant psychiatrist and clinical psychologist Daniel Stern terms "consequential relationships" (Stern 1985, pp. 80-81) and what child psychologist Lois Bloom terms "relational concepts" (Bloom 1993, pp. 50-52). Insofar as these relationships are foundational-- "if I close my eyes, it is dark"; "if I move my lips and tongue in certain ways, I make and hear certain sounds"--it is not surprising that the relationships are foundational to everyday human habits, such as closing one's eyes to go to sleep or when a light is too bright, and saying the words "No" and "Yes." Just such kinesthetically felt and cognized experiences ground the faculty that Husserl identifies as the "*I-can* of the subject" (Husserl 1989, p. 13), a faculty that engenders a repertoire of abilities and possibilities that are indeed in many everyday instances habitual. More finely put in phenomenological terms, tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses and their invariants are realized in basic if/then relationships that we spontaneously discover in infancy in learning our bodies and learning to move ourselves. Tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses are thus a central aspect of animation, a tactile-kinesthetic built-in of life, a vital dimension in the formation of habits.

That expectations are indeed basic to animate forms of life can hardly be doubted, not only in such ordinary realities that if I turn my head and twist my torso, then a different profile of the object at which I am looking comes into view, and not only in such commonly passed over realities that 'if I close my eyes, it is dark', but in hearing a strange rustling in the midst of silence or in smelling smoke. In other words, habits of mind are also spurred by happenings and by particular valuings and thoughts that follow in response to those happenings that become standard. Though they are open to possible variations according to circumstance, they retain their basic dynamic: the bodily-felt dynamic of apprehension, for example, or of suspicion, and so on. In this regard they might evolve in the form of 'wondering if', for example, or 'thinking that', precisely as when one hears a strange rustling in the midst of silence and straightaway 'wonders if ...' or smells smoke and straightaway 'thinks that...' Moreover habits of mind may

be defensive as well as expectant. Ernest Becker, a cultural anthropologist who elaborated on Otto Rank's conception of truth-seeking as an immortality ideology—Rank was a one-time disciple of Freud—captured this defensive habit of mind in a striking way when he wrote about “the life-and-death viciousness of all ideological disputes”: “Each person nourishes his immortality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to which he gives his allegiance; this gives his life the only abiding significance it can have. No wonder men go into a rage over the fine points of belief: if your adversary wins the argument about truth, *you die*. Your immortality system has been shown to be fallible, your life becomes fallible” (Becker 1975, p. 64). It is of interest to note that Husserl at one point gives voice to how what Becker terms an “allegiance” can be an obstacle to one's vision and understanding. He does so with respect to a “zoologist and naturalistic psychologist,” each of whom is so wedded to the “*scientific attitude*” or to “‘Objective’ reality” that “[h]e wears the blinders of habit” (Husserl 1989, p. 193; italics and quote marks in original). The blinders of habit are clearly not limited to scientists, but include those whose “allegiance” deters them from considering findings, perspectives, or ideas different from, or inimical to their own.

As the above examples suggest, through investigations of habits of mind with full phenomenological rigor, one might come to a description of mental tendencies and dispositions in valuing and thinking. Yet such an investigation might be met with skepticism since it is possible that, even with the practice of free variation, mental tendencies and dispositions exist beyond one's individual phenomenological capacities. In essence, one might thus skeptically claim that there is no valuing and thinking ‘morphology’ of humans akin to the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.¹ Insofar as phenomenological inquiries are open to verification, however, elaborations, amendments, corrections, and so on, are certainly possible and in fact to be cultivated if phenomenology is to prosper. Furthermore habits of mind fruitfully investigated phenomenologically might be authenticated and possibly even refined through Buddhist Theravada meditation practice. Such practice has basic methodological and experiential similarities with phenomenology (Sheets-Johnstone 2011a). It might thus be affirmed that whatever an individual's limitations might be with respect to encompassing a full-scale phenomenological description of habits of mind, that investigation is open both to verification by other phenomenologists and to habits of mind discovered through a different method of inquiry and study that has the possibility of complementing a phenomenological investigation

1 For perhaps similar reasons, some might claim that there is no “emotions morphology” of humans en par with the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.

and possibly even expanding its insights.

Concerns about a morphology of mind notwithstanding, the above discussion and examples indicate that habits of mind may be and commonly are formed coincident with kinetic habits, and from the beginning in learning one's body and learning to move oneself. The full-scale realities of habit are indeed psycho-physical in nature and develop in concert with experience. They are at once cognitively, affectively, and kinetically dynamic: they flow forth with varying intensities, amplitudes, and perseverations in each of these dimensions of animate life and at the same time as a singular whole in the habit itself. That Husserl writes often of the "intertwining" of body and soul is revealing in this respect, perhaps most decisively when he affirms that "the unity of man encompasses these two components not as two realities externally linked with one another but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually penetrating (as is in fact established)" (Husserl 1989, p. 100).

In sum, what comes to mind may be and not uncommonly is habitual in some degree, as the above examples indicate and as psychological renditions of associations might furthermore show. The idea that habits of mind exist, however, might pose conundrum. Such habits seem both to affirm and to contradict the fact that thoughts simply arise. Aficionados of *the brain* might claim that the affirmation and contradiction attest to the hegemonic nature of the brain; that is, they might latch on to the conundrum as a validation of the monarchical status of *the brain* and its right to experiential ascriptions such as "If you see the back of a person's head, the brain infers that there is a face on the front of it" (Crick and Koch 1992: 153). The habit of inferring arises and the thought "a face on the front of it" arises because the brain infers and says as much. This rather comically eccentric not to say preposterously homuncular metaphysics is clearly at odds with experience². However much thoughts may and do simply arise, we are able to concentrate attention on a text, on a report, on a paper we are writing, on a puzzle we are trying to solve, on a fugue or nocturne we are trying to learn, and so on. We are at the same time, however, something akin to passengers with respect to what turns up in the process of our concentrated attention—a wayward concern about an upcoming meeting, a recurring concern about how a sick child is doing, a resurging regret about not having done something earlier. Yet

2 State ments of neurobiolo gist Semir Zeki and neurologists Antonio and Hanna Damasio engender a similarly quirky metaphysics: "An object's image varies with distance, yet the brain can ascertain its true size" (Zeki 1992: 69); "To obtain its knowledge of what is visible, the brain ... must actively construct a visual world" (Zeki 1992: 69); "When stimulated from within the brain, these systems [neural systems in the left cerebral hemisphere that "represent phonemes, phoneme combinations and syntactic rules for combining words"] assemble word-forms and generate sentences to be spoken or written" (Damasio and Damasio 1992: 89).

though thoughts outside our concentration may and do arise, we surely control “turning toward,” as Husserl emphasizes, just as he emphasizes that we control our attention to something, that is, our interest (or disinterest) in something, and we of course control what we choose to do or not to do. We are indeed *freely-motivated* and *freely-moving* (e.g., Husserl 2001, p. 283). These dual facts of human life are obviously of pivotal importance to our understandings of habit. Supposing we are sufficiently attuned to our affective/tactile-kinesthetic bodies, we can, for example, choose to change our habit of turning only toward certain things and not others, or of finding interest in only certain things and not others, or of doing only certain things and not others. These dual facts of human life are of pivotal importance as well to understandings of habit and its relation to *style*. Husserl deftly and succinctly captures the relation of habit to style when he writes, “Every man has his character, we can say, his style of life in affection and action, with regard to the way he has of being motivated by such and such circumstances. And it is not that he merely had this up to now; the style is rather something permanent, at least relatively so in the various stages of life, and then, when it changes, it does so again, in general, in characteristic way such that, consequent upon these changes, a unitary style manifests itself once more” (1989, p. 283). That habits are breakable, so to speak, and that any particular habit can be replaced by a different habit means that one’s style of life is precisely changeable with respect to what Husserl terms “*affection and action*.” Husserl’s common meaning of affection is tethered to “allure” and motivations (Husserl 2001, p. 196), that is, to ‘turning toward’ and ‘interest’. He writes, for example, of receiving “some joyful tiding and liv[ing] in the joy,” pointing out that “Within the joy, we are “intentionally” (with feeling intentions) turned toward the joy-Object as such in the mode of affective ‘interest’” (Husserl 1989, p. 14).

Such investigations and findings conflict with present-day phenomenological studies that pass over kinetic and affective realities, and this in part because they unwittingly pass over ontogenetic realities of human life, choosing instead a perspective that is in truth adultist. Gallagher and Zahavi, for example, affirm that “[T]he sense of agency is not reducible to awareness of bodily movement or to sensory feedback from bodily movement. Consistent with the phenomenology of embodiment, in everyday engaged action afferent or sensory-feedback signals are attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of our body.” They cite Merleau-Ponty (1962) as a reference and conclude, “I do not attend to my bodily movements in most actions. I do not stare at my hands as I decide to use them; I do not look at my feet as I walk.” Their apparent unwitting

appeal to vision and neglect of kinesthesia is both telling and puzzling. Why would one stare at his or her hands in deciding “to use them” any more than one would look at one’s feet as one walks unless there was a pathological condition of some kind³. In short, when phenomenologists write as knowledgeable adults without ever stopping to ask themselves how they came to be the knowledgeable adults they are—using their hands to grasp a cup or towel, walking along a trail or down the street—and in turn, offer fine-grained phenomenological descriptions of same, they pass over the need for a full-scale constructive phenomenology, a phenomenology that might indeed at times embrace a genetic phenomenology, the latter in the sense of determining how we come to the meanings and values we do. A full-scale constructive phenomenology necessarily addresses the question of familiarity, in particular, the nature of that familiarity that undergirds habits having to do with using my hands, for example, and walking. How indeed is it that reaching for a glass or throwing a ball, or walking or skipping, or moving in all the myriad habitual ways we move in our everyday lives, run off as what famed neurologist Aleksandr Romanovich Luria termed “kinesthetic melodies” (Luria 1966, 1973)? How is it that these melodies, with all their variations with respect to particular situations and circumstance, become engrained in kinesthetic memory? How indeed—except on the basis of *familiar qualitative dynamic patterns*, particularly inflected patterns of movement that run off in a way not dissimilar from the way that Husserl describes internal time consciousness “running off”? Movement, like time, is a “temporal Object,” and temporal Objects “appear” in a wholly different way from “appearing objects”: they are precisely “running-off phenomena” (Husserl 1964, p. 48; see also Sheets-Johnstone 2003, 2012, forthcoming 2014). Familiar qualitative dynamic patterns are just such phenomena. We may thus ask how, other than as learned patterns of movement, patterns learned in infancy and early childhood, such familiar qualitative dynamic patterns come to be? As pointed out earlier, infants and young children learn their bodies and learn to move themselves in myriad ways in the course of growing. In effect, when present-day phenomenologists overlook ontogeny, they overlook the very ground of that adult knowledge that allows them to claim “a recessive consciousness of our body” and to state, “I do not attend to my bodily movements in most actions.” Indeed, an adultist stance seems generally to allow a distanced stance with respect to the body: “The body tries to stay out of our way so that we can

3 One might be inclined to think that Gallagher and Cole’s study of Ian Waterman, a person who “does not know, without visual perception, where his limbs are or what posture he maintains” (Gallagher 2005, p. 44), has unwittingly influenced phenomenological practice and in this instance compromised it.

get on with our task” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 163)⁴.

A veritable phenomenological analysis of what is going on “in most actions” shows something quite different. It shows that, whether a matter of walking or eating or dressing ourselves or drying ourselves after a shower, or whether a matter of myriad other everyday “actions, the dexterity, the precision, the fluidity, and so on, that are necessary to the “action” running off are engrained in kinesthetic memory in the form of an ongoing qualitative dynamic that is spontaneously inflected and modulated according to circumstance, an ongoing qualitative dynamic that was learned and cultivated in earlier years and is now so dynamically familiar that it runs off by itself. In short, whatever the everyday adult actions, their dynamic familiarity is anchored in the tactile-kinesthetic body and thus in kinesthetic memory. Their formal reality is in part related quite precisely to Husserl distinction between an appearing Object and a running off Object: staring at one’s hands in deciding to use them or looking at one’s feet in walking are not equivalent to everyday synergies of meaningful movement, synergies that were honed from infancy and early childhood on and that adult humans reap in the form of “getting on with our task.” It is indeed not that the body “tries to stay out of our way,” but that in learning our bodies and learning to move ourselves, we have amassed an incredibly varied and vast repertoire of I cans. To overlook ontogeny is thus to fail to ask oneself basic questions concerning one’s adult knowledge and in turn foil foundational elucidations of habit. It should be added that neither does Merleau-Ponty ask himself ontogenetic questions, basically *genetic phenomenology* questions, nor does he, in his discussion of habit, provide answers to the question of how habits come to be formed. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty declares simply that habit is “knowledge in the hands” (1962, p. 144) even though in the previous sentence he declares that “habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action” (ibid.).

Gallagher and Zahavi’s reliance on Merleau-Ponty is in fact disconcerting, and this because, again, quite to the contrary, movement “pure and simple” does not surface with phenomenological clarity and depth in Merleau-Ponty’s writings. Without this surfacing, genuine phenomenological understandings of habit are kept at bay. In a long footnote, for example, in which he tries to explain how motion, “which acts as a background to every act of consciousness, comes to be constituted,” Merleau-Ponty

4 We might in fact ask whether it is “the body” that “tries to stay out of our way,” or “we” who try to keep the body out of our way, or what “our way” would be had we not learned our bodies and learned to move ourselves and in the process forged those myriad familiar dynamic patterns that inform our everyday lives and that run off so effectively without our having to monitor them.

writes, “The consciousness of my gesture, if it is truly a state of undivided consciousness, is no longer consciousness of movement at all, but an incommunicable quality which can tell us nothing about movement” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 276). Moreover his earlier appeal to “the bird which flies across my garden” (ibid., p. 275) actually confuses movement with objects in motion (for a phenomenological clarification of the distinction between movement and objects in motion, see Sheets-Johnstone 1979) and leads him simply to posit “[p]re-objective being.” In short, Merleau-Ponty too passes over *the qualitative dynamics inherent in kinesthetic experience*, which indeed are “incommunicable” only if one disregards them. Merleau-Ponty in fact dismisses kinesthesia outright when he affirms that “As a mass of tactile, labyrinthine and kinaesthetic data, the body has no more definite orientation than the other contents of experience” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 287-288) and when, in his attempt to fathom the complexities of movement in relation to learning, he simply states, “a movement is learned when the body has understood it” (ibid., [1945], p. 139). His statement is in fact an unacknowledged near quotation from Henri Bergson who wrote almost fifty years earlier, “A movement is learned when the body has been made to understand it” (Bergson 1991 [1896], p. 112). His continuing statement that a movement is learned when the body “has incorporated it into its ‘world,’” and that “to move one’s body is to aim at things through it” is taken up explicitly by Gallagher and Zahavi. They declare, “[W]e are normally prepared to describe our habitual or practised (sic) movements as actions. I would say that ‘I hit the ball’ or ‘I played one of Beethoven’s sonatas’, rather than ‘the arm (or fingers) changed position in space’. But in this case the movements are at some level conscious. They are teleological *actions* which contain a reference to the objects at which they aim (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 139)” (Gallagher and Zahavi, p. 174).

A description of our “habitual or practiced movements” does not of course have to be, or even “normally” is, in the past tense any more than it has to be described “normally” in terms of action. Phenomenological descriptions hew fairly consistently to the present tense of the experience they are describing, taking into account its temporal flow and how the experience comes to be constituted. Furthermore, if “habitual or practiced movements” are to be elucidated phenomenologically, they warrant bona fide phenomenological descriptions that, rather than packaging them in *actions*, do justice to their particular and unique qualitative dynamics—whether a matter of hitting a ball, hammering a nail, playing one of Beethoven’s sonatas, or playing Liszt’s Liebestraum No. 3. Further still, doing phenomenological justice to “habitual or practiced movements”

means realizing that *movement is not a matter of body parts having “changed position in space.”* By its very nature, movement is neither positional nor is it simply spatial. Movement is a phenomenon in its own right, a spatio-temporal-energetic phenomenon that is clearly distinguishable in essential ways from objects in motion, which do change position in space. To do phenomenological justice to the phenomenon of movement requires opening one’s eyes not to positional awarenesses but to the dynamics of *change* (for a phenomenological analysis of movement, see Sheets-Johnstone 1966/1979 and 1980; Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). The underlying problem in all these purported phenomenological descriptions of movement is a basic ignorance of movement “pure and simple,” meaning that complex qualitatively dynamic phenomenon that is opaquely subsumed in various and sundry ways in action, behavior, and embodiment, and that is furthermore mistakenly described as an object in motion and thus relegated to what amounts to no more than positional information of one kind and another. Habits, both general human ones and highly personal human ones, are not reducible to changes of position unless, of course, one is referring to an attempt to change one’s habit of slouch-sitting to erect-sitting, for example. Even then, kinesthesia cannot be ignored: that pan-human sense modality is integral to the change, not only to felt changed tensions but to changes in body line, i.e., changes in the linear design of one’s body that, as experienced, are dependent in part on one’s imaginative consciousness (on this latter topic, see Sheets-Johnstone 2011b). Moreover kinesthesia can hardly be ignored since it, along with tactility, is the first sensory modality to develop neurologically in utero (Windle 1971) and, barring accidents, is there for life. Indeed it is *an inexpressible sensory modality*. As well-revered and internationally-known neuroscientist Marc Jeannerod concluded in the context of examining “conscious knowledge about one’s actions” and experimental research that might address the question of such knowledge, including experimental research dealing with pathologically afflicted individuals, “There are no reliable methods for suppressing kinesthetic information arising during the execution of a movement” (Jeannerod 2006, p. 56). “Information” terminology aside, especially in the context not of position or posture but of movement, Jeannerod’s declarative finding speaks reams about the foundational ongoing reality and significance of kinesthesia, reams that should certainly lead phenomenologists to take kinesthesia seriously and the challenge of elucidating its *inexpressible living dynamics* of signal importance. Puzzlingly enough, Gallagher bypasses this very foundational reality. When he writes (Gallagher 2005, p. 83), “The

phenomenon of newborn imitation suggests that much earlier [before later forms of imitation and the “mirror stage”] there is a primary notion of self, what we might call a proprioceptive self—a sense of self that involves a sense of one’s motor possibilities, body postures, and body powers, rather than one’s visual features—he clearly affirms that “a primary notion of self” is not a visual recognition of oneself. At the same time, however, he bypasses the foundational reality that is the tactile-kinesthetic body, its neurological formation, as noted above, encompassing the first sensory modalities to develop⁵. He bypasses as well findings such as those of infant psychiatrist and clinical psychologist Daniel N. Stern whose studies led him to the description of a “core self” identifiable in terms of four “self-invariants”: self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity, and self-history. As Stern states, “In order for the infant to have any formed sense of self, there must ultimately be some organization that is sensed as a reference point. The first such organization concerns the body: its coherence, its actions, its inner feeling states, and the memory of all these” (Stern 1985, p. 46; see also Sheets-Johnstone 1999c). Though not specified as such, these invariants all rest on the tactile-kinesthetic body (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). The description of each dimension indeed validates the primacy of movement and the tactile-kinesthetic body. Recognition of this body would obviate the need of Gallagher or any other researcher to “suggest” anything. On the contrary, recognition of the tactile-kinesthetic body straightaway gives empirical grounds for affirming that the phenomenon of newborn imitation is rooted in a kinetic bodily logos attuned to movement (see, for example, Spitz 1983 on what Husserl would term the “allure” of movement), and further, that as that body learns, it cultivates and forges an ever-expanding repertoire of I cans, that habits are engendered in that repertoire, and that a certain style—or “character” as Husserl also terms

5 Proprioception, as first described by Sir Charles Sherrington and as taken up by many present-day academics (e.g., Bermudez 2003, Thompson 2007, Gallagher 2005, Gallagher and Cole 1998), is basically a postural rather than kinetic sense. Indeed, Sir Charles Sherrington’s original coinage of the term and his focal emphasis define proprioception as “the perception of where the limb is” (Sherrington 1953, p. 249). Proprioception provides us postural awarenesses and, in addition, a sense of balance through vestibular mechanisms. Gallagher and Cole uphold Sherrington’s postural specification when they explicitly state, “Proprioceptive awareness is a felt experience of bodily position” (Gallagher and Cole 1998, p. 137). Gallagher and Zahavi do likewise when they state, “Although I do not have observational access to my body in action, I can have non-observational proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of my body in action. Proprioception is the innate and intrinsic position sense that I have with respect to my limbs and overall posture. It is the ‘sixth sense’ that allows me to know whether my legs are crossed, or not, without looking at them” (2012, p. 162). Whatever the meaning of “non-observational . . . awareness of my body in action”—does “non-observational awareness” mean simply “knowing without looking”?—Gallagher and Zahavi clearly bypass phenomenologically deepened understandings of the sense modality that is kinesthesia, which is to say the experience of movement and its qualitative dynamics.

it--is born and being shaped in the process, a style that others readily recognize.

The lapses specified above indicate a call “to the things themselves.” In heeding the call, one is led back to Husserl’s phenomenological insights. They are indeed an imperative beginning to bona fide understandings of habit, a beginning that might proceed from, but is certainly not limited to his conclusion that “each free act has its comet’s tail of nature” (Husserl 1989, p. 350). What Husserl meant by this metaphor is that, by way of earlier experiences, “[t]he Ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history,’” that “aftereffects” are present in “tendencies, sudden ideas, transformations or assimilations” (ibid.). This insight in particular leads most decisively to an appreciation of the significance of ontogenetic studies. Pathological case studies may enhance phenomenological understandings, but they are not essential in the way that phenomenologically-informed ontogenetic studies are essential: a constructive phenomenology is indeed essential to understandings of habit, just as it is essential to understandings of emotions and agency (on the latter topic, see e.g., Bruner 1990, Sheets-Johnstone 1999c; on the former topic, see Sheets-Johnstone 1999b, Johnstone 2012, 2013). In fact, how “[t]he Ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history’” is of sizeable import. Husserl implicitly indicates just how central that history is when he brings together habit and style, and habit and the freely-motivated, freely-moving subject. He states, “As subject of position-takings and of habitual convictions I have of course my style . . . I am dependent on my previous life and my former decisions . . . I depend on motives . . . I have a unique character . . . I behave according to that character in a regular way” (Husserl 1989, p. 343). While he is clearly at pains to distinguish “who I am” as natural being from “who I am” as “position-taking Ego,” he is clearly at just as sharp pains to show their relationship, in other words, the relationship of what he terms the freely-acting Ego to “affect and action” (for a full discussion, see ibid., Supplement XI, pp. 340-343). His emphasis on the relationship of a foundational basis in nature—a lower psychic level—to a position-taking Ego is succinctly put when he states that, “with each position-taking, there develop ‘tendencies’ to take up the same position under similar circumstances, etc.” (ibid., p. 293). The relationship is emphasized in different but related terms when, in describing “The spiritual Ego and its underlying basis,” he points out that whatever is constituted naturally, i.e., in associations, tendencies, perseverations, and so on, permeates “all life of the spirit”: spirit “is permeated by the ‘blind’ operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives . . . all of which determine the subsequent course of

consciousness according to ‘blind’ rules. To these laws correspond *habitual modes of behavior* on the part of the subject, acquired peculiarities (e.g., the habit of drinking a glass of wine in the evening)” (ibid., p. 289). It is in this context, several pages later (ibid., pp. 291-292) that Husserl writes of the *background that is prior to all comportment* and of what we find “in the obscure depths”: “a root soil.” In sum, habits, including habits of mind, particularly for Husserl in the form of motivations, are a basic dimension of a freely-moving subject, which is to say that the “medium of its history” is integral to the life of a subject.

Surely it is essential for phenomenologists to attempt a regressive inquiry, to take an ontogenetic perspective and carry out a constructive phenomenology. Habits are a fundamental dimension of human life. Indeed, we could not readily live without them. If everything were new at each turn, if all familiarity was erased and strangeness was ever-present, life as we know it would be impossible. A few final words about a dimension of habit make the point both incisively and decisively. That dimension has to do with style, specifically, our common dependence on style in our interchanges with others and our recognition of them as individuals to begin with. Husserl affirms, “One can to a certain extent expect how a man will behave in a given case if one has correctly apperceived him in his person, in his style” (Husserl 1989, p. 283). He offers many examples of style—not only in the way in which an individual judges, wills, “and values things aesthetically,” but in the way “‘sudden ideas’ or ‘inspirations’ surge up . . . in the way metaphors come to him and [the way in which] his involuntary phantasy reigns,” and even further, “in the way he perceives in perception . . . [and] “in the specific way his memory ‘operates.’” In short, Husserl affirms that style permeates to the core and does so on the basis of habit. What we notice in another person’s style are precisely just such aspects of another person’s comportment—the ways in which he or she typically relates to his or her surrounding world, thus not only the way in which a person “behaves,” i.e., his or her typical kinetic qualitative dynamics, but the things the person typically values, his or her typical lines of thought, what he or she typically notices, and so on. Moreover Husserl includes in a person’s style his or her “turning of attention,” a turning that, Husserl states, “is also a ‘comportment’,” but is not a position-taking as are other aspects of the person’s style. Yet here too, as Husserl observes, “the subject displays his ‘peculiarity’, i.e., in what it is that rivets his attention and how it does so . . . [how] [o]ne subject jumps easily from object to object, from theme to theme; another one remains attached for a long time to the same object, etc.” (ibid., p. 291). In sum, Husserl’s observations pertain to a social

world. We indeed seem to be more aware of the habits of others than of our own habits. We do so to a sizeable extent on the basis of the movement of others, what we in a packaging way term their “behavior,” but which we get a glimpse of in terms such as “jumping easily from object to object” in contrast to “remain[ing] attached for a long time to the same object.” The qualitative dynamics of another are perceived. They are integral dimensions of his or her style. We can thus anticipate what another will likely do given such and such a situation. There is a certain familiarity about the person that is simply there, evidenced in the dynamics of his or her comportment across our history with them, hence dynamics that we have experienced before and have now come to expect. It should be noted that we do not anticipate ourselves in the way we anticipate others. As indicated above, we are commonly less aware of our own qualitative dynamics than we are of the qualitative dynamics of others-- unless we have attuned ourselves to our own movement.

When we begin not with an adultist perspective and speculative entities to explain various phenomena, but with a veritable reconstructive or constructive phenomenology that allows one to “get back” to those nonlinguistic days in which we learned our bodies and learned to move ourselves and in the process formed nonlinguistic corporeal concepts in concert with synergies of meaningful movement, we approach veritable understandings of mind. We find that those synergies of meaningful movement are orchestrated not by an embodied mind but by a mindful body, alive to and cognizant to its surrounding world and developing fundamental abilities to move effectively and efficiently within it from infancy and in fact from in utero onward.

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HABIT AND MIND. ON THE TELEOLOGY OF MENTAL HABITS

abstract

In the following pages we shall discuss the notion of habit in sight of its role in the constitution of meaning. We make use of Wittgenstein's analysis of rule following to show the crucial role played by habits in the establishment of verbal meanings. Then, we show how habits can be established according to the Peircian model of abduction. The generalizing power of abduction (and habit) is explained in terms of teleological motivation, whose roots we expose by means of Husserl's analyses on passive synthesis. Finally, we draw the conclusion that the notion of habit may lead to a "non-naturalistic naturalization" of mind, that is, a "naturalization" opposed to both objectivistic and reductionist accounts of mind.

keywords

Teleology of habit, meaning, motivation, Husserl, Peirce, Wittgenstein

The notion of “habit” is a philosophically crucial and often misunderstood notion. Usually “habits” are mentioned in two theoretical contexts: by mentioning (and often stigmatizing) the power of mere reiteration of experiences in the constitution of beliefs, and by questioning the transmission of social practices.

The first case is emblematically represented by Hume’s treatment of habits, which considers them a powerful force in the mind, while simultaneously depicting them as mere mechanisms, enforced by the contingent regularity of nature. This way of understanding habits grants them a central position, but at the same time makes of habits something essentially meaningless: an unanalyzable contingent fact of nature.

The second interpretation regards the notion of habit as akin to “custom” and makes use of it as an explanatory key for traditions and social practices. This acceptance is legitimate and interesting, however it disregards the essential discontinuity between habits and social practices. Habits are *personal*: they may or may not have been inherited from social transmission, and they may or may not be intersubjectively shareable. Therefore habits are only a *necessary* precondition for social practices, but in order to become social practices a mechanism of transmission must be implemented, and this raises further questions that go beyond the nature of habit.

In the following pages we want to discuss the notion of habit in the light of its crucial role in the constitution of *meaning*. As we are going to show “habit” is the essential key to grasp and interpret the whole sphere of “learned contents” as such.

1. Wittgenstein on Rule- Following and Meaning

Wittgenstein’s argument on the conditions for following a rule is among the most discussed pieces of philosophical literature, however its scope is not always clearly perceived. By focussing on rules Wittgenstein actually examines the conditions for learning and standardizing *any* mental content that we may use with constancy over time. This means that what counts for *rules* does count for any *learned meaning*, inclusive of the most strict and formal ones, like the ones handled by mathematical thought.

Wittgenstein noticed that, although ordinary language follows rules, we usually do not know either which rules we are using, or how to explain them. Furthermore, any explanation of the meaning of a sentence is finite and can never be exhaustive: if I do not understand “snow is white”,

somebody can try to explain each word occurring in the sentence, and at some point, if the explanation is still unsuccessful, the verbal dimension will be trespassed by coming to a level where I will be just prompted to *have in the first person* some experiences.

By resuming Wittgenstein's point, let us suppose that we are trying to teach a child to count by one (positive natural numbers). All that we ordinarily do (and *can* do) is: to provide the child with *examples*, to require her to *produce samples* of enumeration in her turn, and to *correct* her possible mistakes.

At a certain point, the child seems to be consistently successful in her production, and the teacher concludes that the pupil has learned to count. However, after some days, we could imagine that the child is required for the first time to count beyond 200; surprisingly, she goes on uttering "202", "204", etc. Should we object that we did not teach her to do so, she might flawlessly reply that we never explicitly showed her *that* passage, and that she simply understood that *this* was the right way to proceed. In principle, this misunderstanding could be repeated endlessly, since we could never provide the pupil with an exhaustive exemplification of *all* possible applications of the rule. Indeed, each rule (each meaning) can have infinite instantiations, while examples and corrections can only be finite.

However, *de facto* we are often successful in teaching rules; therefore, there must be some reason why the possible derailment of the rule does not usually take place. In outline Wittgenstein's answer is that when you learn a rule, you do not produce an *interpretation* of what the teacher provides you with (examples and corrections) (Wittgenstein 1958, § 201), but you simply reproduce the same act that you have been initially prompted to perform. This means that we follow the rule "blindly", that is, we do not warrant the identity of the rule by a preliminary rational act: to follow the rule is not to choose among alternatives (Wittgenstein 1958, § 219), nor to produce interpretive hypotheses, but primarily to persist in performing the same act.

But when we talk of the "same act", we are already mentioning a kind of identity, though not a rationally ascertained one. Where does this "sameness" come from, then? The sameness of the act, says Wittgenstein, depends primarily on its *habitual* nature: rules are not something that we could follow only once in our life - says Wittgenstein - they are *habits* (customs, institutions) (Wittgenstein 1958, § 199). Rule learning is possible insofar as rules are rooted in unreflective habits.

It is important to see that the identity of any rule is never ultimate and definitive: the paradoxical deviation in the ordinary rule of enumeration is in fact a simplified version of re-interpretations that actually do take place

over time. For instance, in the history of mathematics there was no pre-settled determination about how to deal with the rule of subtraction when the minuend is greater than the subtrahend. When the question was posed, the rule of subtraction had to introduce an interpretative supplement, which turned out to be the introduction of negative numbers. In any case, each interpretive act must intervene on an *operational core*, learned by examples and corrections, which is what we call habit. Therefore habits (of some kind) are at the roots of all meanings (concepts, notions). Habits are anything that can be learned in experience and replicated. Habits must not be conceived of as overt physical movements: the interiorized verbal sequence of a nursery rhyme or the sensorimotor sequence of saccades in scanning a picture can be both habits. Habits lie at the heart of meanings, where they enable the reiterated application of the same content to infinite experiences. This means that habits appear at the crucial crossroad where the empirical and the general (universal) meet.

2.
The
Establishment
of Habits:
Peirce on
Abduction

Habit, we are claiming, is what can turn the *particularity of experience* into the *generality of meaning*. This, to be clear, does not mean that meaning can be reduced to habit: the only point that is at stake here is the passage from particular experiences to the *generality* that is essential part of meaning. Even with this limitation, this is a fairly bold claim, since the question of the passage from particular experiences, especially sensuous experiences, to the sphere of universals is among the most debated and controversial issues of the history of philosophy. In any case, we shall not try to provide a full-fledged answer to the question of the birth of meaning, but shall concentrate on the emergence of its replicable “content”, leaving aside the crucial point of the role played by *language* in shaping and conveying meaning.

The first thing to remark is that habits need *no* iteration of experience in order to be primarily established. Although the traditional psychological interpretation of habit considers them to be *borne* by repetition, this is, strictly speaking, impossible. Clearly *repetition* can take place as such only if the *first* experience already has a *re-identifiable content*, otherwise the very possibility of novel instantiations of the *same* could not be conceivable. This has nothing to do with the possible *awareness* of the relevant identity: even if we are completely unaware of the identity of an emerging content through experience, the enforcing role of repetition can take place only when an identity is already available. This means that *each single experience must be already able to institute a habit*, although repetition does affect the readiness and smoothness in performing the acts that characterize the relevant habit.

This point was acknowledged also by Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce, like Wittgenstein, recognized that habits must lie at the core of meanings; this is what his famous pragmatic maxim conveys:

“Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.” (Peirce, CP 5.422)

The pragmatic maxim gives expression to the observation that what we grasp in any propositional content is a knot of the implications that we would be disposed to draw from a belief in that content. Such implications are “practical” in the undemanding sense that they are “things to do” at some level (including the mere deployment of further signs). The relevant implications can be revived by us because they are habits. The propositional content “snow is white” entails in principle all the verbal explanations and the bodily acts that we are able to produce by grasping parts and whole of the judgment (inclusive of perceptual acts). De facto, according to the context of use only a subset of those implications will be drawn.

But, how can we understand the essential passage from experience to general content? Peirce shows a way to deal with this question through his notion of *abduction*. Abduction is the first step in the establishment of the meanings (rules) to be used in reasoning and deductions. According to Peirce all meanings (i.e., “conceptions”), which are endowed with universal content, are established through experience. But *inductive* experience is not the first step in the constitution of meanings. Events can be inductively confirmed, and frequencies of those events can be attributed, only insofar as a *first* experience generates something like a *hypothesis* (Peirce, CP 6.144-6.145). This movement that generates hypotheses from primal experience is what he calls *abduction*: “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.172). Abduction comprises “all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered” (CP 5.590).

In fact, how exactly abduction is to be understood is not thoroughly clarified in Peirce’s texts, its crucial role notwithstanding. Abduction is not primarily the conscious formulation of a hypothesis, but is the origin of the contents with which conscious hypotheses can be built. When an experience is apprehended, it turns itself immediately into an expectation referring to a class of possible events: by making the acquaintance of an individual (say, “Kant”), I can immediately grasp a class of items kin of it (anything

“Kantian”). Any experience (sensuous experience to begin with) immediately brings to light an instance which is capable of being re-instantiated; this instance already is a habit since it is a relatively stable disposition concerning what we *can do*. And, as we said, the relevant habit need not have any overt muscular-bodily manifestation: if a word steadily elicits a series of other words in my mind (as in a poem known by heart), this practical effect may not have any manifest behavioral expression, but it still is a habit.

3.
The
Establishment
of Habits:
Husserl on
Protentions

We can try to improve our understanding of the first establishment of habit by looking at Husserl’s analyses of the *temporalization* of experiences and of its connection with the idea of *motivated possibilities*. In Husserlian language the passage from sensuous impressions to established meanings (*noemata*) may be articulated as follows.

Primal impressions (*Ur-Impressionen*), which are the most elementary level of sensuous experience, affect consciousness and produces a *modification* (*Modifikation*) of consciousness. This process of modification primarily appears as *temporalization*. Temporalization takes place in the form of an internal (essential) relation between so-called *retentions* and *protentions*. *Retentions* are the passive moment of sensuous consciousness, which apprehends our experiences as a train of events ordered by succession (*Hua X*: 118): if we hear a melody, the tenth tone receives its musical meaning from the previous nine tones, inclusive of the specific duration of (possible) silent intervals; the antecedent tones (and intervals) bestow meaning to the present impression *without being present* and *without being voluntarily presentified* (recollected). Thus retentions originally posit an order of succession. In fact, retentions must not be reduced to any psychophysiological model of memory, where succession would be supposedly generated out of a merely present state of affairs (mnestic trace, memory storage). Indeed, you cannot describe any process where a succession would be “generated” without already implying that succession is entertained by a mind (consciousness). If one thinks that a present entity, for instance a magnetic track, can somehow “stand for” a succession, one should realize that this track has an order of succession only if it is “read” by somebody, who “keeps track” of the gradually receding elements of the track, in their specific order and “timing”. Otherwise you just have a piece of present matter without any reference to any temporal ordering. This means that you cannot “generate” succession without resorting to the kind of primal ordering activity that we recognize in living consciousness.¹

¹ For a more detailed discussion of temporalization in phenomenology, we take the liberty to refer the reader to Zhok 2012: 216-225 and Zhok 2011: 247-251.

Retentions are not, and cannot be, “facts”; they are modifications of consciousness that can be retrospectively discovered from their present offshoots.

Retentions constitutively issue into *protentions*, whose *motivated* character is qualified by the retentional content (Hua XI: 337). Protentions are *tacit plural expectations*, based on retentional content. Protentions are not *specific conscious expectations* for two reasons: 1) because they do not imply any *pre-figuration* and 2) because they are not bound to a *single* content. For instance, when I walk I may have no pre-figuration whatsoever, but if the ground collapses under my feet, my surprise and disappointment show that my walking body did have a tacit expectation concerning the solidity of the ground. And secondly, this expectation is only one in an indefinite plurality of similar tacit expectations. For instance, if during my unfortunate walk oxygen suddenly disappeared, I would learn the hard way that among my tacit expectations there was also the smoothness of breathing; and so on.

The essential point to grasp in this scheme is that retentions, being modifications of consciousness, are *not* sensuous particulars anymore: primal impressions can be said to be particulars, but retentions, which are prompted by primal impressions, already have a general content *insofar as their “content” motivates protentions*. Motivation (“teleological impulse”) is the *crucial generalizing power in consciousness*.

This passage could be also described as follows: sensuous experiences are particulars that primarily elicit “passive reactions” (retentional *content*), which are part of our general bodily sensorimotor reactivity; such reactions institute habits, since they can be re-activated in different moments as bearers of the same sense (function, *télos*). Each time a sensuous impression is apprehended as percept, it implicitly dictates a range of motivated expectations (protentions) concerning its possible developments (Husserl’s *adumbrations*, *Abschattungen*). This horizon of embodied expectations is precisely the initial phase of what we are calling “habit”.

Indeed, Husserl himself describes habit (*Habitualität*) in internal connection with the notion of *Vermöglichkeit*, which is a *learned disposition* that opens up a room of *possibilities* (Hua XXXIII: 24-5; HuaMat VIII: 378-381). What Peirce conceives as abduction (primordial hypothesis) is described by Husserl through the passage from sensuous affections to embodied dispositions (habits as *Vermöglichkeiten*). Such embodied dispositions initially appear as protentions, which primarily are perceptual expectations, rooted in sensorimotor (kinesthetic) activity. They are indeed something like “perceptual hypotheses”, that can be confirmed, corrected and replicated over time. Since perception is the first source of all learned meanings, this

scheme accounts for the basic establishment of those habits that provide the core content of meanings.

4. The Teleological Logic of Habits

Yet, the classical idea of habit, as it appears in Humean accounts, seems rather at odds with our ordinary notion of meaning. Meanings are flexible, intelligible and, of course, “significant”, whereas habits are often conceived as dumb mechanisms. It is therefore important to carefully re-consider the nature of habits. In order to do so, the first thing that we have to do is to re-consider the nature of perceptual habits, that is, of the habits that are on display in our customary sensuous behavior.

Let us take a trivial example of learned sensuous behavior: I am in the street and jump on my motorcycle; while beginning to move from the right sidewalk I see just in front of my tire a broken bottle; immediately I look to the left, to see if anybody is coming, before turning in order to avoid the bottle. Now, this is a trivial case of behavior, guided by perception, where *no reflective act* has taken place. What is interesting to note is that this behavior has a clear *logical* structure, which can be easily translated into a structured reasoning. It is precisely as if I had said to myself: “I want to go, but *if* I go in this direction, I may damage my tire, *then* I shall change my trajectory, yet *if* I suddenly turn left, somebody could run into my vehicle, *therefore* I check that nobody is there.” This is a sample of what constantly happens in our usual sensuous behavior: in the wake of what we have practically learned, we perform tacit hypothetical reasonings and conditional inferences, using as occasional material for the inferences the current perceptual and behavioral contents. Our practical competence (in riding the motorcycle, moving around in the street, detecting obstacles, etc.) has been acquired through experience and is available in the form of habits. But, contrary to what is often thought, the fact that habits can work “mindlessly”, does not imply at all that habits are “dumb mechanisms”.

First of all, habits are *not* mechanisms: they are sensitive to the environment and they keep their sense even when they have to take into account obstacles and delays. Any habitual behavior is sensitive to current environmental changes and is altogether different from a kind of ballistic device, which, after being launched, would proceed unchanged till completion. Take some dull habit like walking or cleaning the floor with a broom. Even if we have never truly envisaged the “ends” or “functions” involved in the current implementation of such habits, they unfold by appropriately reacting to different and changing contexts: we can meet irregularity in the ground or obstacles on the floor and we can (unreflectively) update our habitual behavior. In comparison with reflective

behavior, habitual behavior may appear “blind” because it is *not concerned with foresight*, and it may appear “mechanical” because it does *not need reflective awareness*. Indeed, habits may be judged to be “short-sighted”, but in the short radius of the anticipations of perception (protentions) they are quite sensitive and far from blind.

Secondly, habits are not “dumb”: they have a *teleological structure* which can be made more and more complex and subtle. Habits can be borne from the simplest sensorimotor reactions, but their “heuristic” and “explorative” character, which we saw as abduction, remains operative and generates continuous “ramifications”. Think of a learned skill like playing tennis. You begin by learning simple motor schemes in standardized situations, but through practice (which is no mere “repetition”), you acquire the ability to quickly adjust the performance to new situations and for different postures. When somebody *knows how* to play tennis, she has learned a complex habit that is unified by its teleological character (the aims of the game) and which involves a plurality of “knots”, from which contextually appropriate behavior flows. Habits, thus, far from being mechanisms, are living practices, where at each stage (“knot”) a plurality of alternative options are available. Each “choice” at each “knot” has a logical form, without any *Logos* (language) being involved. When playing we are continuously in situations which could be described by sequences of hypothetical and conditional inferences: “If the opponent does so, I should go *there* and prepare *this* stroke, but, look, she does *so and so*, then..., etc.” All this inferential process need no reflective act to be intelligently developed (and, in fact, if reflection intervenes, the behavioral outcome often turns out to be suboptimal). Habits are functional, teleological and plastic. The plasticity of habit is permitted, among other things, precisely by its teleological orientation, which makes possible that a plurality of courses be legitimate insofar as they converge in the same issue (or perform the same function).

5. Habits and the “Naturalization of Mind”

The central position that we have here attributed to the notion of habit seems to move in the direction of a *naturalization* of meaning and mind. Yet, this excludes the mainstream sense of “naturalization”. In the present account, consistent with Wittgensteinian and Peircian analyzes, habits appear as the embodied basis of meaning. Habits perform a sort of mediatory role between the particularity of sensuous experience and the generality of expectations, hypotheses and concepts. Yet, we should be wary not to conceive of habits as “physiological dispositions”. The present account of the function of habit cannot be translated into any usual naturalistic description, because naturalism assumes an ontological priority of the

objects described by natural sciences, to which all other descriptions should be reduced. But the conceptual scope of the objectivistic categories of natural sciences is too limited to account for either “meaning” or “habit”. More specifically, in the light of what we said above, the notion of “habit” turns out to be unintelligible without reference to “temporalization” and “teleology”, but neither notion can be translated into naturalistic terms. That is, neither “temporalization”, nor “teleology” can be expressed through objectivistic notions, *i.e.*, through notions that regard as ontologically real only what is describable as *spatiotemporal object*. The essence of the customary idea of a naturalization of mind is the descriptive or causal reduction of first person phenomena to third person accounts in terms of spatiotemporal objects (events). This is no sensible option for the notion of habit because neither finality nor temporality (nor living corporeity, for that matter) can be reduced to accounts in terms of mere objects (events) in space and time.

Habits primarily emerge from *perceptual meaningful* activity, not from causal chains of physical events, even if we can partially describe perceptual activity in terms of physical causes. The reiterability of habits, which is what makes them eligible for becoming part of shared meanings, depends on their teleological sense, which can be regarded as a “natural phenomenon” but most certainly is no “naturalistic fact”.

The generality of habits must be recognized at two levels. At the personal level, I can reactivate *over time* the *same* habit elicited by different sensuous particulars. At the interpersonal level, we can learn the *same* habit *by different routes*. For instance, me and you can both learn to ride a bike, and thus we can both access the knot of implications (meanings) included in “riding a bike” (traveling, training, sweating, but also the hardness of saddle, the danger of wet tracks, the muscular cramps, the wind in the eyes, the flat tires, etc.). All such blocks of practices inherent in the iterable notion “riding a bike” can be learned even if the specific biographical circumstances where we have learned to ride the bike are remarkably different. I may have fallen while learning and you may not, I may have learned by myself, and you under somebody’s guidance, etc. Nevertheless, the identity of the practice can be preserved over time, and often shared. What precisely can or cannot be shared is discovered only after establishing a stable communication on such items, but the essential point here is that a stable operational core there is, and this is what allows the communication of meanings.

Yet, the fact that habits are to some extent independent from sensuous particulars does not mean that they are extraneous either to *bodily*

constitution or to the *exposure to specific kinds of experiences*.

As to bodily constitution, habits are learned continuously and spontaneously whenever appropriately demanding conditions occur. Even if there are in principle endless ways to perform an action developing from A to B, there is always for each bodily constitution an ideal “line of less resistance”, which is not represented by a physically unique course, but by a family of closely connected acts. When we walk, each step of ours has certainly some idiosyncratic particularity, but its typical unreflective *identity* is guaranteed by the fact that, under the same external conditions, there is a spontaneous way to unfold muscular contractions and balancing acts, so as to make the step most smooth and functional (“natural”). This line of less resistance is what leads to the establishment of a specific habit instead of another. If we want to alter the spontaneous development of an unfolding habit of ours, we must expose our behavior to special constraints, that lead to *spontaneously* learning a different habit. This is what happens in special trainings (sports), but is not different in principle from what happens, for instance, when we adjust our gate to a pain in the leg, by limping: in the presence of pain, the new limping gate is a new line of less resistance in our walking habit; and, after being learned, the limp can be freely simulated. The felt line of less resistance is generally sufficient to establish habits as monotonous and roughly self-identical.

Thus, our ability to establish some habits and not others is inescapably rooted in our bodily constitution; from this perspective, we can make sense of the famous Wittgensteinian remark according to which “[i]f a lion could talk, we could not understand it” (Wittgenstein 1958: 225). If, by hypothesis, the bodily constitution of a lion and its habits are taken to be radically different from ours, no shareable core of experiences available for verbal signification could be found.

But also the specific exposure to some classes of experiences is decisive in learning determinate habits. As Michael Polanyi said, in order to become a good medical diagnostician (or a connoisseur of wines as well), a subject must be exposed to a plurality of appropriate experiential samples, under the guidance of experts that already possess the relevant discriminating abilities and that signal the aspects to which attention must be especially devoted (Polanyi 1969: 54). Polanyi recalls the learning process that gradually enabled him to read pulmonary radiographs: at the beginning, he says, the image looked to him like a blurred jumble, where he could hardly discern heart and ribs, while the radiologist’s comments sounded to him like a kind of bluff, a stageplay pretending to take those muddled blots as a precious informative source. Only after a repeated commented

vision of those images, weeks later, he began to make out a rich landscape of meaningful signs, signaling physiological variations, pathological changes, scars, infections, etc. (Polanyi 1969: 100-101). The increased perceptual ability was, of course, no matter of improved visual acuity, but of learning a habitual articulation of units and differences, emerging as a system of signs. Incidentally Polanyi notices that although he dropped the medical career and the relevant studies, this ability to read radiographs never went lost. If we take both sides of the relation that can generate habits, we can see in which sense we can, and in which we cannot, talk of a “naturalization” of habit (and mind). Habits are neither physical facts nor reducible to physical facts. Yet habits are inescapably bound to bodily constitution and to appropriate experiential exposure. In this sense, instead of talking of “naturalization” we may prefer to talk of an “*ecological correlation*” where bodily constitution and the available environment concur in articulating a world of “practical units”. We can apprehend, remember, re-instantiate and mean what we usually do, insofar as we have the bodily constitution we have and as we are exposed to a specific environment.

This does not imply, notice, that different body constitutions or different environments would *necessarily* dictate radically different habits (and meanings). This may or may not be the case. I may suppose that things look mysteriously different to the proverbial Nagelian bat, or that they look just more limited than how they look to us, or even that they do not “look” at all to the bat. What we can know, and what we can guess, anyway *makes just use of the set of habits that we can recognize in the first person* and of their variations.

There are chromatic phenomena to me, because I have eyes. Does it mean that a gradual change of my eyes, becoming something radically different, would involve a gradual change in the sensuous phenomena at my disposal? Altogether different colours? Altogether different sensations? This development is quite unwarranted and our usual experience bears witness to a different development: when reaching certain phenomenal thresholds experiences simply lose their unity and intelligibility.

In other terms, the contents of my world may well be tightly dependent on my body and its habits, yet this does not exclude the subsistence of *essential* boundaries within which experiential units can only emerge. The kind of “ecological naturalization” that this perspective allows invites to reflect on the living correlation of our body and its environment (which may be historical and cultural). It is our living and operative position in the natural and historical environment that determines the space of habits and therefore the palette with which the world of meanings can be painted.

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NATURALIZATION: HABITS, BODIES AND THEIR SUBJECTS

abstract

The paper seeks to draw a preliminary map of the relations between the human body, habituation, and nature, in a lineage of questioning which should be referred to as Aristotelian in the wider sense of the term. The trail begins from Aristotle's articulations of Hexis, and reaches Bergson's definition of motoric habitude, through the two intermediary-stops of Thomas Aquinas and Félix Ravaisson. In all of the four "stations" of the trail, one finds intricate relations between habituation and nature that include the role that the human body plays in the process of coming-near of the two and the approximation between them. Habituation has a task to play in the bringing of a human-body as close as possible to its own natural reality. Yet by that process habituation effectively covers and wraps the body with a "second" nature, a supplementary nature including not only actions, operations, gestures and deeds but also things that participate in these. Finally, based on this basic structure of habituation, all the four "stops" in the presented conceptual genre conceive of the task of habituation as carrying a moral tenor, which the article seeks to portray.

keywords

Habitude, habitus, Ravaisson, Bergson, naturalisation

The concept of the human body is still a difficult theme to approach in a philosophical manner. During the second half of the 20th century, continental philosophy has persistently returned to inquire into the problem of the reality of the body. Philosophical reflections on the body produced by thinkers as Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Giorgio Agamben, and more recently Catharine Malabou, Graham Harman and Ray Brassier exemplify the centrality of the body as a philosophical issue in continental philosophical debates. Still, Jean-Luc Nancy was able to remark in 2000 that “All thoughts of the ‘body proper’, laborious efforts at re-appropriating what we used to consider, impatiently, as ‘objectified’ or ‘reified,’ all such thoughts about the body proper are [...] contorted: in the end, they only expel the thing we desired”¹. A central challenge regarding the status of the body regards its intermediate position between a subject-actor and a passive object, being enacted and moved by a subject-actor. In other words: Is the body a mechanical dispositive to be automatized as cleverly as possible, or is it rather an intimate layer of inner experience, escaping the rationalizing grip of the intellect and at the same moment being distinguished from the physical matter of nature? That is, is the body an organic part of nature, or is it somehow distinguished from nature qualitatively, by the fact of possessing or being possessed by a human subject²? The concept of habit, contracting into itself a long tradition of discussion that will be portrayed in outline below, makes one of the possible apertures to approach this complex, ambivalent reality of the body. Habit merits this privileged position as its functioning, similarly to that of the body itself, takes place between activity and passivity and between actuality and potentiality. Most importantly, it is the position of habit as a second nature, or as a naturalized capacity, that places habit in the vicinity of the body itself. One therefore is called to pay attention to the manner in which the body makes itself a site for the activity of thought by processes of habituation. When the body is approached via the habitual framework, one is able to think of the human body in a manner which we recommend viewing as inherently *moral*, which is to say belonging to the domain of the human mastery of one’s actions.

1 Nancy, 2008: 5.

2 On this see Gontier, 2001.

We proceed now to the more reconstructive core of this essay, which will revolve around issues related to the rather popular maxim “habit is a second nature”. The philological origins of this expression are, in fact, quite complex³. We suggest examining central articulations of the relation between habit and nature at several central stations in the conceptual history of habit: Aristotle, Aquinas, Ravaissan and Bergson. We’d refer to nature here in the general sense of an organized matter, composed of things, bodies and movements. As we shall see, the core Aristotelian definitions are pertinent to the scholastic and to the modern formulations of habit, including habit’s relation to nature and to the body, so that one can detect here what could be called a conceptual genre. The present restoration of the conceptual genre of habit is done by comparing the three central historical moments of its *longue-durée*: the ancient, the medieval and the late modern. This will provide an introductory orientation for the question, preparing the groundwork for a fuller examination⁴.

The Ambiguities of the Relation Between *Hexis* and Nature in Aristotle

In Aristotle, corporeal habit (ἕξις, *hexis*) is an evident member of the family of habits. In the *Metaphysics*⁵ Aristotle refers to bodily health as a *hexis* which is responsible for the well-balanced maintenance of living-beings. Yet the general structure of habit in Aristotle, by itself, is somewhat ambiguous. A basic structural ambiguity to be found in the term “*hexis*” is that it is brought by Aristotle as a central example for three important categories: Relation (πρός τι, *pros ti*), Quality (ποιότης, *poiotes*) and Possession (ἔχειν, *echein*)⁶. *Hexis* is therefore conceived by Aristotle as exemplifying these three categories: relation, quality and possession, and it is not quite decided to which of the three it most essentially pertains. It should be underlined that *Hexis* in itself is not a category, but rather a state of affairs participating in these three central categories. We further learn from the *Categories* that as a (first kind of) quality, *hexis* should be differentiated from διάθεσις (*diathesis*, disposition). Both *hexis* and *diathesis* are qualities belonging to a substantial reality (οὐσία, *ousia*), and any *hexis* is also primarily a *diathesis*. Yet, in as much as disposition is fleeting and unstable, *hexis* is a disposition which “has been naturalized” (πεφυσιωμένη, *phepusiomene*) over a period of time”. *Hexis* is then established by a process of appropriation between an acting

³ This known maxim is not to be found in Aristotle. In Augustine, one finds the expression “*secunda natura*” together with “*consuetudino*”, not with “*habitus*.” (De musica, lib. 6, 19). Augustine himself points to Cicero as the origin of this expression.

⁴ I am thankful to the Gerda Henkel Foundation for the support of the present project as well as to the community of the Thomas Institute for hosting my work.

⁵ Aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b13).

⁶ Aristotle, 1962b: 46-47 (6b1), 62-63 (8b27), 106-107 (15b19).

⁷ Aristotle, 1962b: 64-65 (9a1-5).

subject and that which she possesses. This can also happen between living organisms and the things that pertain to them: In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle writes that between he who has a garment and the garment which is being had, exists a *hexis*⁸. That is to say: *hexis* mediates between the “owner” and that which is “being-had”, or property. We will return to this point later.

The Scholastic
Challenge:
Between a
Virtue and a
Genre of Things

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle differentiates between habit, affect (πάθος, *pathos*) and potency (δύναμις, *dunamis*); and out of these three state of the soul, only habit serve as the foundation of virtue⁹. Both potencies and affects could be viewed as participating in the natural pace of things: Potency exists in the thing by the latter’s very nature and could not be eradicated, and affects are exterior movements causing a corresponding movement in the body, according to causal natural laws. *Hexis*, in its turn, exists between the two former states of the soul: As a process of naturalization, *hexis* is the human capability to react properly or improperly to the affects¹⁰, that is to say to all that which changes the human-being from the outside. And when a habit is established, it behaves *like* a potency, that is to say like something belonging to human nature. From this we induce that *hexis* has a complicated relation to nature: *hexis* is a *naturalizing* process. It goes *towards* nature, working to achieve a situation which is nature-like. And even if ethical virtues belong first and foremost to the soul, φύσις (*phusis*, nature) has an integral part to play in them. In the ethical context, a distinction should be made between *hexis* and ἦθος (*ethos*), which are both translated occasionally as “habit”. Whereas *hexis* does not necessarily belong to the ethical domain, *ethos* refers exclusively to habits pertaining to the ethical domain which is arranged by the soul. Moreover, if *hexis* signifies a state of possession in a general manner, then the meaning of *ethos* goes in the more specific direction of a “custom” or “character”¹¹. Yet every “habit” effectuates a process which is related to nature and affected by it. In *Memory and reminiscence*, Aristotle writes: “ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις τό ἦθος”¹², “character comes after nature”. Therefore, it is useful to differentiate between *ethos* as character, which belongs to the ethical domain of praxis, and *hexis* which should be regarded as belonging to a *proto-practical* domain: *Hexis* is certainly *capable* of participating in ethico-practical processes, but by itself and in its elementary form, *hexis* concerns the fundamental, general human ability to master and dispose of his own

8 Aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b9).

9 Aristotle, 1962a: 86-89 (1105b20-1106a14).

10 Nickl, 2001: 19-35.

11 On the difference between *hexis*, *ethos* and *hutos* in Aristotle, see Miller, 1974.

12 Aristotle, 1957: 304-305 (452a27)

actions and reactions to the affects, in regard to its potencies. Even if rigorously intermingled with natural elements and movements, virtue is *not a natural quality*. Virtue is constituted *neither from nature nor against nature*¹³; virtue is rather determined, stabilized and naturalized through a process necessitating experience and time-lapse, establishing its own regulations. This structure necessitates a body and an area which is its exterior. It necessitates the sensitivity and responsiveness of the body to outside influences. Finally a habit in the ethical framework necessitates a process of commerce between the acting-subject and its surrounding, determining the manner in which the acting-subject is actualized in its affecting environment.

A synthesis of the above mentioned Aristotelian text-locations suggests that the Aristotelian *hexis* is an active relation of possession, being stabilized between a living actor and something that she possesses. In the ethical framework, that which is possessed in *hexis* is a capacity to react to the affects, in a manner which serves first and foremost the form or the soul of the subject-actor.

The Scholastic Challenge: Between a Virtue and a Genre of Things

In its medieval scholastic version, *habitus*, which is the Latin translation of the Greek *hexis*, belongs first and foremost to the soul. Yet one has to emphasize that Thomas Aquinas *did not exclude* physical *habitus* from the list of habits¹⁴. Instead, Aquinas accepted Aristotle's determination that both beauty and health are habits, but he specified that they are "as habits", that is to say, closer to a disposition than to habit in the full sense of the word. The reason Aquinas provides for this differentiation is that, whereas habits are taken as stable and difficult to change, the body, according to the scholastic understanding, is viewed as a non-permanent, fleeting reality, always susceptible to be changed and mutated. *Habitus* of the body is therefore "as" a habit, in as much as *habitus* of the soul is properly a habit¹⁵. *Habitus* in the proper sense of the word, according to Aquinas, belongs exclusively to the moral domain and is, as in Aristotle, the foundation of virtue. Only habit that is directed to a form (rather than to an operation), that is to say, to the soul (or the reality) of the subject, could have its "seat" in the body and therefore have the body as its subject¹⁶. Therefore *habitus* of the body, in the Thomistic framework is directed to the actualization of the reality (the "form") of the actor, rather than to a specific operation that

13 Aristotle, 1962a, 70-71 (1103a25).

14 Aquinas, 1920: 797-799 (Quaest. 50 Art. 1).

15 Ibid., Reply to 2.

16 Aquinas, 1920: 798 (Quaest. 50, art 1, answer).

the actor performs. Finally, *habitus* could reside in the body in a *secondary manner*, when it *participates* in the general habit ordered and directed by the soul. Therefore in the scholastic framework bodily habits are acknowledged, though they are submerged in the habits of the soul and are subordinate to them. In a second step, as we are going to see, Aquinas raises the possibility of including material things in the kingdom of habit.

In the opening of the discussion of *habitus* in the *Summa Theologiae*, and following Aristotle in the *Categories*, Aquinas differentiates between *habitus* as “relation” and *habitus* as “having”, and it is the latter that Aquinas links with physical usage. Aquinas returns to the examples of the garment and its wearer given by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*. Aquinas sharpens and radicalizes Aristotle’s suggestion by saying that habits are situations *involving things*, i.e., those things that “we have about ourselves”¹⁷. Therefore here *habitus* is designed not only as a relation but also as including the material thing itself, having an actual relation with a body and being carried by a body. Habits are, therefore, *inter alia*, also bodily accessories which are found in a relation to a body, adorning and covering it: “Thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered [*ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum*]: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that ‘a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had’; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves [*quae circa nos habemus*]. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things [*speciale genus rerum*], which are comprised under the predicament of ‘habit’: of which the Philosopher says that ‘there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed’ [*inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius*]”.

To conclude this all-too-brief account, in the scholastic version, *habitus* of the body should be understood as a quasi-*habitus* closer to a disposition (because its subject could be easily changed), which is directed to the form of the subject, that is to say, to the actualization of the natural form of the actor. Corporeal *habitus* maintains the ambiguous status of the Aristotelian *hexis*: on the one hand, it is contingent and artificial, but on the other hand it adheres and conforms to the form of its actor and is integrated in the actor’s operations. Hence, Aquinas maintains both the elements and the ambiguity of the Aristotelian definitions: He maintains the dispersal of *hexis* between the various categories (relation, quality and having), as well as

17 Aquinas, 1920: 793 (Quaest. 49, art 1, answer).

the distinction between habits, potencies and affects. Yet Aquinas enlarges the Aristotelian model by adding to it this “*speciale genus rerum*”, the habit understood as a “*res*”. One has indeed to remember that in the Romance languages, “habit” also denotes simply a cloth, a garment, dress and custom, this genre of things that cover the body and serve as its “second skin”. In as much as Aquinas distinguished between the possessive-material kind of *habitus* and the properly moral one, in the 19th century the two parts of *habitus* re-unite to create the modern “*habitude*” In this later formulation of habit, the bodily possession of habit is considered not only as an element but as a constitutive part of the moral domain.

**The Organic
Habitual
Domain in
Ravaisson**

In 1802, Maine de Biran has located the notion of *habitude* as the center of his treatment of the human psyche and its faculty of thought (*pensée*), to which corporeal reality itself, according to Biran, is immanent¹⁸. A treatment of the peculiar immanence of the body in Biran and of the place of *habitude* in its construction will require a separate study¹⁹. Yet it is important to note that Biran differentiates between passive and active *habitudes*: those habits which are “forced” on the organism from its surrounding, and those which are initiated or developed by the conscious organism itself. This Biranian differentiation, as we shall see, will be elaborated by Bergson.

Ravaisson's *De l'habitude* of 1838 condenses several traditions of discussion of habit, of which the prominent ones are the Aristotelian and the Biranian²⁰. The scholastic model, on the other hand, is not explicitly named as a direct source for Ravaisson's inquiry. Nevertheless, Ravaisson's attitude towards *habitude* shares notable affinities with that of Aquinas, affinities regarding the spiritual, theological horizon and beginning of habits. Ravaisson opens his inquiry with the quote from Aristotle mentioned above, “character comes after nature”²¹. Hence the relation between *habitude* and nature is posed as the *leitmotif* of the essay. The second quote from Aristotle Ravaisson brings at the opening pages of his essay is a known sentence from the opening of the second book of the *Ethics*²² in which Aristotle maintains that inanimate things could not acquire a virtue: “for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force”²³. The Aristotelian ethical framework of Ravaisson's discussion is therefore evident, and one

18 De Biran, 1953.

19 For such an examination see Henry, 1965: 71-105.

20 Janicaud, 1997: 15-35.

21 Ravaisson, 2008: 24-25.

22 Aristotle, 1962a: 70-71 (1103a20).

23 Aristotle, 1961: 246-247 (1220b4-5).

of the central conceptual operations of Ravaissson's essay is the synthesis between ethics and physics, a synthesis extending between will and nature, a synthesis that, according to Ravaissson, makes the work that *habitude* has to accomplish.

Differently from the Thomistic version which proceeds from the presentation of *habitus* to the discussion of moral virtue, Ravaissson begins his essay with an extensive discussion of the *physical world* and the manner in which *habitude* participates in its construction. The discussion begins by questioning the place of habit in nature, in spatiotemporal reality, in material things and in bodies. From an Aristotelian point of view this method is acceptable as in fact this order of discussion searches to understand *habitus'* foundation in natural disposition (diathesis), conforming with the discussion in the *Categories* that was mentioned above, stating that habit begins as a disposition. Also in agreement with Aristotle, Ravaissson's conclusion is that in the inorganic domain, which is immediate and homogenous (according to Ravaissson), *habitude* as such *does not exist*²⁴. Therefore, *habitude* does not belong essentially to nature. Instead, *habitude* begins where human action begins, that is to say, where an ethical organization (in the Aristotelian sense) is enabled. Even if the habitual dynamics are not natural, Ravaissson demonstrates that the depths of the habitual architectonics come infinitesimally close to nature in its pure physical reality. *Habitude* acts like a membrane prolonging the movement between the moral and the natural domains.

Ravaissson's *habitude* is an instrument of prolongation. Two levels of *prolongation* characterize the Ravaisssonian *habitude*. First, as we have seen, like in Aristotle (and in Aquinas), the work of *habitude* needs an enduring process of acquisition and contraction (these are Ravaissson's terms). Secondly, *habitude* necessitates the existence of an element of a domain which is *exterior* to the active organism. In other words, a primary condition for the formation of a *habitude* is a situation of *heterogeneity* existing between a thinking-active body and its natural surroundings²⁵. This fundamental *heterogeneity* is the reason for the fact that habituation is a process demanding a time-span, a *duration*, in order to gradually (and never fully) bridge-up this abyss between the soul and exterior nature. In the inorganic world, where cause and effect are established and immediate as the rules of nature, there is neither a need nor a place for a process of habituation. This

24 Ravaissson, 2008: 28-29.

25 On heterogeneity in Ravaissson see Montebello, 2003: 82, 89, 91.

lapse of time characteristic of human reality and its *habitudes*, as we shall shortly see was captured and underlined by Henri Bergson. Moreover, for Bergson, the domain of *habitude* extends, in principle, also to the inorganic world, that is to say, to matter itself²⁶.

For Ravaissan, with the help of *habitude*, liberty and consciousness could re-unite with the natural tendency for repetition and rehearsal, which is spontaneous and unconscious (otherwise referred to in physical terms as “inertia”). In order to describe the architectonics of *habitude*, Ravaissan introduces the model of a spiral, which has its deep roots in the very beginning of organic life, whereas its upper bounds dwell in the light of consciousness. “Habit comes back down this spiral, teaching us of its origin and genesis”²⁷. This “spiral” movement of *habitude* is established only in the domain of organized life; but organization of life, as in Aristotle and in Aquinas, is always a result of the morphologies of the soul, and therefore: “It is in consciousness alone that we can find the archetype of habit; it is only in consciousness that we can aspire not just to establish its apparent law but to learn its how and its why, to illuminate its generation and, finally to understand its cause”²⁸. Yet when arriving to the pure formal level of the organization by the soul, one is no longer in the domain of nature: “As soon as the spiral arrives at self-consciousness, it is no longer merely the form, the end or even the principle of organization: a world opens within it that increasingly separates and detaches itself from the life of the body, and in which the soul has its own life, its own destiny and its own end to accomplish”²⁹. Godly grace and the Spirit’s freedom are transcendent both to nature and to the habitual domain. And both Godly grace and the Spirit’s freedom are, according to Ravaissan’s understanding, the beginning and principle (*arché*) of *habitude*. The beginning of *habitude* is generated by a gesture of grace enacted upon human reality from its outside. On this issue, Ravaissan is closer to Aquinas than to Aristotle. As we are going to see, for Bergson, who also strolled down the paths of the Aristotelian formulations, *habitude* is generated by nature and from within nature, and, in a certain sense, *habitude is nature itself*.

Motoric Habitude in Bergson

Bergson radicalized the affiliation of *habitude*³⁰ with corporeal reality and to nature itself. In this, as Bergson clarified in his course notes of 1892-1893, he

26 “A vrai dire, la matière est susceptible d’habitudes”, Bergson, 1992: 272.

27 Ravaissan, 2008: 76-77.

28 Ravaissan, 2008: 38-39.

29 Ravaissan, 2008: 66-67.

30 I am following the translation of Mabelle L. Andison in Bergson, 1946.

followed what he called “the naturalist thinkers of *habitude*”³¹. Yet, Bergson’s explorations of *habitude* refer explicitly as well to the Aristotelian and the Ravaissonian sources. Dominique Janicaud, an eminent researcher of the relation between Ravaisson and Bergson, has determined that Bergson’s reading of Ravaisson on the subject of *habitude* is an “optical error”³² that fails to serve as a true reflection of Ravaisson’s model. Bergson’s reading of Ravaisson is erroneous, according to Janicaud, as the former emphasized the mechanical nature of *habitude* and even reduced *habitude* to a mechanical activity, whereas as for Ravaisson *habitude* has an extra-natural, spiritual and godly source. The approach taken in the present paper, though, neither over-emphasizes the idealistic character of Ravaisson’s work nor over-materializes the mechanical character of *habitude* in Bergson. Both Spiritualist thinkers pursued what Pierre Montebello called “a movement towards profundity” [*Le mouvement vers la profondeur*]³³. And for both Ravaisson and Bergson, it is *habitude* which opens the door to the descent inwards, though by two different methods.

Both versions of *habitude*, adhering to the Spiritualist decree³⁴, reserve for it the privileged status of *serving as a starting platform of philosophical inquiries*. Moreover Bergson returned to an issue which was addressed by de Biran but was not prominent in Ravaisson’s model, which is the relation between *habitude* and memory³⁵. Much more than an optical error, this observation by Bergson in fact drew a reasonably poignant conclusion from Ravaisson’s habitual spiral, and bounded Ravaisson’s discussion more strongly with its Biranian, and therefore Spiritualist, roots.

It is true though that for Bergson all *habitudes* are essentially *motoric*. In numerous places in his writings, the word “*habitude*” appears together with the word “*motrice*”, creating the expression of “*motoric habitude*”. *Habitude* is therefore connected in Bergson’s thought to the movements of the organism. This is how Bergson presents Ravaisson’s concept of *habitude*, in an honorary essay from 1904:

For motor habit [*une habitude motrice*], once contracted, is a mechanism, a series of movements which determine one another: it is that part of us which is inserted into nature and which coincides

31 Bergson, 1992: 265-273.

32 Janicaud, 1997: 50.

33 Montebello, 2003: 97.

34 Janicaud, 1997: 126-161.

35 Biran, 1953: 130-163.

with nature; it is nature itself. Now, our inner experience shows us in habit an activity which has passed, by imperceptible degrees, from consciousness to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. Should we not then imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured consciousness and a dormant will? Habit thus gives us the living demonstration of this truth, that mechanism is not sufficient to itself: it is, so to speak, only the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity³⁶.

Bergson's version of the concept of *habitude* is indeed different from that of Ravaisson. For Bergson, *habitude* is immanent to the mechanical nature of practical life. Motoric *habitude*, Bergson emphasizes, has its cause not so much in the spirit but rather in the *utility* of the organism. *Habitude* guaranties that the same gesture would be ready to respond to future situations belonging to the same genre³⁷. Thus, *habitude* engenders and installs in the body a motoric apparatus³⁸, whose own effect, Bergson clarifies, is either to construe the automatic machinery in the organism, or to produce a *need* in the organism³⁹. As in all conceptions of habit discussed in this essay thus far, so also for Bergson the acquisition ("contraction") of a *habitude* is achieved through repetition and rehearsal. The rehearsal of gestures by habituation orders and organizes the activity of the organism.⁴⁰ Moreover, for Bergson, this establishing and ordering of gestures is of a *mnemonic* kind⁴¹. Every gesture which is performed by motoric *habitudes* realizes a virtual reservoir of movements, perceptions and memories, already performed by the organism as a reaction to a similar movement, cause, or image⁴². We note *in passim* that this still stands in agreement with the Aristotelian determination of *hexis* as a capacity to react to the affections.

Therefore, according to this Bergsonian understanding, from any rehearsed gesture of the body one could draw enormous amount of data regarding the history of the organism. The habitual spiral of Ravaisson mentioned above, therefore, was brought by Bergson to a radical conceptual consequence, in Bergson's view that the roots of habit lie not only deep in the body but also in the very past of the organism.

36 Bergson, 1946: 275; Bergson, 2009: 267.

37 Bergson, 2012: 186.

38 Bergson, 2012: 267.

39 Bergson, 1992: 266.

40 Bergson, 2012: 88-89.

41 Bergson, 1992: 270.

42 Bergson, 2009: 182.

Motoric Habitue as Memory

The decisive character making Bergson's *habitude* a concept in its own right is its relation with memory. This aspect of the relation between *habitude* and memory is not to be found in the Ravaissonian version, but is rather to be found earlier, in de Biran⁴³. Bergson understood the core-activity of memory as operated by motoric *habitudes*. For Bergson, motoric *habitudes* are memory in its mechanic, automatic, un-reflective aspect, taking place in the body as well as in the soul.

In the operation of *habitudes*, the actor constantly re-enacts, re-realizes its past deeds, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously. For Bergson, this *not only* includes a physical aspect but *is the physical aspect* of the organism. The body is a lump of conglomerated, better or worse organized *habitudes*, and the part of the soul directing mental or corporeal *habitudes* is already conceived as spatial in its very nature, and therefore belonging to material reality, not to spirit's domain. Yet the memory of the body, constituted by the ensemble of the sensorial-motoric system that *habitude* has organized⁴⁴, condenses the entire past of the organism into momentary actions, which can be transfigured into moments of intuition. Bergsonian intuition therefore should be considered as working along with and within the architecture of *habitudes*, rather than as a transgression beyond them altogether. Bergsonian intuition, understood literally, should be conceived as a grasping of the manner in which an intensive-compressed network of habits and memories are realized in a certain momentary act of a particular apprehension (of an idea, of an object etc.): "In concrete perception memory intervenes, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities is due precisely to the fact that our consciousness, which begins by being only memory, prolongs a plurality of moments into each other, contracting them into a single intuition⁴⁵". Intuition, in this sense, is a *configuration* of *habitudes*. Furthermore a *pure intuition*, the productive intuition that one finds in philosophy and art, is enacted as the un-making (*défaire*) of *habitudes*, in order to "recover contact with the real"⁴⁶. Bergsonian intuition therefore is a two-layered mental act (literal and pure), and both layers involve the working with *habitudes*: At the literal level, intuition configures a reservoir of *habitudes* into a point of contact with reality; and at its pure level, intuition un-makes this virtual reservoir in order to restore something that was missed or contorted in the literal moment of apprehension.

43 Biran, 1953: 117-145.

44 Bergson, 2012: 169.

45 Bergson, 1911: 292; Bergson, 2012: 246.

46 Bergson, 1911: 241; Bergson, 2012: 205.

Therefore we learn that *habitude* has the capacity to register knowledge of the history of the habituated organism in an orderly and *extended* manner, *partes extra partes*. This capacity of *habitude* has also its pedagogical aspect:

The memory of the lesson, which is remembered in the sense of learnt by heart, has *all* the marks of a habit. Like a habit, it is acquired by the repetition of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition and then a re-composition of the whole action. Lastly, like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up [*emmagine*] in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic movement which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take the same length of time⁴⁷.

Therefore, learning by heart, appropriating a poem, a language, a style, being acquainted and truly familiar with some object, embodies the core structure of *habitude*.

Habitude is acquired by the repetition of effort; but when effort is repeated automatically, it tends to diminish and to evaporate. Yet repetition itself holds the capacity to de-compose a movement and to re-compose it again. And this, according to Bergson, is already a supplementary effort which keeps *habitudes* alert and intelligent⁴⁸. Therefore *habitual* repetition holds the capacity to become innovative when it involves the de-composition of gestures, actions and deeds. Without repetition and rehearsal one could neither begin nor continue to perform the task of understanding a poem. Yet the *habitual* activity, for example like of literature reading or wine-tasting, is being enhanced by attention and effort, thereby producing an ever-growing subtlety, that is to say, taste⁴⁹.

The motoric gestures of the body, by their rehearsal, create a mechanical *habitude* and establish the movements that automatically follow certain perceptions. This is the basis of the *survival* of the organism in its adaptation to its milieu. This process registers the past of the organism in the figures of its *habitudes*⁵⁰: "The body retains motor habits capable of acting the past over again [*jouer à nouveau le passé*]; it can resume attitudes in which the past will insert itself; or, again, by the repetition of certain cerebral phenomena which have prolonged former perception, it can furnish to remembrance a point

47 Bergson, 1911: 89-90; Bergson, 2012: 84.

48 Bergson, 2012: 122.

49 Bergson, 1992: 244.

50 Bergson, 2012: 89.

of attachment [*point d'attache*] with the actual, a means of recovering its lost influence upon present reality"⁵¹.

In our view, then, Bergson's reading of Ravaisson's *habitude* distinguished an important aspect of *habitude* which was latent in Ravaisson's account. Moreover, we suggest that one should assign to *habitude* a decisive place in Bergson's philosophy at large, a more important place indeed than the one which is usually admitted. Bergsonian *habitude* is not only a reservoir of the past of the organism; it also constitutes the primary subject-matter of philosophical inquiry.

Habitude as Philosophical Subject-Matter

According to Bergson, *habitudes* of all kinds (material, mental and intellectual) divert our spirit from capturing reality, as they construe an architecture of assumed relations between situations and actions. Yet the reversibility of *habitudes*, that is, the fact that they are not natural, but rather constituted and artificial (again in full conformity with the Aristotelian formulation), makes *habitudes* capable of being disintegrated, so that a momentary contact with reality would be enabled: "Intelligence has contracted habits necessary for everyday living; these habits, transferred to the domain of speculation, bring us face to face with a reality, distorted or made over, or at any rate, arranged; but the arrangement does not force itself upon us irresistibly; it comes from ourselves; what we have done we can undo; and we enter then into direct contact with reality"⁵². *Habitudes* are formed by the practical necessities of man and it is the task of metaphysics, according to Bergson, to begin its inquiries by dissipating and questioning those *habitudes*, the artificial obscurities that diverted mind's connection with reality⁵³. In other words, Bergson assigns to philosophy the task of (re-)beginning by a deconstruction of the synthetic reality, in which utility constructs motoric habit. This habitual reality should be referred to as a moral reality in the Aristotelian sense of being occupied with the managing of human actions, gestures and deeds. Any metaphysical inquiry should begin by a questioning of the habitual domain of human reality which is simultaneously moral and physical, beginning by examining the philosopher's own mental-habits, decomposing them and recomposing them anew. Returning to the Aristotelian vocabulary, we'd say that Philosophy, according to Bergson, should begin with a *naturalized* reality, with the extended habit that has been established in some subject who is under consideration. The inquiry then should proceed by dismantling, undressing, deconstructing, going down the spiral of habit and *denaturalizing* it in order to uncover its beginning, its *arché*, which is, in

51 Bergson, 1911: 299; Bergson, 2012: 253.

52 Bergson, 1946: 30-31; Bergson, 2009: 22.

53 Bergson, 2012: 9.

all versions that we have examined (Aristotle, Aquinas, Ravaissan and Bergson), an affect arriving to the subject from an outside (Nature, movement, godly grace, necessity, etc.). This kind of metaphysical questioning will neither be “materialist” nor “idealist”, but it would be at any rate an incorporated process of inquiry, in which thought would have to pierce through its own incorporated, inhabited habits, in order to achieve moments of contact with nature.

Pending Questions

Could one think of the 19th century French chapter of dealing with *habitude* of the body as a response to the Aristotelian and Thomistic challenges and ambiguities? In the Spiritualist version suggested by Ravaissan and Bergson, *habitude* is not anymore a quality laid upon the surface of the organism: rather it is a reality installing the interior and the depth of the organism itself, up until the point of the lodge of the spirit, the latter remaining always free and self-constituting. Habit in this version is seen more as *prosthesis* rather than as ornament, it is an ornament becoming prosthesis, being anchored in the organisms' reality.

The two most crucial questions arising out of this state of affairs are (a) what could be the conceptual consequences of the late 19th century mixture between *habitude* and corporeality to the understanding of spatiality and extension in general; and (b) returning to the Aristotelian and Thomistic formulations, locating *hexis* and *habitus* between an actor and the habits that wrap it, one should ask what could be the consequences of Ravaissan's and Bergson's elaborations of *habitude* not only for the actor-subject, but rather for *the cloth itself*, that is to say for the accessories accompanying the bodily actor. In the last couple of decades, within the framework of what is known as the Speculative-realist turn, one finds a tendency to talk about an “object oriented ontology”, aiming to put in the center of philosophy not the human subject but rather the things and instruments surrounding it.⁵⁴ Here, on the other hand is suggested an equally realist manner of approaching the accessories and the habits of the human body as naturalizing instruments, while nevertheless maintaining the primacy of the subject: Habits *participate in the subject*, they generate and re-generate it, covering the actor and simultaneously endowing the actor with profundity. The subject, embracing both the human actor and its habits, must be conceived as a moral, acting reality⁵⁵, in which the rehearsal, realization and actualization of past actions literally produce the body, consisting of accessories, covers, containers, and the locks that hold all these together. Denaturalizing habits meaning finding the keys to unlock these various habitual cases, yet not doing away with habit altogether.

54 Harman, 2010: 93–104.

55 Badiou, 1982.

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF HABIT: REASON, KNOWING AND SELF- PRESENCE IN HABITUAL ACTION

abstract

Paul Ricoeur claims in *Freedom and Nature* that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking about. Habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. It has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a form to our world relations.

But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? In ordinary discourse, habits are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act 'before we know what we are doing'.

In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. I will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to expression as subject. In doing so, I will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. Here, I will refer to the work of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. My claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative.

keywords

Habit, knowing, phenomenology, embodiment, hermeneutics

"To acquire a habit does not mean to repeat and consolidate but to invent, to progress."

Paul Ricoeur

Paul Ricoeur claims in *Freedom and Nature* that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking about (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 280). Habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. It has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a form to our world relations.

But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? In ordinary discourse, habits are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act 'before we know what we are doing'.

In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. This will not be comprehensive and seeks only to temper a certain one-sidedness in discussions of habit. I will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to expression as subject. In doing so, I will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. Here, I will refer to the work of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world.

My claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. But first to the more negative appraisal.

1. In the *Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle makes explicit mention of habits but only to dismiss them as irrelevant to intelligent acting. Ryle is concerned with offering an account of "knowing how" which is essentially distinct and irreducible to propositional "knowing that" inasmuch as it is enacted rather than enunciated.

But he is clear that “knowing how” is not to be identified in any way with the notion of habit. Habits, along with explicit propositions, in fact, make up the two poles in whose tension the notion of dispositions is held. For Ryle, the disposition is an engaged, mindful and dynamic way of knowing which is made manifest as responsive to the demands of a situation. This responsiveness requires revision of the classical Cartesian account of knowledge because the intelligence involved in responsive dispositions does not involve something *that* we know but is rather an enacted intelligence. Still, such enacted *knowing how* is not to be identified with habituality.

While Ryle is often described as a thinker with strong behaviorist sympathies, his account of dispositions must rather be understood as an explicit attempt to distance himself from behaviorism inasmuch as he thinks of dispositions as incorporated ways of knowing the world which are not automatic. On the other hand, behaviorist claims seem to very much determine the way he thinks about habits. To act from habit, he says, is “to act automatically and without mind to what one is doing” (Ryle, 2000, p. 42). Following a famous cue from Aristotle, Ryle describes habits as ‘second natures’ but goes on to say that these second natures consist of drill and the rote learning of basic skills or facts which can be reproduced or recited without significant use of intelligence. When a child learns to recite the multiplication tables, she does so in a way that lacks any meaningful mental engagement. She merely repeats the words in the way a parrot might. So while dispositions involve a non-propositional application of intelligence that is dynamic, adaptive and progressive, habits are blind and thoughtless and are incorporated into actions as reflexes. He claims that while “drill dispenses with intelligence, training develops it” (Ryle, 2000, p. 42). A habit, then, is a stock response, lacking in dynamism, which is always the same, and which issues forth in answer to a specific stimulus. A habit might, of course, appear to be intelligent (the multiplication tables are the manifestation of an intelligence) while a disposition might appear to be a reflex (as when the chess player makes a spontaneous move without appearing to deliberate) but we must not let ourselves be deceived. What separates the habit from the disposition is (a) the extent to which the agent appropriates the knowledge as *her* knowledge and, (b) the capacity to engage with the world on the basis of this knowledge in a way that is innovative. Acting from habit denotes, for Ryle, a type of performance that is static because its meaning in wider contexts of significance remains largely opaque for us. As such, habitual action cannot be considered to manifest knowing in any genuine sense.

This view of habit is typical of the way it has come to be thought by philosophers and in ordinary discourse. Even one of the great thinkers of the formation of subjectivity in habituality, Heidegger, tends to present habit in a largely negative

light. Take, for example, the social expression of habit in Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's public everydayness (Heidegger, 1962, p. 213). Ordinary everydayness is presented, by Heidegger, as incorporating and reproducing ways of being, talking and thinking about the world, oneself and others which are intelligible in a sense but which cannot be considered to manifest genuine knowing. For Ryle, learning the multiplication tables also contained a certain intelligibility in the sense that the tables themselves are the product of intelligent organizations. When I repeat them, however, I am not doing so intelligently but spontaneously and without thought. Likewise, for Heidegger, the idle talk (*Gerede*) of the 'they' (*das Man*) is not lacking in intelligibility and he even concedes that it is a way of disclosing the world. And yet the Dasein which discloses in such talk does so in a mode of "groundless floating" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 221) which "not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 213). Habitual ways of being and acting, as such, distract, uproot and alienate Dasein from Being-in-the-world by dissolving individual Dasein into an inauthentic self-forgetfulness or an amorphous 'they' that is everyone and no-one. This contrasts with authentic self-appropriation which is made possible on the basis of radically disclosive experiences that reveal the singularity of Dasein, not apart from the world but in the network of world and other relations.¹ So for both Ryle and Heidegger, the problem is not so much that habitualities lack intelligence but that the intelligence is not genuinely expressive of the habitual agent. Whether this lack is the lack of enacted rational agency (Ryle) or of an authentic self-relation (Heidegger), the point is that they involve ways of being, thinking and acting which are incorporated in *me* but which are not really *mine*. Heidegger is concerned here with habitual ways of making sense which are, to be sure, much more complex than what Ryle has in mind with the concept of habit but what both discussions have in common is the presentation of incorporated ways of acting as lacking in understanding or dynamism, as stock and as falling away from a genuinely intelligent engagement with oneself and the world. What these accounts have in common is a commitment to the idea that authentic world engagement must revolve around an immediate kind of self-transparency. The problem with habits is that they inhibit transparency through the incorporation of ways of being and acting that are, from the start, thoughtless or

1 There are other places in Heidegger's text which could fruitfully be discussed with regard to our theme. Not least of which is his analysis of the primordially of Dasein's practical engagement with the world. As is well known, Heidegger provides detailed analysis of the way in which the world is first and foremost encountered as a network of significances which are ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*). These are eminently relevant because of the fact that it argues for a world relation that is shot through with habituality. For Heidegger, habit is essential to any understanding of human Being-in-the-world. However, my claim here is simply the minimal one that the overriding concern for authenticity in Being and Time results in a clear ambivalence regarding habits in that they are viewed as both essential and problematic.

which have become so.

2.
Habit,
Embodiment,
Hermeneutic
Consciousness:
Merleau-Ponty
and Ricoeur

But must habit be so understood? I want now to turn to certain texts of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur who challenge this view by claiming that habits are, in fact, crucial to the constitution of the individual as individual and to her constitution as knower of the world.² Their claims will turn out to hang on the importance of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness for our understanding of what subjectivity is. The idea is that subjectivity does not simply stand in opposition to objectivity but naturalizes or objectifies itself through its Being-in-the-world. This is important for the concept of habit because it enables us to think the objectification process, which partly determines habit acquisition, not as a loss of genuine engagement with the world as subject but as a crucial moment of this coming to expression. At the same time, they are aware that this objectification can reify and become automatism. They simply reject the claim that such degeneration of habit should be identified with habit simpliciter (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145).

2.1
Habit and
Embodiment

As is well known, Merleau-Ponty makes embodiment fundamental to any genuine understanding of the meaning of subjectivity, a commitment which entails thinking of the habitual body not as a 'falling away' of consciousness but a crucial moment in its coming to presence. As such, the formation of habit is considered to be important to the way in which consciousness spiritualizes the world and is naturalized by it such that it becomes important to the constitution of authentic Being-in-the-world. Habit acquisition is a crucial moment in the dialectic between spirit and nature which, in turn, is of crucial importance for the singularization of the subject as knower. As such, habits are intensely individualizing and cannot be considered to stand for a flight away from myself. In many ways, Merleau-Ponty's habits are close enough to Ryle's dispositions even though their import encompasses both considerations of epistemology and also the constitution of personhood and identity.

But is it just a question of terminology that separates Ryle and Merleau-Ponty?

² Merleau-Ponty is not alone in his positive evaluation of habit and habituality. As Dermot Moran has recently pointed out, Husserl's writings are replete with detailed and comprehensive analyses of habits and their crucial role in the constitution of human life at corporeal, social and cultural levels (Moran, 2011, p. 61). These analyses are so important for Husserl's account of rational personhood that they make the various Cartesian caricatures of the founder of phenomenology untenable (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 82). I will not be discussing Husserl in the present context for two reasons. The first is that his coverage of habituality is simply too comprehensive to be done justice to here. The second reason is that our theme is especially about knowing and while this is not alien to Husserl's discussions of habit, he tends mainly to prioritize the role of habit in the constitution of the person.

Is the latter is simply calling habit what the former called disposition? It might appear so given that Merleau-Ponty also discusses thoughtless, automatic actions which he distinguishes from habits such that it might seem that his habits are identical Ryle's dispositions. And yet, the significance of the explicit connection between habituality and embodiment should not be overlooked here. In making this connection, Merleau-Ponty appears to incorporate a naturalistic perspective into his account of knowing in the sense that there is a respiration between the emergence out of and the sinking into nature in the embodied subject's business of knowing the world. For Ryle, by contrast, the concept of disposition was explicitly intended to protect the concept of intelligence against its degeneration into natural being through habit. For Merleau-Ponty, corporeal habits are about "the reworking and renewal of the corporeal schema" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 143) and have to do with the way the body knows the world and is transformed by it (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 143f.). In a similar vein, Ricoeur says that habit, "is a new structuring in which the meaning of elements changes radically" (Ricoeur, 1966, pp. 287-288). Speaking at the level of bodily habit, he follows Merleau-Ponty in thinking of habit as the adaptation of the body to the meaning of the world, the incorporation of that meaning and a new gestalting of the environment through bodily engagement. Again, we see the complex dialectic, which is better described as an interweaving of body and environment, or the body's institution in the text of the world.

This understanding of the meaning of bodily habits is therefore explicitly intended to challenge the way that we think about consciousness and mind. It prompts us to rethink what we understand by the notion of 'understanding' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 146) precisely because the body knows the world, in habit, in a way that is adaptive and dynamic without being self-consciously deliberative (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145). As he did throughout his career, Merleau-Ponty is here trying to think together that which has traditionally been thought apart; namely consciousness and nature (Merleau-Ponty, 1983, p. 2). As such, he insists that we err in our attempt to makes sense of the constitution of meaning if we do not approach the problem in terms of a deep interwovenness of body and mind.³ While Ryle might be inclined to agree with parts of Merleau-Ponty's reasoning here, the former reflects little on the explicit meaning of embodiment for *knowing how* such that the role

3 It was no doubt for this reason that Merleau-Ponty's later writings show a distrust of even the concept of constitution which he (somewhat unfairly to Husserl) thinks of as a one-way street of 'meaning giving' *Sinngebung*. As an alternative, he uses the notion of institution which seems to capture what was essential to Husserlian constitution while simultaneously acknowledging the way in which the conscious subject is given over to itself in and by nature. See, for example, his lectures on *Institution and Passivity* (Merleau-Ponty, 2010)

of embodiment remains somewhat under-communicated.⁴ It is possible that the largely unthought role of the body accounts for Ryle's wariness of the notion of habit and his dismissal of settled dispositions as thoughtless. For Merleau-Ponty, habits, especially as corporeal, are crucial to the reception and generation of meaning. He claims that "the body has understood and the habit has been acquired when the body allows itself to be penetrated by a new signification, when it has assimilated a new meaningful core." (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 148)

In other words, to be an ego is to be an habitual ego, an ego of capacities. This does not mean that the habitual ego is an entirely predictable ego that mindlessly repeats patterns of thought and action without invention. Quite the contrary. Habits constitute us as having a certain style and are the horizon of our capacity to know the world and to personalize this knowing. But this is a moving, dynamic horizon. Habits are not mechanisms but tendencies or dispositions within which imagination, creativity and spontaneity come to expression.

Habit as a capacity for discovery is, as such, utterly belied when it is described in terms of automatism (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 284). Habits can degenerate into automatism but they are not predominantly this. This point was clearly at stake in Merleau-Ponty's famous and oft cited example of the football player's perception of the playing area:

For the player in action the football field is not an 'object', that is, the ideal term which can give rise to a multiplicity of perspectival views and remain equivalent under its apparent transformations. It is pervaded with lines of force (the 'yard lines'; those which demarcate the penalty area) and articulated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' between the adversaries) which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions. (Merleau-Ponty, 1983, p. 168)

This example is usually cited in order to demonstrate the claim that the environment is not primarily encountered as a system of objects, shapes and figures which are to be understood before being engaged.⁵ This is an important point to be sure. What is often overlooked, however, are the implications of this example for the way we think about thinking and

4 This in spite of the fact that Ryle often uses examples of embodied dispositions that would seem to be perfectly compatible with Merleau-Pontyian accounts. He would, however, certainly have been skeptical to the claim that the body can be said to "know more than we do about the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 248)

5 This kind of interpretation is typical of Dreyfus' reading of Merleau-Ponty and is also consistent with environmental accounts of mind found in writers such as James Gibson (Gibson, 1979) and Jacob von Uexküll (von Uexküll, 2010).

knowing. Hubert Dreyfus, for example, has given birth to a certain orthodox reading of Merleau-Ponty on this point that maintains that because the football player is not thinking propositionally about the football pitch or about his body's movement in it, that he is not present to himself as thinking at all (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 356). This goes too far and betrays the point that Merleau-Ponty is trying to make. When the football player engages the field as lines of force, he is specifically engaged in a practical species of thinking that engages the field as a field of possible actions. The game has rules which mean that the lines and spaces have a certain meaning within that context. However, these demarcations do not impel action but invite it and they invite it by opening for a range of *possible* engagements. The football player's habit gives rise to a "probing", as Ricoeur puts it (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 290), which co-creates the meaning of the space in the dialectic of transforming and being transformed. It is therefore not so much that action is 'drawn out' of the agent, but that the agent meets a field of possible action which can be engaged imaginatively only *because* he is thinking.

It is possible that Dreyfus means this too but his focus in these discussions has always tended to be in the wrong place.⁶ He follows Merleau-Ponty in arguing correctly that "movement is not thought about movement" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 139) but would do well to note Ricoeur's insistence that while I do not think the movement, I make knowing use of it such that "we need not say that in habit *consciousness* is abolished but only that *reflexive* knowing and willing are" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 286). In other words, the creative, spontaneous nature of world engagement in habit is one that justifies thinking of habit as comprising a kind of mindful, practical imagination. The fact that this is not thinking under the species of conceptual, propositional thinking does not mean that it is not thinking at all.⁷ That the football player does not think about the rectangularity of the football pitch or the bio-mechanics of his own movement as he plays is true but focusing only on this question leaves the meat of the account of habit untouched. It tells us what habitual action is not (explicit thinking) but not what it is. While there is more that could be said here, it suffices to say that Merleau-Ponty considers habits to be crucial to the individuation of consciousness and to the life of discovery. Habits are not automatisms that hinder genuine understanding. They denote, rather, the way in which my life is constituted in experience through my own actions

6 On this, see my critique of Dreyfus' reading of Merleau-Ponty (McGuirk, 2013).

7 Precisely this point of the status of practical coping vis-à-vis the conceptual was discussed in great detail in the 2007 debate between Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2007a, 2007b) and John McDowell (J. McDowell, 2007; John McDowell, 2007). My point here goes in another direction inasmuch as I am claiming that habitual action is neither a conceptual form of knowing (McDowell) nor an opaque form of coping (Dreyfus).

and the actions of others and the world upon me. The dialectic is what gives the ego to itself as this individual even while we must always remain wary of sedimentations that will dissolve individuality. The traces that the past (both personal and historical), others and nature leave upon us do not close the future as a future of sameness but enable our capacity to meet the future as a new field of possibilities.

2.2 Habit and Hermeneutic Consciousness

But habit is not just a feature of our bodily being-in-the-world. It is also crucially determinative of the socially engaged subject, as we have seen already with Heidegger. While this dimension of habit is rarely broached by Merleau-Ponty, it is central in Ricoeur's treatment of the matter in *Freedom and Nature*.

Ricoeur takes his cue here from Merleau-Ponty, but also from Felix Ravaisson, whose little book *On Habit* (Ravaisson, 2008), with its modernization of the Aristotelian notion of habit as 'second nature', is frequently cited. To be sure, Ravaisson's reflections on the relationship between freedom and nature are interpreted through the lens of Merleau-Ponty but in a way that allows Ricoeur to draw certain unspoken conclusions out of the work of the latter. That Merleau-Ponty himself did not take the discussion in these directions is no critique since it is beyond the ambit of what he is trying to do in *Phenomenology of Perception*. That is, while Merleau-Ponty's exploration considers the dialectic between naturalized consciousness and spiritualized nature in order to challenge basic assumptions about epistemology, anthropology and ontology, Ricoeur brings these to bear in a more comprehensive evaluation of habit as such. Thus, his approach is thoroughly phenomenological and Merleau-Pontyian⁸ while it tries to match the sweep of Ravaisson's discussion. In other words, Ricoeur's discussion is anchored in a more comprehensive discourse about being-in-the-world in which he presents a non-Heideggerian response to a Heideggerian problem, at least as far as the question of habit goes.

In this text, Ricoeur claims that the way habits shape perception and physical competences is analogous to the way in which fore-knowledge both opens new fields of possibilities and comes to expression in new and surprising ways. For Ricoeur:

What I know intellectually is present to me in the same way as the bodily skills I have. What I learn, what is understood in an original act of thought, is constantly being left behind as an act and becomes a sort of body of my

⁸ Ricoeur never cites Merleau-Ponty in *Freedom and Nature*, although he once claimed that his debt to Merleau-Ponty was enormous and that the latter had shaped his thought in immeasurable ways. He said of Merleau-Ponty's thought, that: "il est passé dans mon sang et dans mes veins" (Ricoeur, 1983). I am indebted to Bengt Kristensson Ugglå for this reference.

thought: thus knowledge becomes integrated with the realm of capabilities which I use without articulating them anew (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 294).

In this way, he extends the scope of the Merleau-Pontyan discussion in a way that would challenge not only Ryle, but also Heidegger, inasmuch as it suggests another way of appraising habitual ways of thinking and acting. Crucial to this alternative picture is the idea that habituality is adaptive. "There is a wisdom of habit," Ricoeur says, "which psychology does not encounter as long as it restricts itself to stereotyped forms of conduct" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 290).

What is learned – at first explicitly – becomes incorporated into the agent's range of possibilities. For Ricoeur, this is important as a way of describing the nature of our knowing relation with the world. The habit comprises, on the one hand, a kind of cognitive short-cut in the sense that what was first appropriated or learned explicitly need not be rehearsed every time it is called upon.⁹ But it gradually transforms our encounter with the world and generates capacities that make possible a new ease of engaging and knowing.

This claim is explicitly rooted in his understanding of the nature of subjectivity and the meaning of the first-person perspective as it is used in phenomenological research. In one of the finest presentations of the paradox of this perspective, Ricoeur explains habituation as a slipping away from itself of the subject where the incorporation of the business of thinking makes it partially opaque at the level of explicit consciousness and opens for the spontaneity of the subject to be a surprise to itself. He says that:

The strange presence within me of my intellectual experience...laid down by the activity of thought itself...seems to objectify thought completely. And yet the paradox which seems ruinous for a philosophy of the subject receives full significance only for it, for what is presented as an enigma is *my self* becoming a nature by virtue of time; an "it thinks" is present in the "I think" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 294)

This was very much the point in Merleau-Ponty's example of the football player's engagement with the field of play in the sense that at stake was a decentring of the thinking agent in a way that is yet not self-forgetful or alienating. A version of this point is also found in Ravaissan, who claims that,

In descending gradually from the clearest regions of consciousness, habit carries with it light from those regions into the depths and dark night of nature. Habit is an acquired nature, a *second nature* that has its ultimate

⁹ Ravaissan addresses the same point when he notes that the effort of consciousness is effaced over time (Ravaissan, 2008, p. 59)

ground in primitive nature, but which alone explains the latter to the understanding. It is, finally, a *natured* nature, the product and successive revelation of *naturing* nature (Ravaisson, 2008, p. 59).

Leaving aside the somewhat unfortunate language of the 'dark night' of 'primitive nature', the point to note concerns an othering of consciousness into nature in which self-presence becomes partially opaque. I become a mystery to myself because of the forces – both natural and cultural – which shape me as well as the way in which my own experience – corporeal and intellectual – becomes embodied such that they come to expression in ways that are not always entirely transparent for me. In this sense, the insights about the nature of constitution which were offered by Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied subjectivity are carried over into other forms of the contextual embeddedness of the subject.

This insight would be determinative for Ricoeur's later hermeneutic work too, of course, in that it pre-figures the thought, central for hermeneutics, that the constitution of the subject comprises both an origination in the time *before* the subject and also a slipping away in the time *of* the subject (Ricoeur, 1984, 1992).¹⁰ But these opacities of the self to itself are crucially not consigned to either the domain of the sub-personal or the inauthentic. They are instead considered forms of self-othering that operate within the realm of the humanizing of the self as singular knower.

Ricoeur's (and Ravaisson's) positive appraisals of the trajectory of mind in habit are important though for validating forms of knowing which lack thorough transparency. And in saying this, the point is not that habitual action is blind but rather that it operates out of a ground which may have receded from view. Rather than making the habitual action blind, the claim is that the ground that has been formed by habit is the basis for seeing, comprehending and acting. For Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Ravaisson, the point is that this humanizing process takes place in a way that is embodied and embedded even to the extent that singularity is constituted in a tension between full transparency and blind opacity regarding the sources of meaningful action.

The difference between this view of habit and that of Ryle (or Heidegger) hangs, then, on the connection of habit to the phenomenology of the body and to hermeneutics (for Ricoeur it is both). For neither Merleau-Ponty nor Ricoeur deny that habit involves a certain opacity of the self to itself. They are clear that habitual action involves an aspect of the self slipping out of

¹⁰ Ricoeur is, throughout his writings interested in the interplay between the involuntary and the voluntary, whether this concern the possibility of novelty in action, as in the fourth study of *Oneself as Another* (Ricoeur, 1992, pp. 88-112) or in language, as in the third study in *The Rule of Metaphor* (Ricoeur, 2003, pp. 74-116).

view for itself. Whether as embodied or historical subject, our being-in-the-world comprises habitualities of mental, social, cultural and physical action, whose originally transparent connection with the will have receded. However, rather than considering such habituality and its attendant opacity as an affront to genuine personhood or to the meaning of human knowing, they suggest that our knowing and being are crucially expressed through these forms.

3
Habit as
the Tension
Between
Spontaneity
and
Automatism

Nowhere is this clearer than in Ricoeur's treatment of the problem of automatism that was so crucial to Ryle's and Heidegger's negative appraisals of habit. In his discussion of the dialectic between "spontaneity and automatism in habit", Ricoeur is able to fully confront the Rylean/Heideggerian prejudice on the basis of Merleau-Pontyian insights in a way that Merleau-Ponty himself did not do. As noted earlier, this is largely because *Phenomenology of Perception* is essentially a discussion of perception and mind that incorporates considerations of habit while Ricoeur's text is a more fully developed phenomenology of habit that builds upon considerations of perception and mind.

When Ricoeur takes up the point, he is able to give Ryle and Heidegger their due by acknowledging the phenomena they point to while simultaneously challenging their interpretation of the meaning of these. Thus, he offers a more nuanced account of habit which is neither wholly positive nor negative. For Ricoeur, habit is always in danger of slipping into automatism. Whether on the basis of aging or a lack of attention, habits can become predominantly expressions of association, repetition and fixation. There is a tendency towards inertia that is inescapable in human life, which tempts us to "resign our freedom under the inauthentic form of custom, of the 'they', of the 'only natural', of the already seen and already done" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 301). This coheres with ordinary intuitions about habit and both Ryle and Heidegger are right to capture this aspect of the matter. However, Ricoeur insists that while "ossification is a threat inscribed in habit, [it is] not its normal destiny" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 302). To act habitually is not to act automatically, programmatically or 'without thinking'. This is, rather, a disintegration of habit into the associative such that "the mechanical represents a triumph of automatism over the will" (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 304). Ordinarily, though, habitualities are incorporated skills and knowledge that enable us to engage dynamically with the world in ways that are seemingly effortless. This goes from basic operations such as reaching for a doorknob to comforting an upset student. These actions can become automatisms if we fail to attend to what we are doing and will cause us to err. As Ricoeur

notes, mistakes only occur on the condition that we lose focus on the task at hand, while “a will attentive to the task is stronger than any association” (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 305). Thus understood, “the mechanical which seems to *invade* certain consciousness to the very roots is never completely independent of a definite *desertion* of consciousness” (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 306). The complexity of habit is such that it can fall into unconscious action or give us over to sedimented ways of responding that barely engage with the situation in which we find ourselves. But his point is that this is fundamentally a degeneration of the habitual and not its essence. Following Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur thinks of habit as “the useful naturalization of consciousness” (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 307), and the ‘descent’ of freedom into nature. This complex interweaving is the site of human being-in-the-world. We exist in the tension that can tend towards an excessive form of reflection that seeks to make us entirely self-transparent and a sleep of reason that allows consciousness to become ossified and objectified but both of these are here understood as distortions of the authentically habitual. The importance of Ricoeur’s account here is that he manages to develop Merleau-Pontyan insights into the nature of habit which take seriously our ordinary intuitions about habit – as expounded in the discussions of Ryle and Heidegger – but which place these intuitions in a more comprehensive framework which is derived from the most systematic analysis of habit to be found in the phenomenological tradition.¹¹

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HABIT AND THE EXTENDED MIND: FLESHING OUT THE EXTENDED MIND THEORY WITH MERLEAU-PONTIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

abstract

This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the non-trivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new habits into one's body schema can make a meaningful difference for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation of external components. Habitualization of one's body to environment and things in the environment is perhaps not a central part of the cognitive system - nor is it always necessary - but habit can and does make a meaningful difference in how well a coupled cognitive system might function and therefore ought to be taken into account. Moreover, habit highlights the extent to which enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. The essay proceeds by introducing Clark and Chalmers' version of the extended mind hypothesis from before turning to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the acquisition of habit qua modifications of the body-schema in conjunction with the extended mind.

keywords

Extended mind, Merleau-Ponty, habit, body-schema, skilled action, embodied cognition

This essay takes as its object the extended mind theory as expressed in Clark and Chalmers essay “The Extended Mind” in conjunction with Merleau-Ponty’s account of the functioning of habit from the *Phenomenology of Perception*.¹ The thesis I want to put forward is that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of habit (which leans heavily on his notion of the body schema) provides a non-intellektualist, temporally sensitive, and more fully embodied account with which to flesh out Clark and Chalmers basic extended framework; this augmentation can enable us to better account not only for Otto and his notebook or Tetris maven, but also applies to the wider domain of extended cognition which may be present in cases of language, tool use, and socially distributed cognition. More specifically, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the workings of habit can provide a more robust account regarding the fulfillment of key conditions for extended cognition such as increased or equal behavioral competence, endorsement, and typical invocation. The acquisition of habit in the service of epistemic action may not itself be properly cognitive but, as I hope to show, it does make a significant difference overall cognitive performance.² Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit begins, so to speak from motor functioning and builds up to “higher level” operations thus foregrounding the important role of the body as the starting point or anchor of many cognitive process. We are not born cyborgs, we become them – and we do so in part through the subtle, often imperceptible, workings of habit.

A problem, as I see it, with Clark and Chalmers “The Extended Mind” is that they fail to provide an full account of how a coupled system comes to be as well as the role of mastery over external elements in coupled systems and how performance might differ based on the acquisition of habits.³

1 This is not the first attempt to bring phenomenology and the extended cognition together. Other important works dealing with the intersections between phenomenology and the extended mind include Richard Menary’s *Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded* (2007), Michael Wheeler’s *Reconfiguring The Cognitive World: The Next Step* (2006), Robert Wilson’s *Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences – Cognition* (2004), and Mark Rowland’s *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology* (2010).

2 Following Kirsh and Maglio, Clark and Chalmers take epistemic actions to be those actions that alter the world to “aid or augment cognitive processes.” Pragmatic actions, by contrast, alter the world because some physical change is desired for its own sake (1998).

3 This is a problem with the extended mind. One could say the problem of the extended mind surrounds the challenges to the hypothesis advanced most notably by Adams and Aizawa. Adams and Aizawa claim that Clark and Chalmers, among others, commit a coupling-constitution fallacy whereby things outside the biological mind may be causally related to the mind (i.e., as inputs) but it would be a fallacy to claim that external elements are constitutive of mind (2001).

Additionally, it seems that if certain cognitive processes are not taking place entirely within the limit of the skull or skin then a skilled body is playing at least some role – to a greater or lesser degree – in said processes. Clark and Chalmers advocate an *active* externalism and yet if one wants to make sense of how a here-and-now coupled system not merely works, but works well such that behavioral competence is equal to or is markedly higher than standard cases of skull-contained biological cognition, then bodily conditions and processes need to be fleshed out in order to tell the whole story, so to speak. A possible solution, as I see it, to this problematically quasi-Cartesian omission would be to recuperate Merleau-Ponty's theory of habit – which begins in motoricity and perception and extends to “higher level” behavior and instrument use – to provide a temporally sensitive ontogeny and non-intellectualist foundation to the extended mind theory and instances of extended mind.⁴

If the extended mind is as a pervasive phenomenon as Clark and Chalmers seem to imply, and if it concerns questions not only of cognition and mind but also of self, identity, morality, and ethicality, then a Merleau-Pontian account of habit as the mortar between the intracranial mind, consciousness, the body, language, other people, and things in the world with which coupled systems might obtain could be a helpful orientation for future research. More specifically, it may provide an orientation that places more emphasis on the role of the skilled body in certain epistemic actions. I will begin with a sketch of key elements from the “The Extended Mind” essay paying special attention to the criteria for coupled systems constitutive of extended cognition such as behavioral competence. I will then turn my attention to Merleau-Ponty's theory of habit from Part One of *The Phenomenology of Perception* in order to highlight how that theory can and should be used to improve upon the work of Clark and Chalmers.

1. The Extended Mind

Clark and Chalmers distinguish their own project from similar externalization hypotheses from the 70s by claiming that those earlier forays into a sort of extended mind or meaning hypotheses only considered passive extension whereas they believe that their contribution takes the hypothesis a step further towards *active* extended cognition (Burge, 1979; Putnam 1975). This active externalism is opposed to other earlier stripes of externalism, which for the sake of simplicity, can be considered passive, distal, and diachronic or historical. The active/passive dichotomy lends

⁴ To my mind, the other key thinkers on the subject habit in the late 19th and 20th century worth seriously revisiting are Marcel Proust, William James, John Dewy, Pierre Bourdieu, Edmund Husserl, Felix Ravaisson, Paul Ricoeur, Gilbert Ryle, and Samuel Butler.

intelligibility the specific way in which “The Extended Mind” essay differs from earlier projects. Clark and Chalmers are concerned with epistemic actions involving some elements outside of the head. These external elements matter not at some prior point in time but *hic et nunc*. If epistemic actions sometimes involve extra metabolic elements then the epistemic credit should be spread among those external elements as well. Clark and Chalmers insist that their active externalism is, in some instances and for certain durations, not a description of a mere aid to cognition. Rather the claim is that extra-metabolic elements can be partially *constitutive* of certain cognitive processes. In their own words, “In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right” (1998). These systems may be, and often are, temporary, but for that reason the external components are no less partially constitutive of cognition. Again, to be clear, the hypothesis of extended cognition does not put forth the idea that mind extends into things and environment all the time or that it must do so by necessity. Rather the claim is that there are some instances in which mind does extend out into the world in ways such that those cognitive processes cannot be fully accounted for by limiting the object of one’s investigation to what goes on in one’s head. Moreover, if one only looked at the skin-bound human mind, or even more concretely at only the brain, then the argument is that one would obtain only a partial, and therefore possibly misleading picture of some types of cognition. With this in mind let’s now turn to more concrete examples of extended cognition. Clark and Chalmers give us three Tetris driven problem-solving examples in order to first highlight the unjustified assumption that the skull is the boundary and limit of all cognition. In the first case we are asked to imagine a sort of *ersatz* Tetris in which a user will not be able to rotate the blocks on the screen but must rotate them mentally in order to determine if they will fit in to various sockets. The second case is more or less a straightforward Tetris in which the blocks can be rotated on the screen by using a rotation button to help determine the fit of blocks with sockets. The third case is a sort of cyborg mash-up of the first two: Imagine one has a neural computer implant that can perform the rotation that would happen on the screen from the second example but now it is happening inside the head or one can opt for the old-fashioned mental rotation from the first example. In other words, the in the third case both possible types of rotation – outsourced and mental - occur in the head and yet the neural implant option is on par with the traditional externalized rotation-button example from the second case. Comparing these three examples is meant to

highlight the similarities in all three cases and the inadequacy of the skin or skull as a boundary for cognition when faced with the third option.⁵ This is a declaration of what Douglas Robinson has referred to as a border-war (2013). Let us look now more closely at the paradigmatic example Clark and Chalmers hazard in favor of their position; Otto and his notebook. Arguably, the core of the “Extended Mind” essay is a thought experiment involving two people who find themselves in New York City and want to go to the MoMA. Their names are Otto and Inga. Inga has normally functioning declarative memory and needs no external tools recall that MoMA is on 53rd Street. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and so rather than being able to use biological memory he uses a notebook for all sorts of things he would like to be able to recall. In this thought experiment, Otto’s notebook contains, among other things, the address of MoMA. Thus Otto can use the notebook in lieu of biological memory with no problems or decrease in behavioral competence. Otto’s use of the notebook in this example illustrates a plausible case of a coupled cognitive system as discussed above. Clark and Chalmers also give us an additional list of criteria that must all be met in order for something to count as extended qua cognition in the case of Otto’s notebook. They write:

1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.
2. That any information thus retrieved be more or less automatically endorsed. [...] It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory
3. That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required.
4. That the information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement (1998).

The “resource” in the case of Otto is his notebook but surely a smartphone or other high-tech tool could do the job as well or better. Moreover, the resource needs to be trusted. True a notebook or smartphone could be tampered with or mistrusted but biological memory is no less immune to gaslighting or doubt. Accessibility when needed is also not sufficiently

5 Based on research by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (1994), the conclusion was drawn that the rotation of these shapes was used not just to position the blocks but also and often to determine their fit within the sockets. The rotation of blocks was thus perhaps an epistemic and not merely pragmatic action. Moreover, this determination of blocks fitting into sockets was achieved far more quickly when one could rotate the block on the screen as in the second case then when had to carry out the same rotation in one’s head.

different in cases of biological as opposed to external memory resources. The naked brain is subject to sleep, intoxication, and emotional overload just as much as the notebook is susceptible to worldly inaccessibility. Clark and Chalmers back away from the force or necessity of the fourth condition because it may suggest that a history is partly constitutive of belief and because endorsement might not always need to be conscious. What Clark and Chalmers argue is that the process of memory retrieval in the case of Otto highlights the parity principle in favor of the hypothesis of extended cognition. The parity principle states that

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process (1998).

In other words, if something external to the body or brain functions in the same way as something internal then it is in a strong sense part of the cognitive process for as long as that process takes place. When is Otto's mind extended into the notebook? Only for the brief period of time that he is coupled with it in the act of retrieving the address of MoMA. In investigating the myriad types of human cognition (an incredibly broad and contentious term) we would do well, Clark and Chalmers tell us, to operative with what is called a "veil of metabolic ignorance (2011)."

Using this veil of metabolic ignorance one would not make proper sense of the process of Otto's recall by limiting the scope of one's analysis to Otto's biological memory and indeed the notebook would seem to be constitutive element of a couple cognitive system. Coupled systems, of which Otto coupled with his notebook is one example, have a number of conditions that need to be met in order for the extended element to be considered constitutive of a cognitive process or system. Clark and Chalmers identify the following four features:

1. All the components in the system play an active causal role.
2. They jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does.
3. If we remove the external component, the system's behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain.
4. This sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head (1998).

These general conditions are clearly tailored for cases such as Otto's whereby parity of internal and external components is key. Of central importance is the condition that if the external component is removed then behavioral competence will drop. A drop in behavioral competence stemming from the removal of the external component of a cognitive system can be seen in the Kirsh and Maglio's study of the performance of determining a block fitting a socket in Tetris (1994). If the competent performance of a cognitive behavior or action is needed for parity then perhaps an additional explanation is needed to explain behavioral competence with an extended component over time, which is to say with the addition of habitual knowledge of how to use a given external component without having to deliberate how - not just use it - but to use it well.

Moreover, It may be that complementarity is just as important as parity in terms of performance, competence, and governing of behavior. There are many people with Alzheimer's or similar conditions who might require or greatly benefit from cognitive scaffolds that replace some biological component that has failed then. However, cases of extended cognition in which the biological has not failed but rather can be improved upon with some external help may be equally worth investigating

In Clark's solo effort, *Supersizing the Mind*, he moves beyond just parity to examine complementarity. In that work, it seems that it is probably the case that in taking seriously the hypothesis of the extended mind we should still maintain the parity principle, but that it is equally promising to think beyond the parity and instead look at cases of complementarity. In other words, the equally fruitful, interesting, and perhaps more pervasive cases of extended mind will not be processes that mirror "skin-bag" memory, as in the case of Otto's notebook. Rather attention should also be paid to those cases which, as Clark writes, show the ways in which "it is the brain's great plasticity and thirst for cheap, outsourced labor that drives the distributed engines of sociotechnological adaptation and change (2011)." He states further that the forward-going agenda of his project is

[...] to understand the larger systemic webs that, spun around the common core shared with so many other animals, help to give human cognition its *distinctive* power, character, and charm. (Ibid.)

With both parity and complementarity in mind one can perhaps see that if there is this perhaps pervasive systemic web spun around the *sine qua non* that is the biological mind then making sense of the kind of behavioral competence or improvement, typical invocation, and endorsement may in some cases require the acquisition of habitual knowledge of the use of external components in an extended cognitive system. Let us now turn to Merleau-Ponty in order further

the possible role of habit in cases of extended cognition.

2. Merleau-Ponty on Habit from the Phenomenology of Perception: or, Actions, Epistemic and Pragmatic, are Anchored in the Habitual Lived Body

Habit, *chez* Merleau-Ponty, is a broad notion that functions as an umbrella term denoting the practices by which quasi-stable dispositions, capacities and fields of meaning emerge in a number of analytically distinct yet conceptually blended regimes running from “higher level” operations of consciousness and non-conscious discursive practices through “lower level” functions like perception and motricity. Habit is the process which denotes the production of second natures (quasi-stable dispositions, capacities, and affordances), and frameworks (or fields) of meaning and action both epistemic and pragmatic. In many of these cases habit can only be understood if we extend the scope of the analysis beyond the skin of the organism. Indeed, habit functions at the fundamental antepredicative, preobjective, prepersonal, and nonreflective level of familiarity with the world.⁶ This does not mean that habit for Merleau-Ponty is not squarely bodily and biological but it is the case that starting from what is given to us by nature, our body and organs, habits can and do emerge which incorporate ‘external’ interments (2012[1945]). Habit, for Merleau-Ponty, should not be understood as mere mechanism or under the guise of Skinnarian behaviorism because, at the very least, his explanations exceed observable behavior. Habit concerns the body and begins with the body for Merleau-Ponty, to be sure, but a clear picture of habit cannot be sketched via embodiment alone; body, mind, environment, language, and artifacts need to be given consideration in the constellation of habit. Moreover, distinctions or oppositions such as mind and body are shown to be the result of leaning too far towards opposing poles of false dilemmas, or rather real dilemmas that can be deflated by pursuing a middle path: lived phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis attempts to avoid the Scylla of something like pure mind and the Charybdis of brute body by starting from phenomenal lived experience; an intentionally ambiguous middle ground that is neither the objective or actual body nor the free floating Cartesian *cogito*.⁷ To be sure, the skin is not the outer limit of habit.

Merleau-Ponty will often use the word “l’habitude” but, as mentioned, its

6 On the distinction between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ or one could say ‘internal’ and ‘external’ or ‘self’ and ‘world’, Merleau-Ponty writes: “Inside and outside are wholly inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself (2012[1945]).”

7 Merleau-Ponty’s work almost always attempts to show that seemingly intractable binary oppositions such as mind and body, subject and object, self and world, idealism and materialism, etc., can be deflated and shown to be a mistake of emphasis or orientation. It varies by case, but it often he proceeds by showing the interdependence of the two terms, the actual truth to each term, and the mistake of privileging one above the other or falling too far on one side or the other of such an opposition which is usually a result of starting from the “antepredicative unity of life and our world” (2012[1945]).

sense will vary. Habit seems to be an ‘operative concept’ which is employed but neither simply defined nor consistently used.⁸ In this essay I will focus my attention to Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on habit in relation to the body schema. Habit is also aligned with or crucially related to language, concepts, discursive thought processes, sedimentation and operative intentionality (2012[1945]). However, it is in his discussion of habit and the body schema that Merleau-Ponty deals explicitly with extending one’s capacities by incorporating external instruments into ones repertoire of possible actions and therefore a fruitful way to bring Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit to flesh out behavioral competence as it might concern the extended mind. This essay thus takes a narrow perspective on what is admittedly a larger role of habit in the work of Merleau-Ponty.⁹

There are many who have worked on variations of this issue before, albeit with different aims in mind and not always conjunction with the extended mind theory. Namely, Sean Gallager in his work on the difference between the body schema and the body image (1986;2005). Ed Casey, in a number of excellent essays, has worked extensively on habit and the body schema (1984;1987). What is more, Dermont Moran has an essay in which he lucidly undertakes the difficult task of disambiguating the notion of habit in the work of Edmund Husserl (with reference to Merleau-Ponty; although he draws a conservative conclusion regarding the importance and scope of habit for Merleau-Ponty)(2011). Additionally, Martina Reuter has done excellent work on Merleau-Ponty’s conception of pre-reflective intentionality, a notion that I see as a key part of the larger picture of the role habit as constitutive element of selves, groups, things, worlds, as well as the relation between those categories, critically understood (1999).

The body schema is the notion that Merleau-Ponty perhaps most closely aligns with habit. The body schema is the pre-conceptual, pre-personal, non-explicit, non-representational command of the body’s current and futurally open location, organization, situation, and capacities in relation to itself, to things, to language, and to world. It is founded in motricity. Although the body scheme begins in basic biological motricity, a more developed body schema can and does run the gamut of actions and

8 I take this notion of ‘operative concept’ from Eugen Fink via Dermot Moran. Fink used the notion of “operative concept” to describe Husserl’s account of habit. Habit - being somewhat unwieldy - suffers a similar fate in the work of Merleau-Ponty.

9 It is difficult to isolate terms or concepts that Merleau-Ponty uses without some distortion because of the how closely any given term or concept is thoroughly integrated with almost all the others. A fuller picture of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit would have to take into account the relation of habit in and to his notions of the intentional arc, operative intentionality, bodily intentionality, sedimentation, language, freedom, space, time, the cogito, and style. Such an account is simply beyond the scope of this essay.

capacities from basic bodily skills and tacit *savoir-faire* that blend into and are indissociable from faculties such as perception.¹⁰ The acquisition of habits modifies one's body schema allowing one to perform highly developed cultural-technological practices that incorporate external components such as playing an instrument, driving a car, or blind person using a cane to navigate through space.¹¹ The acquisition of habits begins with testing or trying-out, not usually nor necessarily with prior deliberation, representation, and objectification.¹² The body schema is not a static relation between self and world, it undergoes change and this change is produced by the acquisition of habits.¹³

When the acquisition of a habit incorporates an instrument into one's repertoire of actions by modifying and augmenting the body schema, it becomes the case that, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive load of performing that action – in terms of attention, consciousness, deliberation, and representation – is lightened. The well-known example of the blind person's cane can be illustrative here. He writes,

But habit does not *consist* in interpreting the pressure of the cane on the hand like signs of certain positions of the cane, and then these positions as signs of an external object – for habit *relieves us* of this very task (2012[1945]).

This example – which so clearly shows that perception and motricity can be nontrivially co-constituted by a non-biological external thing – also shows that once a habit is fully incorporated into one's body schema, conscious interpretation is no longer needed and presumably competence or command of the external component has been mastered.¹⁴

I want to highlight two more important aspects of habit acquisition and

10 Merleau-Ponty writes, "In fact, every habit is simultaneously motor and perceptual because it resides, as we have said, between explicit perception and actual movement, in that fundamental function that simultaneously delimits our field of vision and our field of action (2012[1945])."

11 On the incorporation of external components into one's body schema via habit, Merleau-Ponty writes: "To habituate oneself to a hat, an automobile, or a cane is to take up residence in them, or inversely to make them participate within the voluminosity of one's own body. Habit expresses the power we have of dilating our being in the world or of altering our existence though incorporating new instruments (2012[1945])."

12 To acquire the habit of using a cane to navigate space Merleau-Ponty states that "If I want to become habituated to a cane, I try it out, I touch some objects and, after some time, I have it 'in hand': I see which objects are 'within reach' or out of reach of my cane (2012[1945])."

13 The acquisition of habits is the acquisition, moreover, of a type of knowledge. Merleau-Ponty writes, "This is what I express by saying that I perceive with my body or with my senses, my body and my senses being precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit or sedimented science (2012[1945])."

14 On the extension of the perception of the world through the cane, Merleau-Ponty writes "When the cane becomes a familiar instrument, the world of tactile objects expands, it no longer begins at the skin of the hand, but at the tip of the cane (2012[1945])."

mastery of certain behaviors. First, habits are transparent. Once a habit is incorporated into the body schema then that habit is not conspicuous, these habits are something we live, act epistemically, and act pragmatically *through*. Moreover, according to Merleau-Ponty, the actions we have habitually mastered, if known at all, can only be known after the fact, known in breakdown, in the removal or misplacement of instruments in cases of extension, or they can be known in reflection subsequent to mastery. Second, habits exhibit temporal and functional dynamism for Merleau-Ponty. Habits are a sort of knowing familiarity, not a pure and self-same mechanistic response.¹⁵ What exactly I mean by this is that we find as a general rule that habits are not something one acquires once and for all and that even those which appear quasi-stable are themselves undergoing change by reinforcement or slight and unnoticed modification upon each fresh application. This is similar to the way that current psychological research shows that episodic memory is not held in storage in the brain and then called up the way that things might be stored in a warehouse and then easily accessed when needed, rather episodic memories are born anew and modified with each recollection.

With Merleau-Ponty's account of the acquisition and mature function of a habit in mind, especially in cases where the habit modifies the body schema in ways that go beyond the limits of the skin such as in the use of familiar instruments in a mode that is highly skilled, transparent to consciousness, dynamic, prepersonal, preobjective, nonrepresentational, and effortless it may be possible to use this theory to underpin and flesh out Clark and Chalmers theory of extended cognition.

An instrument or tool of epistemic action, bracketing cyberpunk neural implants for the moment, is by necessity beyond the limits of the skin or head. Therefore the use of such an instrument will, by *varying degrees*, rely in some way on motricity and perception in order to be used.¹⁶ To not merely use such a tool or instrument, but to use it *well*, that is to say with mastery

15 Merleau-Ponty explains this familiar by recourse to an example of an organist playing on an unfamiliar organ. An experienced organist, having a body schema that has mastery over the playing of organs, can modify and adjust their body schema to a new organ in the course of a few minutes of practice. Memory of the objective location of pedals, etc., or predicative knowledge of the new organ's unique layout prove to be inadequate and misleading explanations of this sort of plasticity for Merleau-Ponty (2012[1945]).

16 The habitual command of one's hands in arranging tiles in a game of Scrabble or similar search and recognition actions will be presumably easier to habitually acquire and will be acquired at a much younger age than the more complicated and specialized tasks, for example those that Hutchins identifies in *Cognition in the Wild* (1995). We often assume that, for example, the skillful motor-perceptual use of a smartphone or computer is automatically intuitive when it in fact is only appears to be intuitive if we already have a habitual command of touchscreen graphical user interfaces. This example will not hold for longer very long, however, think of the use of computers by older individuals that did not grow up as 'digital-natives,' so to speak.

or a high level of behavioral competence that exceeds the novice or first time user. It is likely the case that in such instances the habit of using such an instrument has been incorporated into the body schema of the subject in question. The habit is not thereby constitutive of cognition but it makes a difference concerning performance and competence. Moreover, if such a habit is acquired then it is likely the case that in performing certain types of epistemic actions, the reliable instrument will be typically invoked as well and endorsed (in the past or present) in a non-explicit, non-deliberative manner. The importance of the role of habit will depend on specific type of epistemic action in question, therefore let us now look at some examples. Recall the Tetris examples from Clark and Chalmers. In the case which allows for an individual to rotate the blocks on the screen in front of them thereby allowing the individual to outperform the epistemic action of fit determination over and above instances mere mental rotation, the individual in question is using a video game controller to rotate the blocks in conjunction with perceiving rotating block on the screen. It is likely that given time, an individual would acquire the habitual command of this motor-perceptual skill in a modest modification of said individual's body schema. Once a habitual command of this skill was acquired then presumably the behavioral competence and performance of that individual at this task would increase. Thus the acquired habit in question would not be part of the cognitive coupled system rather it would subtend that system and would do so in a way that makes a difference in the efficacy and overall performance of that process. Indeed performance would increase as the habit becomes more fully integrated into the individual's body schema. The case of Otto's notebook presents some difficulties for my thesis is so far as it is unclear if Otto's Alzheimer's makes it unable for him to develop new habits understood as modifications and enrichments of the body schema. Assuming Otto can acquire new habits then it is likely the case that his command of his notebook as an external cognitive resource would be improved with and motor-perceptual familiarity which is the acquisition of a habit via the incorporation of that habit in the body schema. Even for those of us that do not have any cognitive impairments, familiarity with the motor perceptual demands of an external memory resource (a phone book, an encyclopedia, a map, a smartphone, a laptop computer) and unknowingly responding to those demands with the acquisition of the needed habit would presumably improve speed and performance of epistemic actions over time. What I have hoped to have shown is that in the acquisition of habits, as accounted for by Merleau-Ponty, it is the case that the motor-perceptual modification of the body schema can make a meaningful difference

for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation of external components. Habit is perhaps not a part of the cognitive system, but habit makes a difference in how well such coupled cognitive system might function. Moreover, habit highlights the extent to which this enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. Habit makes a difference for extended cognition and Merleau-Ponty's theory of habit helps to flesh out or show the role of embodiment, more specifically the body schema, in this regard.

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3

SESSIONS

SESSION 3

THE SOCIAL AND NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF HABIT

Nick Crossley (University of Manchester)

The Concept of Habit and the Regularities of Social Structure

Valérie Kokoszka (Independent Scholar)

Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity

Frank Scalabrino (University of Dallas)

From a Phenomenology of the Reciprocal Nature of Habits and Values to an Understanding of the Intersubjective Ground of Normative Social Reality

Alejandro Arango (Vanderbilt University)

Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking and Second Nature

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THE CONCEPT OF HABIT AND THE REGULARITIES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

abstract

In this paper I discuss the concept of habit from a sociological point of view. My aim, in part, is to consider the ways in which sociologists and social philosophers could use and have used 'habit' in their analyses and explanations. In particular the concept of habit can contribute to our understanding and explanation of the behavioural regularities involved in social structure. In addition, however, I am interested in the limitations of the concept of habit, within a sociological context, when compared against other concepts which are used to do similar work. In particular I contrast the concept of habit with the concepts of 'rule' and 'convention', drawing out the strengths that it has relative to those competing concepts but also identifying important aspects of behavioural regularity which they bring to light and which habit ignores. In the conclusion to the paper I consider ways in which these various concepts might overlap and might be used in conjunction with one another.

keywords

Convention, rule, social practices, habitus, Mauss, Bourdieu, Winch

In this paper I approach 'habit' as a sociologist. I am interested in the way that both 'habit' and the related concept of 'habitus' (see below) are used, particularly in the context of 'theories of practice' and even more particularly in those theories of practice which build upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1992), to explain the regular and enduring patterns of social interaction (that is, the social practices) that form a central element of 'social structure'¹. Habit is a crucial concept for these purposes, in my view, but it is a limited concept which only captures one element of what is involved in these regular and enduring patterns. My aim here is to identify and explore some of these limitations, delimiting more precisely the role habit that plays in the reproduction of social life whilst also considering the elements of that process that it doesn't capture. I do this by contrasting 'habit' with two concepts which are sometimes used to do the same analytic work as it but which have fallen out of favour as 'habit' has risen to the fore in sociological thought: rule and convention. I will argue that they do not, in fact, do the same work; that each draws out a distinct aspect of the regular and enduring patterns of interactivity that interest sociologists and that sociologists would do well to attend to these differences and to the range of concepts necessary to adequately grasp them. We need the concepts of rule and convention as well as the concept of habit if we are to fully understand and enjoy the capability to analyse the enduring patterns of interaction which (partly) constitute social structures. From the point of view of specific focus of this special edition, namely, habit, I hope that this offers a useful interrogation of its sociological meaning and scope. I begin with a brief account the concept's somewhat chequered history within sociology and of the role accorded it in explaining social structure.

Sociological Habits

In sociology, as in other academic discourses, the concept of habit has undergone various reappraisals and changes of meaning across time (Camic 1986). Early sociologists used the concept, positively, to denote acquired dispositions of a fairly broad nature, perceiving it to be entirely compatible with their understanding of human action as purposive and intelligent. In the early twentieth century, however, partly as an effect of the rise

¹ Other key elements of social structure are patterns of connection between the participants in particular 'social worlds' and the distribution of resources between them.

of behaviourist psychology and physiology, with their mechanistic and reductive explanations of human action, sociologists began to think of habits as largely involuntary behavioural ticks; inconsequential, devoid of meaning and for these reasons sociologically uninteresting (*ibid.*). Elements of the old concept of habit were maintained in such concepts as custom, tradition and even perhaps culture but 'habit' itself was dropped from the lexicon. More recently, however, habit has made a comeback. The work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1992), in particular, has put the concept of 'habitus' at the heart of contemporary sociological thought, and that in turn has prompted a return, in some quarters, to 'habit' itself.

I have discussed the (lack of) difference between 'habit' and 'habitus' elsewhere (Crossley 2013). It very much depends, I have suggested, whose concept of habit and whose concept of habitus one refers to. For every theorist, such as Bourdieu or Marcel Mauss (1979), who develops a concept of habitus, distinguishing it from 'mere habit', there is another, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) or John Dewey (1988), who has sought to rescue 'habit' itself from a reductive behaviourist understanding, refusing to relegate it to the domain of simple, insignificant and mechanical behaviours. Restoring something of its original meaning, they locate habit within behaviour which is meaningful, intelligent, rational and sometimes strategic. In addition, they discuss collective habits, formed and diffusing within social networks whose members they serve to mark out as distinct social groups: e.g. social classes, nations and ethnic groups.

Furthermore, they identify the sociological importance of habit as a mechanism which anchors socially and historically variable forms of conduct, physically, lending the society or social world to which they belong durability and a relatively stable structure. Society persists on a day-by-day basis, they suggest, because its forms have become habitually engrained within the behavioural repertoires of its members. William James captures this in a widely cited passage, adding the important further observation that habit contributes to social reproduction because it entails desensitisation to inequalities and hardships which, were they to be experienced with full force, rising to the forefront of consciousness, might provoke discontent and uprising:

Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious

uprisings of the poor. It along prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman ... at sea It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice ... it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. (James 1892, 143)

James anticipates many of the key elements of Bourdieu's theory of habitus in this passage, not least the sense that habits are formed in particular social worlds, whose structure they subsequently reproduce. Actors adapt their behaviour to fit the social worlds in which they find themselves. This gives rise to habits which both attach the actor to that world and contribute to its reproduction; shaping the actor's behaviour in a way which then shapes the world in question. To quote Bourdieu himself, habitus are:

... durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1992, p.53)

Pragmatists (Dewey in particular) and phenomenologists (Merleau-Ponty in particular but also Husserl (1973, 1990)) make a crucial contribution to this renewed focus upon 'habit', opening up and exploring the nature of habit to a far greater extent than Bourdieu. They ground the concept by illuminating and exploring its place in everyday activity and experience. They challenge its behaviourist framing both with detailed critiques which reveal the inadequacy of behaviourist theory to explain even its own experimental findings (Merleau-Ponty 1965, Dewey 1896) and also through careful phenomenological analyses of familiar habits which refute any notion of mechanical repetition and show rather how habit enables skilled improvisation and how it can be transposed to novel situations. Furthermore, they understand habits as open to revision in the context of an engagement between the organism and its environment, and they expand the scope of the concept beyond simple motor functions to the realms of perception and reflective thought, simultaneously exploring how these realms are intertwined (Crossley 2001, 2013).

Finally, connecting with the key sociological theme identified at the outset

of this paper, they explore the key link between habit, history (and thus temporality) and identity (both individual and social). Habit, they argue, lends continuity to our lives, making me the same person tomorrow as I was today and allowing projects begun at one point in time to be completed at another. As such it contributes to our freedom and capacity for choice. Choice is meaningful because it achieves traction and anchorage in my life through force of habit. At the collective level, this same mechanism ensures the continuity of history and the distinctiveness of particular periods within it. The human organisms who populate different historical periods do not differ greatly qua organisms but their habits do and this makes a huge difference.

Note that habit facilitates both conservation and change in this account or rather the conservation that is integral to change. Habit preserves aspects of the past within the present, facilitating actions which build upon that past in pursuit of a future. It is because of habit that our activities, individual and collective, never emerge *ex nihilo*. As James emphasises in the above-cited passage, we cannot 'begin again'. The present must always build upon the past as preserved within habit and the clock is never, can never be turned back.

It will be apparent that I deem habit or *habitus* (I will use 'habit' to refer to both hereafter) a crucial mechanism in the reproduction of the social world. As noted in the introduction to this paper, however, it is, like any scientific concept, selective, drawing certain aspects of the empirical world into the foreground of our attention, at the expense of others which may also be important. We must reflect upon these others too if we are to achieve a satisfactory account.

One particular concern that I have with habit is that it locates 'social structure' entirely within the individual failing to engage with the intersubjective and more broadly relational nature of the social world qua social. Habits are individual dispositions and even collective habits are mere aggregations of individual habits. They can and I believe that they usually do take shape within the context of social interaction but this social dimension is not captured within the concept of habit itself, which, as noted, tracks it back into the individual. This individualised element is important and I will defend it. However, it is not the whole story. Social worlds are networks of interacting and interdependent actors, both human and corporate² (Crossley 2011). The structure of these networks is a further

² By 'corporate actors' I mean such as organizations as firms, trade unions and governments, which involve mechanisms of collective decision making and means of implementing their decisions.

element of social structure, and the behavioural regularities focused upon in this paper are not only anchored by means of habit but also by relational means, within these networks.

In what follows I will tease this out by contrasting the concept of habit with the concepts of 'rule' and 'convention' respectively. In contrast to habit, both 'rule' and 'convention' imply interconnection and a discussion of them allows me to demonstrate why connection is important. I will not be arguing against 'habit', however. Where habit, rule and convention are discussed together theorists typically argue for one over the others. Bourdieu (1990) famously argues for habitus over rule, for example, and Peter Winch (1958) argues in favour of rule over habit. I briefly review both arguments, identifying merit in them but the either/or framing is problematic and unnecessary in my view because each concept identifies a different and important mechanism at play within regular patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, though the three mechanisms are often found together each is sometimes found in the absence of the other, and they can conflict, such that we must distinguish between them in our analytic toolbox. I begin by considering Winch's critique of 'habit'.

Habit and Rule

Winch draws a comparison between habits and rules in his path-breaking study, *The Idea of a Social Science*. Having argued for the importance of rules, drawing upon Wittgenstein (1953), he observes that much of the work which he assigns to 'rules' in his account is assigned to 'habit' in the work of his contemporary, Michael Oakeshott (1991, 1999). Winch accepts a broader and richer account of habit than was typical at his time of writing and is not, therefore, entirely dismissive of Oakeshott. However, he does not believe that 'habit' can play the role which he attributes to rules:

Oakeshott appears to think that the dividing line between behaviour which is habitual and that which is rule-governed depends on whether or not a rule is consciously applied. In opposition to this I want to say that the test of whether a man's [sic] actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can *formulate* it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things ... Where that makes sense then it must also make sense to say that he is applying a criterion in what he does even though he does not and perhaps cannot formulate that criterion. (Winch 1958, p.58, emphasis in original)

His first objection, outlined above, is that social practice has a normative aspect which is captured by 'rule' but not 'habit'. Social behaviour can be and often is judged right and wrong, either in a moral or a technical sense, by those involved. 'Rule' entails this normative element, 'habit' does not and 'rule', therefore, is the preferable concept. His second objection is that the regularities of interaction that these normative judgements refer to and which I have previously referred to in this paper are not mere repetitions of a set behavioural pattern, as 'habit', on his interpretation of that concept, would imply, but rather appear regular in virtue of their adherence to an underlying principle, as the concept of 'rule' would suggest. Following a rule does not always mean acting in an identical fashion across time and different social contexts, he observes. It entails understanding the rule, and understanding, as Wittgenstein famously claims, entails the capacity to 'go on', extending and/or applying a rule beyond the limited range of examples involved in one's learning of it. Like the individual who is able to continue a number series further than they have heard it recited, continuing '12, 15, 18 ...' after hearing '3, 6, 9 ...', social actors act in accordance with rules which they have learned and understood without exactly replicating forms of conduct which they have seen others perform in the past. Their interactivity manifests understanding of a rule rather than habitual repetition.

Curiously, Bourdieu uses a very similar observation to Winch to argue against the concept of rules and in favour of habit. For him 'rule' implies rigidity of conduct whilst habit or at least *habitus* implies a flexible disposition and 'feel for the game' which allows the actor to spontaneously improvise in unfamiliar situations. The strategic action of the footballer, who is constantly innovating and improvising in response to the state of play is an example of *habitus* for Bourdieu. Furthermore, most of the revisionist accounts of habit that I referred to above equate habit with understanding and knowledge, bringing 'habit' much closer to 'rule' than Winch's account suggests. Merleau-Ponty, for example, views habits as forms of embodied understanding and know-how:

We said earlier that it is the body which understands in the acquisition of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense datum under an idea, and if the body is an object. But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our notion of 'understand' and our notion of the body. To understand is to experience harmony between what we aim at and what is

given, between intention and the performance – and the body is our anchorage in the world. (1962, 144)

Habit is embodied know-how for Merleau-Ponty, which allows the actor to spontaneously adapt to unfolding situations in a manner intelligently and rationally adapted to those situations, given the actor's goals.

It follows from this, contra Winch, that the same habit may give rise to a variety of behavioural responses, across different situations, unified only by their manifestation of the same basic understanding. In Winch's defence, however, we might argue that understanding is always necessarily understanding-of something or other and we would therefore have to ask what is understood in habit? The answer will vary according to the habit in question. However, if that habit is amongst those which are constitutive of social structure then it seems inevitable that what it will grasp is a rule of some sort. Indeed the concept of understanding seems logically to entail 'rules', in Winch's Wittgensteinian sense, because it must entail the possibility of misunderstanding or not understanding and therefore right and wrong ways of going on. Furthermore, we might ask whether Bourdieu's 'feel for the game' does not necessarily entail constitutive 'rules' of the game. What does an actor have a feel for when they have a feel for the game if not rules which define the objectives and constraints of the game?

Equally importantly, Winch's insistence that 'rule' implies that there is a right and a wrong way of doing things does identify an important element of social structure that is not captured by the concept of habit. Social practices are not only regular and enduring. They have a normative character such that those involved sometimes correct both themselves and others, drawing a distinction between right and wrong ways of going on. 'Rules' captures this but 'habit' has no such normative implication. Habits might be good or bad but only in relation to a rule or standard which is extraneous to them.

The point here is not to deny that rule-following is sometimes habitual. It is and this doubtless contributes to the survival of particular rules. The point, rather, is that there is an important normative aspect to social structure which 'habit' does not capture. I return to this. Presently, however, I will continue the critique of habit.

Though Winch is careful to allow that social actors may not be able to formulate the rules they understand and orient to, breaches of rules in

social circumstances are likely to be noticed by those who understand the rule and may occasion reflective attempts at correction. Likewise for the individual actor who confronts a situation where application of the rule is not straightforward:

...questions of interpretation and consistency, that is, matters for *reflection*, are bound to arise for anyone who has to deal with a situation foreign to his previous experience. (Winch 1958, 64, emphasis in original)

Most rules are not subject to reflection for much of the time, on Winch's understanding, but in the context of a rapidly changing social world any rule might be elevated into conscious reflection. In this respect Winch balances the attention to pre-reflective activities often afforded in accounts of habit with a focus upon the role of reflective intelligence and understanding. Our patterns of interaction are not completely habitual. Periodically they come into question and what we reflect upon in such circumstances –i.e. how to go on– bears upon the principle underlying our action; that is to say, rules.

Building upon Winch I would add that rules are also important because, at least as defined by Wittgenstein (1953), they are irreducibly social. They exist not within but between individuals, within a social network. They rest upon 'agreement in forms of life' and therefore presuppose at least two actors who 'agree' upon them (often more, of course). Habits, by contrast, even where shared and therefore collective, are properties of individuals. Even collective habits are only aggregations of individual habits. A collective habit is an individual habit that happens to be shared, and habits can be strictly individual (at least in theory). By contrast a rule exists only in the context of social relations between multiple individuals. Rules are relational and, as such, they permit us to explore the genuinely social nature of social life.

Furthermore, where rules are supported by sanctions this too adds a relational dimension to structure. Actor A acts as she does, following a rule, because actor B will punish her if she does not. This situation may be reciprocal. A and B may each be in a position to sanction one another for rule violation. In some cases, however, only one of the two may have the means to sanction the other, a position which arguably allows her also to impose the rule to which the other must adhere. In this case we would deem the power balance within the relation between A and B to be asymmetrical.

Whatever the precise details, however, the key point is that relations matter and that relations are not captured by 'habit'.

The various advantages of the concept of rule do not amount to an argument for using it instead of the concept of habit, however. On this point I disagree with Winch. Just as 'rule' captures certain aspects of regular patterns of social interaction missed by 'habit' so to 'habit' captures aspects that are neglected by 'rule'. Not only is it perfectly meaningful to refer to habits which are individual and therefore not rule-following, it is equally meaningful to distinguish between instances of rule following which are habitual and instances which are not. Though it does not occur to Winch that rule following may sometimes be habitual, for example, we have seen that he distinguishes between situations where rule following involves reflection and situations where it does not. Furthermore, where rule following is habitual there will always have been a time at which it was not; that is, a time at which some degree of conscious effort was required to follow the rule.

The concept of rules captures the pattern adhered to by actors in particular situations and the normative aspect involved but it does not explain why actors adhere to rules. There may be many such explanations, from the desire to do the right thing through to fear of punishment for doing the wrong thing, but these all presuppose that rule following is a reflective activity; that an act of decision and a degree of conscious effort is involved. Habit adds a further possibility. It alerts us to the way in which certain patterns or principles of conduct, that is to say, certain rules, are conserved within the pre-reflective 'structures of behaviour' which underpin our reflective life such that they become, from the point of view of the actor, automatic. Habit is a mechanism which explains some (but not all) instances of rule following.

As 'rule' and 'habit' each do a different job in explaining and rendering social practices intelligible I would suggest that we do not consider their respective merits in either/or terms but rather look to keep both in our analytic toolbox. In the conclusion to this paper I return to this suggestion. Before I do, however, I want to introduce a third concept into the discussion: convention.

Convention Like 'habit' and 'rule', 'convention' is defined in a variety of ways both within and outside of social science. We find an interesting use, however,

in the philosophical work of David Lewis (1969) and the sociological work of Howard Becker (1982), who draws (selectively) upon Lewis. Conventions, for Lewis are solutions to ‘coordination problems’ and involve mutual expectations between actors as to how each will interact in a given situation. In many circumstances in social life social actors need to coordinate their activity, Lewis observes. Various possibilities for acting are open to them, any of which would equally well serve their purposes, as long as the others involved make a complementary choice. Thus, in the UK, we drive on the left side of the road. We could drive on the right, as is common elsewhere, but as long as we all drive on the same side it doesn’t matter. Where a particular option is settled upon, Lewis argues, we may speak of convention. A convention is a course of action, integral to the solution of a coordination problem, which all (or at least most) relevant actors within a given population orient to.

Lewis’ concept of convention is important because, like ‘rule’, it draws out a relational aspect to social structure which is not entailed in ‘habit’ (even collective habit) and which habit arguably ignores; namely, that social activity requires coordination and thus ‘agreement’³ between those involved. Social activity is inter-activity, interaction, and its regularities cannot therefore be grasped entirely by reference to a concept (habit) which captures the manner in which forms of conduct are conserved within the action repertoires of discrete individuals. Just as the concept of habit does not entail that action might be right or wrong, as suggested by rule, neither does it address the issue of coordination and the intersubjective agreement this involves. ‘Conventions’ are ways in which we act together rather than, as in the case of habit, individual instantiations of action which may or may not be found across multiple individuals.

Furthermore, like rules, conventions necessarily exist between people, in interaction. A convention only exists when at least two people ‘agree’, often tacitly and in practice, about how each will act in certain situations.

Conventions and Rules

In some instances conventions will involve a normative element and thus have a rule-like nature. However, this is not necessarily so. There are two types of counter-example. Firstly, some conventions lack a normative element because their arbitrariness is recognised and/or deviation does not cause huge

³ This is not to say that parties to a convention actually come to a reflective consensus but rather than they act in complementary ways. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, they agree, not (necessarily) in opinions but in forms of life.

coordination problems. Parties to a convention recognise that other ways of behaving in a situation would be entirely appropriate, only sticking to what they do because agreement between their respective ways of behaving is useful to them. Friends who regularly meet at a particular table in a café may be said to have established a convention, for example, which eases the coordination of lunchtime meetings between them but this is unlikely to be regarded as normatively binding. If the first to arrive at the café fancies sitting somewhere else for a change the second will not deem this wrong (either morally or technically), unless it proves particularly disruptive or inconvenient. Similarly, if somebody else is sat at their seat when they arrive they might regard this as an inconvenience but not as a breach of a rule.

Secondly, challenges to convention are sometimes viewed positively, especially in aesthetic domains. The musicologist Leonard Meyer (1956), for example, argues that the pleasure generated by music stems in large part from the composer and/or performer playing with and bending conventions and thereby teasing the audience. The audience expect a passage that has begun like 'this' to finish like 'that', for example, because that is how such sequences conventionally run. Knowing this, however, the performer deviates from the convention, generating tension within their audience which they will later release either by diverting to another convention or establishing a non-conventional pattern which they audience can at least recognise as a pattern and which might become a new convention. 'Convention' is defined here much as Lewis defines it. It involves shared expectation. The audience expect certain things of the performer/composer and the performer/composer expects that they expect it. Furthermore, these expectations facilitate coordination and communication between the two parties. The aesthetic effect is only achieved to the extent that the audience, following convention, react in the way that the composer/performer expects. However, Meyer's composer/performer plays with and deviates from convention herself, and though this may sometimes be met with negative sanctions it can also be an occasion for praise and positive sanctions. Though the concepts of convention and rule sometimes overlap, therefore, this is not always so and we have good reason to keep both, distinguishing between them, in our analytical toolbox. In what follows I will show that the same is true for 'habit' and 'convention'.

Habit and Convention

As with 'rules', the advantages that the concept of convention affords us do not merit our choosing it over 'habit' because 'convention' does not do the work of 'habit' any more than 'habit' does the work of 'convention'. Conventions can be habitual but not always. To give an example which covers both rules and

conventions: when I drive in the UK I follow the convention and the rule of driving on the left hand side of the road, and I do so by force of habit. It does not occur to me to do otherwise. I get in the car and pull onto the left-hand side of the road. If an occasion were to arise in which another road user drove on the right I would be shocked, evidencing a taken for granted (i.e. habitual) expectation about the behaviour of others, as is proper to convention, and I would no doubt feel a sense of moral outrage, evidencing the normative weight (and thus rule-like nature) of this convention, but in most cases in the UK everybody drives on the left, by force of habit, and insofar as we notice at all it feels natural to do so. When in France, by contrast, I drive on the right hand side of the road. This does not come naturally to me. It is not a habit. Indeed it goes against my habitual inclination. I know what I ought to do, have expectations about how others will drive and have expectations about how they will expect me to drive but this largely arises in my reflective consciousness and I find that I have to remind myself what to do, especially when approaching challenges such as those presented by a roundabout. Driving on the right feels strange, at least at first, until I get used to it (habituate to it) and begin to form a habit of driving on the right.

It might be argued that such driving conventions/rules only work because they are habitual for the vast majority of drivers. This is no doubt true but the fact that we can follow such conventions/rules even when they are not habitual indicates that 'habit' adds something to our analysis that neither 'convention' nor 'rule' in themselves entail, just as they each make a unique contribution, covered neither by the other nor by habit.

The work that 'habit' performs in relation to 'convention', to reiterate what I said with respect to habit and rules, is to lend them stability and durability by anchoring them within the individual, beneath the level of reflective decision, where their instigation and execution would always potentially be open to question. Habits may be called into question, of course, and may become subject to conscious attempts at cultivation and/or destruction. However, habitual action, for the most part, is action which is triggered and executed without the intervention of reflective thought.

Removing structures of behaviour from the realm of choice and conscious deliberation increases their regularity and durability by rendering them 'automatic'. All things being equal an actor will behave in a habitual manner within a familiar situation. The selection and filtering which reflective deliberation affords is bypassed. In addition, habituation lowers the costs of action, in terms of effort, generating a degree of inertia. It is much

easier to act as we habitually act than to devise new ways of acting, and even where we consider alternatives, therefore, we may still revert to habit unless changes in our situation have significantly reduced their use value. In a further twist, moreover, habits have the effect of naturalising certain behaviours. In part this is a matter of putting them outside of the realm of discourse. If we do not need to think about doing them then we may not even notice that we do them and will certainly be less inclined to think about or question them if we do. Even if we do question them, however, the fact that they come so easily to us will often incline us to suppose that they are 'natural' ways of acting.

Defined in this way 'habit' potentially conflicts with 'convention' as Lewis understands it. A defining feature of convention, for Lewis, is our awareness that we could act otherwise. Patterns of interaction which are believed to be 'natural' and perhaps even those executed without reflective awareness would not qualify fully as conventions from this point of view. Lewis offers no good reason for this particular aspect of his definition of convention, however, and I believe that it has counter-intuitive implications. A convention might cease to be a convention over time, for example, as social actors forget about its arbitrariness and it becomes taken for granted. Conversely a behaviour which is taken-for-granted will only become a convention when its taken-for-grantedness is challenged. More strangely still, the same behaviour might be a convention for some of the people who engage in it (those aware of alternatives) but not for others (those who deem it natural). It is certainly true that, as analysts, we will not recognise a convention as such unless we are aware that other arrangements are possible but the requirement that lay actors share that awareness is unnecessary. Actors need not be aware that an arrangement is conventional in order for it to be conventional.


Habit, convention and rule are not, as Bourdieu's and Winch's reflections on habit and rule each seem to suggest, alternative ways of conceptualising the same thing. Rather, each concept picks out a different aspect of social practice. 'Rule' identifies a normative aspect: actors act in a way which their peers deem correct and/or believe that they ought to act. Furthermore, it identifies an underlying principle or criteria which actors understand and apply in their activity. 'Convention' identifies the way in which particular ways of acting resolve coordination problems and involve mutual expectations about the behaviour of self and other. 'Habit' identifies the anchoring of understanding and expectations in the pre-reflective life of the

embodied agent.

Each of these aspects is important and in many cases each will be simultaneously in play, as my UK driving example suggests. However, I hope I have also shown that any one may be absent in a particular situation. This is why we need to distinguish the three. We may elaborate upon this by way of a Venn diagram.

The diagram presents seven possibilities for the possible interplay of habit, convention and rule. Any specific instance of regular and enduring behaviour will fit into one of these seven possibilities. We may use the diagram as an analytic tool for considering the specific interplay of these factors involved in concrete cases of regular/enduring behaviour.

Figure 1.1: Habit, Rule and Convention



The reflections offered in this paper only begin to scratch at the surface. A proper understanding of social practice requires further and much more nuanced differentiation of the various mechanisms in play within it. This includes those focused upon here, those gestured towards (e.g. sanctions and balances of power) but no doubt many more besides. I hope that I have at least made a start here, however.

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL HABITUS AND SOCIAL CREATIVITY*

abstract

How is social creativity linked to habitual dispositions?

This paper critiques Bourdieu's answer to this question, which is related to his theory of habitus, against the background of its phenomenological evidences. His concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked both to an internalisation of the performativity of habits as a form of Kantian schematism (in Husserlian terms: 'noetization'), and to a static concept of the social environment, which is never analysed in its own dynamic structural relation to the life of the bearer of habits.

Through the genetic-phenomenological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes, the paper seeks to show that the social environment cannot be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual dispositions, but should instead be seen as an enactively framed habitat. When we further distinguish between passive and active habitualities, their intertwining comes to the fore, showing how in taking a position in relation to its own cultural environment the subject finds in the hiatus between disposition and the disposed leeway for a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, a space allowing for individual and, ultimately, social creativity that is absent from Bourdieu's account.

**Translated by Jacob Martin Rump (Emory University)*

keywords

Habit, types, Bourdieu, creativity, Sartre

To Alice and Marie, my daughters

Connected from the outset both to habits and routine, at once the support and the vehicle of this myriad of actions undertaken by the human being in a kind of reckless spontaneity, habitus seems to be the antagonist of social creativity, of the deliberate emergence of new configurations and new opportunities. It is in this sense, that, for Bourdieu, habitus is a system of dispositions, “the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to found it in reason, at the same time as regulated changes and revolutions”¹. Habitus, as the generative scheme of practices adapted to objective circumstances of social context, “generates dispositions objectively compatible with these circumstances and in a way pre-adapted to their demands. The most improbable practices are therefore excluded without examination as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission to order that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and to will the inevitable”². Habit so conceived seems capable of supporting only the reproduction of acquired conditionalities, incorporated into a second nature which retains nonetheless the virtue of making its requirements “reasonable”³ in the eyes of common sense: the behavior which it befits each to adopt, according to her condition (i.e. her social position). Habitus would thus be reduced to the *modus operandi* of a *modus vivendi*.

One can grant that habits and routines obviously structure a great number of our banal and everyday activities. If it were only a matter of producing yet another theory of social reproduction, no one could find any fault in this. But Bourdieu puts at the heart of a theory of action a principle that accounts more for that which is likely for the action than that which is possible for it, something worse than having linked the likely and the possible, such that one is the exact correlate of the other. It is this that leaves us puzzled⁴.

To understand the issue, we must remember that the challenge for Bourdieu consists in being able to give an account, on the one hand, of the regularity of social configurations and lifestyles *without* reverting to a soulless mechanism, and on the other, to do justice to a certain creativity in social interactions *without* reference to a subjective power whose rationality

1 Bourdieu (2000), p. 277, and Bourdieu (2012a), pp. 91-92 [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54].

2 Bourdieu (2012a), p. 90 [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54, translation modified].

3 Cf. Bourdieu (2012a), p. 93 and note 15 on p. 104 [Bourdieu (1990), 55f and note 10 to p. 62].

4 See on this subject Haber (2004).

would be able to escape from the reproduction of social structures. And indeed, neither the referring of social change solely to the movements of the structures of society, nor the artful disappearance of the weight of the structure and conditionings in current social interactions will allow us to meet the requirements of a theory of collective action. But the determining of habitus as an operative passivity, as a disposition endowed with a plasticity of adjustment *by analogy*, by which it *schematically* cuts out all objective context in order to extract the recognized elements necessary for its own reiteration and its own strengthening, was destined to fail to account for elements of social creativity⁵. From a purely epistemological point of view, it is because:

The habitus fulfills a function which another philosophy confines to a transcendental consciousness: it is a socialized body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world—a field—and which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world⁶.

that Bourdieu's project cannot effect a *final* synthesis between the objectivism of structuralism and the subjectivism of interactionism. Indeed, habitus as a structured *body*, makes the disposition out to be a milieu immediately *comprehended and included [compris]* in the worldly context, a milieu which is only transcended through the analogical transfer of the schemes of a previous situation to a relatively new one. In its blind spontaneity, habitus suffers from a lack of distance or difference from itself, and perpetuates itself only according to its pre-disposition, purely and simply, without social and contextual evolution, and in principle always slowly and imperceptibly.

To formulate the critique in Husserl's terms, the incorporation of habitus is overcompensated by its predominant use of the Kantian transcendental schematism of the imagination, that is to say by a *noétization* of the operative mode of habitual disposition. The habitus is structured as body, and structured-structuring as schema, which is why, in spite of its agility and flexibility, it ballasts everything present with the "disproportionate weight" of the past⁷. But this is not all: because its schematizing anticipation is presented in a context of conditions favorable to its own renewal, habit is blind to those possible other conditions which contain the situation, and which could themselves initiate a new given.

⁵ Bourdieu (2000), pp. 261-263.

⁶ Bourdieu (2012b), p.155 [Bourdieu (1998), p. 81, translation modified].

⁷ Bourdieu, (2012a), p. 90. [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54].

This brief detour through Bourdieu's concept of habitus allows us to bring out more deeply the conditions of possibility and, in return, of impossibility, of a theory of habit capable of supporting social creativity without relying on an all-powerful subjectivity whose specter causes the sociologist to flee.

We propose in this essay to draw the outlines of such a theory by taking up and extending Husserl's theory of habituality. This will involve demonstrating:

- 1) The practical and ethical reworking of the correlational a priori to show that to habitus as subjective disposition there always responds a typical⁸ dis-position of the world which constitutes its objective correlate. Man is not habituated only to a world which he finds already structured by innumerable rules; he is not acquainted exclusively with a space composed of ways of doing and being. The world is also given to him as a space he has to in-habit [*habiter*], that is to say, to which he must give an inhabitable [*habitable*] form, typical of his way of living [*manière de l'habiter*]. This inter-implication of habituality and the typical is at the basis of the dynamism of meaning [*sens*⁹] and action.
- 2) One thus cannot understand the operativity of this "inhabiting" exclusively through the habituality which is passive, embodied, and which disposes us constantly to the familiarity of the world so that we do not have to begin again every morning like unfortunate Pénélopes; carnal links that unite us with the world, spatio-temporal structures, relations of similarity and dissimilarity, etc., extending all the way to the social relations that underlie everyday life. To grasp this operativity, one must also study the active habituality through which we conform, our lives, and the world of life—our life, our world—as the space that we wish to in-habit according to a certain style through those material correlates we have created to make it inhabitable: tools, works of art and institutions.
- 3) This is why, for Husserl, active habituality and passive habituality maintain relations of intertwining and implication and not of opposition or antagonism: the passive does not constitute an opacity or a heaviness that would have to be overcome in a resounding effort of self-transparency necessary for becoming *truly* self. Instead, active habituality, that is to say deliberate habituality, rests upon and plays from this fundamental

8 ["Typical", "typification", etc. are used throughout in the sense of Husserl's "theory of types". –Trans.]

9 [The French *sens*, like the German *Sinn*, corresponds to English's *sense* and *meaning*. It is translated both ways in this essay in accordance with idiomatic English usage, but this double-connotation should be kept in mind for both words throughout. –Trans.]

disposition to iteration in order to establish a personal or intersubjective style of life and, correlatively, to create concrete material devices for the reiteration of position-takings, that is, institutions.

4) The constitution of material devices of reiteration constitutes the terminal point of Husserlian ethics. That is why we turn to the Sartre of *Search for a Method* [*Questions de méthode*] and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* for support to develop, in conclusion, a brief analysis of the institution as material device for the incorporation of ends.

1.
The Practical
Reworking
of the
Correlational
A Priori:
Habituality and
Type

The correlational a priori is a foundational thesis of Husserl's phenomenology, at first glance quite simple or seemingly obvious: all consciousness is consciousness of something which that consciousness is not. The immediate consequence of this is that without something it would be the consciousness of, consciousness is not, and vice-versa: without a consciousness that is aware of it, the something is not, i.e. it has no meaning. Static phenomenology—which interrogates neither the genesis of the stream of consciousness nor its potential generativity in order to confine itself to the constitution of sense in the present—could consider the correlational a priori to be a simple correspondence, an eidetically necessary correlation both for the determination of consciousness and for that of its “correlate,” the objective phenomenon. With the development of genetic phenomenology in the 1920s, especially in the *Passive Synthesis Lectures* [*Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*], this correspondence which was inclined toward the noetization of the intentional field is literally invalidated. Husserl shows that the correlation does not express a characteristic of the essence of consciousness, which could be taken up a priori by examining the formal structures of the pure ego as the center of operation, but instead manifests a relationship of consciousness to the world that requires the analysis of subjective experience insofar as it is in-formed [*Einbilden*], formed from the inside by that which is not it, and more rigorously, which is not from it: alterity.

From a formal standpoint, the correlational a priori instead defines a relationship of consciousness to the world through reciprocal implication. In its dynamism, the liveliness of sense is enhanced by the event of experience that consciousness undergoes [*ce dont la conscience fait l'épreuve*]. The “self-production” of the life of consciousness—“self” because this production is not the result of an external impact or stimulus that arouses the consciousness from its drowsiness in order that it make sense—is immediately affected by its production itself, by its *being toward* alterity.

The original position-taking of life as life involved in alterity, the inter-implication of life and the world, consists of nothing other than that *Urdoxa* given to us under the repeated evidence of an everyday occurrence, the knowing of the constant conjunction of human life and the lifeworld [*Lebenswelt*] in which it lives. One of the tasks addressed to genetic phenomenology is precisely to reveal the eidetic lawfulness that underlies and deepens the phenomenological investigation of the constitution of meaning in the direction of its genesis.

To do this, Husserl makes use of the double reduction, initiated in the lecture course *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*¹⁰ through which the phenomenological field is expanded to non-present [*inactuel*] lived experiences of consciousness and opens up to the indefinite horizon of past and future by breaking the artificial restriction that prevailed in static phenomenology. The double reduction in this way frees “the endless temporal stream of life”¹¹ of consciousness taken in its ongoing development and allows for reflection on non-present lived experiences in the background of consciousness, since they are not given absolutely as is the case with present lived experiences, but nonetheless *implicated* in any current lived experience as sedimented in it. This allows for a major shift in phenomenological reflection, which in turning away from the present actuality of the act of consciousness, accesses the transcendental field of lived experiences, a field which is made up not only of lived experiences but also of things, the world, as the intentional correlate of these experiences. In this way phenomenological reflection can now avail itself of an intentional field that allows for the description of both the directedness of consciousness and the object that it aims at as its correlate, so that within this field, the directedness of consciousness and object to which it is directed are presented as equal and simultaneous.

This co-location in the temporal stream of the life of consciousness proves to be fundamental: from the noetic point of view, it allows us to account for the structuring of the intentional field and its unification while from the noematic point of view it allows us to account for the role of alterity in the structuring of this field, that is to say, to explain the immanent operativity of alterity in intentionality.

The opening of the intentional field thus presents a double implication: the implication of alterity in intentionality and the implication of non-present lived experiences in present lived experiences. In the temporal genesis of the stream, these refer respectively to transversal intentionality

10 Husserl (1973b), pp. 177f.

11 Husserl (1959), p. 152.

(relating to the temporal object) and to longitudinal intentionality (relating to the phases of the stream)^{12,13}. If, however, the correlational a priori manifests the inter-implication of the life of consciousness and its world in the order of genesis, in return, in the order of becoming, it is the co-genesis, that is to say, the common becoming of subjectivity (and subjectivities) and of the world that phenomenology brings to light. It is demonstrated through the original correlation of these two vectors of sedimentation, that is to say of intentional implication, which are noetic habituality on the one hand, and the noematic type on the other¹⁴. It is through the correlation of these two vectors that to the “becoming me in the unity of history”¹⁵, to the individuation of transcendental subjectivity soon rethought under the Leibnizian concept of the monad, there always corresponds on the noematic plane a typical configuration of the world, understood beginning in *Ideas II* as the “secondary individuation of the opposite”¹⁶. The correlation thereby founds, in the immanence of the genesis, and according to a lawfulness that we will present in detail, this immediate familiarity with a world that presents itself from the outset with its typical shape, as our habitat. But a habitat that, if it is at the origin of the dynamism of meaning as something already there, is also at its end: the world is not only a given, it is also a task and a responsibility. And the sense that it reveals, good, fair or cruel, democratic or authoritarian, is revelatory also of us.

Passive and Active Habituality

The correlation of habituality and type is part of a geneticization of phenomenology that will change Husserl's original project and lead him to develop a concrete universal ontology that requires taking up the concept of the monad. By this concept, Husserl understands, as Leibniz before him, the power that possesses the principle of its absolute individuation and the principle of its temporal/contingent individuation. It allows him to resolve the tension between the identity-permanence of the pure ego—

12 For detailed and precise analyses of these fundamental points, only briefly sketched here, see Kokoszka (2004).

13 This is the reason why genetic phenomenology cannot content itself with the notion of time as the necessary form of all genesis, but must equally do justice to the fact that temporality finds itself in a “continual, passive, and completely universal genesis.” Husserl (1973a), p. 114 [Husserl (1999), p. 81].

14 Husserl outlined the operativity of this habituality/type correlation following a specific genetic sequence: a) genesis of passivity, b) the participation of the me and relationships between activity and passivity, c) active genesis, d) formation of monadic individuality, e) genetic relationships between individuated monads, f) possibility of undertaking the absolute consideration of the world, a “metaphysics.” Husserl (2001), pp. 342-343 [Husserl (2001), p. 631].

15 Husserl (1973c), p. 36.

16 Husserl (1971), p.301. [Husserl (1989), p. 315].

substrate of habituality—and the contingency of the self¹⁷, the substrate of habits in which phenomenology remained imprisoned, preventing it from accomplishing the becoming-self of the ego, and, correlatively, the becoming-my-world of the world. Although it is a configuring power, both genetic and generative, habituality is nothing like the mysterious faculty that a suspect metaphysics would attach to a no less contentious transcendental subjectivity. It simply consists in the disposition of the pure ego (as center of the functioning of acts) to the iteration of its acts which are sedimented and grounded in habit. These habits constitute the having [*Habe*] of a self, its reservoir of experiences. Between the ability to iterate that governs the fusion of acts in habits, and the acts founded in habits, lies the entire gap that separates the disposition from that which is disposed. This gap opens an *internal* distance, absent in Bourdieu, that the me is able to mobilize to create itself in the unity of a “personal” style, *idealiter*, in that which Husserl calls vocation.

But before addressing this point, we should briefly sketch the basic features of passive habituality and its role in passive genesis. This is based primarily on association, of which Husserl distinguishes two forms. The first is association as a principle of the formation of a unity, of the configuration of different moments, whether simultaneous or successive, within the *same phase of presence*. It is accomplished by means of a reciprocal associative awakening, through which the data are synthesized, homogenized, and fused remotely on the basis of contiguity, similarity and contrast. As the passive engine of “universal unification of the life of an ego” and correlatively of the unity of the field of consciousness¹⁸, the associative awakening puts in play a persistence of interest, a “consequence” in which both the life of consciousness and its worldly field are unified. “[T]he life of consciousness here, like everywhere, is subordinate to the grand principle of iteration,” says Husserl¹⁹. Iteration or habituality, at the most originary passive level, is neither a pure repetition of the initial position-taking nor a purely causal attainment: if the interest persists, if the consequence governs the synthesis of data without there being a voluntary and determined orientation of consciousness, it is only that the associative awakening is made dynamic, on the noematic side, by the “resonance” of data that echo each other, recall each other, infringe upon each other, attract or repel each

17 [The interpretation of Husserl presented here relies on a distinction between the transcendental ego as “Funktionzentrum”, pure activity *quapassive* structure conceived as bare substrate and the “me” as the active ego *quaperson* or self. The former has been translated by “ego” and the latter as “the me,” “the self,” etc. throughout. –Trans.]

18 Husserl (1966), pp. 405–406 [Husserl (2001), p. 505].

19 Husserl (1966), p. 409 [Husserl (2001), p. 510].

other to form unities of the similar and the dissimilar.

The second form of association appears in Husserl as the principle of the apperception of objects in cases where they already have a determined meaning. It is built up through the apperceptive awakening of previous experiences and through the resultant analogical recollection. At the heart of longitudinal intentionality, apperception is essential to the thought of a stream of becoming in which the becoming is not an anarchic surfacing of data, but a regulated relationship: "*The stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series, but a development, a process of becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of different typicalities (among them, all the apperceptions that give rise to the universal apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out of apperceptive intentions of a primitive kind*"²⁰. There is therefore a double consequence to the work, horizontal and longitudinal, through which the correlative individuation of the subjective life and the world occurs. If the life of consciousness is originally an awakening, a life directed toward the "encounter," this awakening is never a pure repeated spontaneity to which only a worldly chaos could respond on the noematic plane. On the contrary, it is a life that is configured in undergoing the event of experience [*en s'éprouvant via ce dont elle fait l'épreuve*] and which configures in return by means of the typical eidetic forms "human being", "world", "body"²¹.

Typification thus constitutes a major process of the pre-predicative sphere since it is only through it that the world is given in a coherence where everything that happens is anticipated according to the mode of familiarity. The correlational a priori thus translates, in the very individuation of the life of consciousness, as the correlation between typical generality (noematic) and habituality, such that the production of the coherence of experience is rooted in the unceasing reiterated interaction of a life that habituates interests and motivations and applies itself to the inhabiting of a mode that constantly presents it with a familiar sense-type.

However, in reinforcing the consequence of the life of consciousness and the familiar coherence of the world, do we not risk falling into a cohesion at this point so smooth or perfect that no incoherence can break through its sense, can provoke surprise or refusal, interest or aversion: a world constantly adapted for those who inhabit it, who in return would only have to let it live? What place remains then for the will, for freedom, for life-projects? If worldly coherence is linked to the usual consequence of the monad, this consequence is always imperfect, partly due to unnoticed or unrepeated resonances, partly

20 Husserl (1966), p. 339 [Husserl (2001), p. 628].

21 Husserl (1966), p. 341 [Husserl (2001), p. 629f].

because of the opacity of interests and motivations that are recombined over time. But that which radically prevents the world from being exclusively “my world” in a perfect match between my consequence and its coherence, is precisely that it is not only mine. The world of experience as it is given to me is already piled with sediments and objective deposits of which I am not the author. Other subjectivities deposit them, according to their interests and to their most original motivations; the fruits of a coherence that is not mine alone. It is thus literally the concrete encountering of the other in empathy that returns subjectivity to itself not as a life directed toward the “encounter” in its native innocence, but as a power-to-be, an “I can” which has to deliberate for itself in order to be achieved. In other words, to preserve and develop its consequence and the coherence of “its” world, subjectivity must reiterate its position-taking in the world according to its values and convictions, this time decisively and voluntarily. Since convictions and values are not held in an apperceptive unity passively formed by association, subjectivity must unify these values and beliefs, arrange and order them in a higher unity, that of the personal self, by which it can achieve its selfhood and be reconciled with itself. Because being “me” is not only letting the self be, submitting to encountered norms, to structures that govern the being of the group, in short surrendering the self and the world of common purposes to the exteriority of the norm²². To be me is to be faithful to my-self, to claim to be a self in the integrity of personal values and convictions, in the unifying unity of a life that gives a form which Husserl conceives, *idealerweise*, as vocation. Vocation indeed consists in the unification of life according to a direction, a meaning, a purpose that corresponds for each of us to the anticipation of a possible style of existence in which it fulfills its “meaning of life”²³, its “will to be a self”²⁴ which remains stable and persists when affected [*dans les épreuves*] without losing its meaning or its hold, and retains its form. This possibility of living in the development of a typical and personal style of existence depends upon the ego’s ability to reiterate its position-takings, to habitualize its effort, its tension towards an objective or an end²⁵. Active habituality, plays, so to speak, on the disposition to fuse effort into habit, so that the choice that the me makes for itself persists without its having to constantly revalidate all of its motives, equipping itself with a base for flourishing and progressing

22 Cf. on this subject the critique of “*faulen Vernunft*” in Husserl (1973c) p. 231. If Bourdieu feared an all-powerful transcendental subjectivity in the manner of Sartre’s “for-itself”, we must also do justice to that which Husserl and Sartre themselves feared: the laziness of the reason that complies with the *ordo ordinatus* and steps down from being *ordo ordinans*: the subsumption to the given order exactly as it is.

23 Husserl (1976), *Beilage XXIV*.

24 Husserl (1976), *Beilage X*.

25 Cf. Husserl (1966), p. 360 [Husserl (2001), pp. 443-444].

in what it is and what it aims for. This possibility is obviously not without setbacks or complications: condition of creating and maintaining a form of life that modalizes and unfolds according to that which it encounters and undergoes [épreuve], habituality can also serve to support rigidities or opaque automations. To be free, to draw its own destiny, to equip itself with a sense of life, flourishing and achieving it in any situation, is a task that falls to a constant willing, not to sporadic good action.

**Intersubjective
Habit and
Social
Creativity**

The world in its familiar typicality of meaning is configured by sediments of meaning, social structures, arrangements of signification deposited there by past generations and by contemporaries. If it is on the basis of this initial configuration that the self chooses for itself, the form for which it decides already no longer depends completely on it alone because of its dependence on other selves. From the outset, every self undergoes in experience [*fait l'épreuve*] the passive inter-implication of monads: common meaning comes precisely from the original interweaving of these subjective lives. However, these subjectivities can decide to voluntarily and actively form the community they are always already forming passively, can choose to inter-implicate their position-takings to configure the world, to give it the manifest form of the "to us" in an *ars vivendi* wherein being and values are reconciled. Here is the radical responsibility that results from the project of a universal ontology of the lifeworld: the making constant of our world, the concrete holding place of our values. Husserl situates the operativity of this configuration in the voluntary inter-implication of monads, which inter-orient their actions, embody and synthesize their purposes to constitute "personalities of higher order", that is to say community institutions such as associations, parties, the university, the state. As material devices, such institutions are tasked with the incorporation, maintenance, conveyance and sedimentation of purposes ordered according to the values that govern those who invest them with their projects. Personalities of a higher order are thus only legitimately institutionalized provided that they concretely use the material devices of the embodiment and iteration of the purposes of a community of action, i.e., of a community that takes its destiny in hand and concretizes its values in the world.

Just as at the personal level, habitual sedimentation runs the risk of rigidifying material structures, the particular perversion of which Sartre would demonstrate in *The Search for a Method*: the empowerment of institutions with respect to purposes pursued by the social body as a whole. In this frequent imperfection, institutions become incapable of allowing themselves to invest in the logics of the actions of the members of a society,

incapable of letting themselves incorporate the goals of individuals. So empowered, these collective units then appear to pursue, uncontrollably, goals and purposes without authors and without leaders. The degeneration of social vehicles for the realization of ends in material devices of social reproduction is such—and this is the radical perversion—that one almost forgets that they were not instituted all and only to reinforce social domination, but also *to achieve goals, to transform the real, to concretize an art of life*. The emergence of new collective units (associations, NGOs, committees for literacy, etc.) thus must overcome the shortcomings of older devices until they in turn fall into disuse or disinheritance, in a constant struggle not of being against value, but of letting-be against the achievement of a worthwhile world²⁶.

26 Sartre (1960), p. 226.

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FROM A PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF HABITS AND VALUES TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERSUBJECTIVE GROUND OF NORMATIVE SOCIAL REALITY

abstract

In this article I take a phenomenological approach to clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality. This approach clarifies what may be referred to as Aristotle's understanding of the reciprocal nature of virtue in regard to the virtuous agent. Reading virtue, then, as a kind of disposition which determines the value system in which an agent participates, a phenomenological understanding of the intersubjective ground of social reality emerges. This advances the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality with a more robust understanding of normativity.

keywords

Rule of distribution, act of distribution, egalitarianism

Introduction

Rather than follow Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and examine habit as constrained by historical and sociological conditions (cf. Bourdieu, 1977), this article examines the habitual grounds of lived experience, through a phenomenological analysis, toward drawing conclusions regarding persons and social reality. This will not be the first phenomenological analysis of social reality. The perhaps two most prominent examples are Alfred Schutz's *The Phenomenology of the Social World* and James Ostrow's *Social Sensitivity: A study of habit and experience*. However, this article differs from the above examples by incorporating the notion of a reciprocal nature between habits and values. Though this notion may be seen in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, its exploration through phenomenological analysis can advance the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality. For example, Ostrow was concerned to provide a phenomenological disclosure of an intersubjective ground to social reality. Stated as a question: how is an individual's lived experience constituted such that the meaning of experience is determined in relation to a social reality? Ostrow's "intersubjective ground" here points to an understanding of individuals as themselves socially constituted. Beyond the awareness, however, of an intersubjective ground as a condition for the possibility of each individual subject experiencing itself as a subject, questions remain concerning the normativity of social reality.

In other words, though two persons, as individuals in a social encounter, may have access to a reflective awareness of each other as subjects by way an intersubjective ground, questions regarding the normativity of social reality pertain to how the social meaning of a situation is determined. Such questions are complex. On the one hand, the very fact that social meaning is social indicates that the meanings determined must extend beyond any one individual subject. On the other hand, the freedom of each individual in a social encounter extends to the determination of meaning. Notice, this is the case even within the context of the suggestion that all meaning is social. One person may determine the meaning of a social transaction differently from another, though both determine the meaning of the transaction as a social transaction.

What is at stake, then, in this article may be referred to as the problem of the intersubjective ground of normative social reality. Just as an account of social reality would not be complete without taking normativity into

consideration, normativity, it seems, can neither be simply reduced to an intersubjective ground nor to individual freedom. Interestingly, normativity does not reduce to an intersubjective ground because of individual freedom, and normativity does not reduce to individual freedom because of the intersubjective ground of meaning. Hence, this article addresses the individual freedom pole of the problem by examining the role of habit in social transactions at the level of persons, and it addresses the intersubjective ground of meaning pole of the problem by examining the role of values in determining social reality.

This article provides a robust account of the intersubjective ground of normative social reality through a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature of habits and values. It may be considered robust in that it provides an account of normativity through an understanding of the habitual grounds of lived experience, rather than attempt to reduce normativity to either personal creation or some non-personal intersubjective ground (e.g. language or a vague notion of empathy). Moreover, this approach differs from those which, despite the existential, social, and historical constraints which may be associated with “roles”, advance a version of “social role embodiment” to account for the intersubjective ground of normative social reality. Hence, this article provides a habit-centered reading of social reality, and given its approach to uncovering the relation between habit and values, this article affirms the value of phenomenology.

Aristotle and Habit-Centered Social Reality

Taking Aristotle’s understanding of the virtuous person as a point of departure, it is possible to see social reality as habit-centered. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle identifies virtue with practice. That is to say, a person becomes virtuous by repeatedly performing virtuous acts. This not only indicates habit as the ground of virtuous activity but also points to the role of habit in determining social reality.

Of all that may be meant by the term “habit”, what I mean here, following Aristotle, is a disposition or tendency resulting from the development of human capacities. The idea is simply that in order to perform actions humans must actualize the capacities involved in the performance of such actions, and through the process of repeated actualization a kind of fluency develops. This fluency may be characterized in contrast to earlier moments in the process of its development by noting that the fluency entails a kind of “momentum.” That is to say, in contrast to earlier less developed moments, a tendency to perform actions related to the now developed capacities has emerged. On the one hand, this tendency makes the performance of actions more efficient, since it allows for relevant actions to be performed with

less intervention by the (now practiced) agent performing the action. On the other hand, this tendency ensures that actions related to developed capacities are more likely to be performed than actions related to undeveloped capacities.

This seems to be precisely Aristotle's understanding of habit and the tendency to perform virtuous actions. According to Aristotle,

This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly (Aristotle, 2009: 103b14-18).

Notice, "our transactions" with others are not merely the result of our virtues. Rather, since virtue is grounded in habit, social transactions contribute to the reality of social life by influencing future transactions. On the one hand, this points to a reading of Aristotle's practical philosophy as more habit-centered than decision or logic-centered. On the other hand, this leads us to ask the question: Is social reality somehow grounded in the habits of the society's individuals?

As habit-centered, Aristotle emphasizes that deciding to be brave does not, of course, make one brave. Similarly, realizing that to be brave would be the logically correct way to handle some social transaction does not, of course, make one brave. Though these may be straightforward conclusions, when social commentators overlook such realities they misrepresent the human and personal realities of the situation. As this article will show, because the habits influencing social reality reside at the level of the (first-person) individual, phenomenology is the appropriate method for showing these human and personal realities in social situations.

To answer the question, then, yes. Social reality is somehow grounded in the habits of the society's individuals. Yet, without providing a phenomenological analysis of how habits relate to social reality, it may be difficult to see why habit is more important than other logical alternatives such as advertising or the collective adoption of social goals. This is not to say that advertising or the collective adoption of goals is not influential to social reality; rather, this is to say phenomenologically, and along with Aristotle, that individual personal habits are more primordial than advertising or the collective decision to pursue a goal.

Hence, what needs to be examined phenomenologically is the relationship between persons and values. Phenomenological analysis will show the

primordial nature of habit in relation to values by revealing that values are not simply aspects of the natural environment to be chosen from like apples at the market. Rather, it is as if habit conditions the horizon of experience. What this means is that though the meaning of a social situation may be determined in many *possible* ways, the tendencies of the habit-grounded-dispositions of the participants in the situation limit the set of logically possible meanings. Aristotle illustrates this insight in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by convincingly arguing that persons may be understood in terms of different character types, and these character types indicate a relation between lived experience and the meaning of a social transaction. That is to say, the possible meanings to be determined in a social transaction are limited precisely by the dispositions constituting the lived experience specific to each character type. A phenomenological analysis of the dispositional nature of the lived experience of persons in relation to values, then, will properly situate values in relation to habit.

Disclosing
States of
Affairs: The
Reciprocal
Nature of
Habits and
Values

An excellent example of a phenomenological analysis of persons in relation to values may be seen in the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). So, though the following analysis may not be unique regarding values, it may be unique in regard to my connecting values with habit and my phenomenological characterization of the results. On the one hand, the reciprocal nature of habits and values was already seen by Aristotle, and arguably perhaps Plato (cf. Plato, 1997). On the other hand, von Hildebrand's phenomenological approach to understanding value allows for the more mysterious aspects of this reciprocal nature to emerge. Therefore, this article builds on a combination of insights found in the work of Aristotle and von Hildebrand toward phenomenologically illuminating the primordial ground of habit in relation to social reality, specifically from the perspective of the person in relation to values.

Performing a social transaction in accordance with a value or set of values, as Aristotle taught, strengthens the habit of performing future transactions similarly. Further, the practical freedom of an agent situated in social transactions seems to suggest the habitual reinforcement of multiple, and even conflicting, values to hang in the balance. In other words, an understanding of habitual momentum does not exclude personal choice in social transactions. Yet, if it is possible for the agent to determine the meaning, i.e. identity, of a social situation differently depending on the values involved, then how exactly are values involved in social situations? Phenomenological analysis responds to this question in a twofold way. First, this question calls for a discussion of disclosure. Second, it calls for

a discussion of the relation between evidence determining states of affairs and an agent's situating of a social transaction. Disclosure points to the determination of experiential truth. That is to say, the lived experience of a situation can be taken as disclosing the truth of what is present to the experiencing agent. This is different from the truth that relates to logical operations. Briefly put, logical truth should stand regardless of the content of the experience an agent may have. However, truth in terms of phenomenological disclosure depends on the content of the agent's experience.

If I take myself to be in the presence of a horse, then the question may be asked as to whether the essence of horse is intuitively fulfilled. In other words, I can imagine a horse because I have an understanding of what a horse is essentially. However, to say that my lived experience discloses a horse to me, if true, means that I have experiential content related to the immediate environment that fills in the essence in question (in this case a horse) such that a horse is experientially present to me. This is often called "intuitive fulfillment" by phenomenologists since it is my intuitions of the environment that count as evidence for or against the essence with which I understand myself to be presented (cf. Husserl, 1983: §138).

Now, social transactions are more complicated than the question of whether there is a horse in front of you or not. Yet, the phenomenological process through which the identity of the social transaction is disclosed to an agent will essentially function in the same way. Since an agent's action in a social situation is inextricably tied to the agent's lived experience, prior to and including its understanding of the identity of the social situation it is experiencing, social transactions are complex in that they include the consideration of multiple disclosures. In phenomenological terminology, each of the multiple disclosures may be thought of as parts contributing to the identification of a whole meaning, and thus the agent's disclosure of this whole meaning is called the present "state of affairs" (cf. Husserl, 1973: §17). Social transactions depend on an agent's disclosure of a state of affairs, since intuitive fulfillment of mere parts of a situation are insufficient. Notice, intuitive fulfillment of mere parts of a situation would mean merely disclosing the meaning of the parts without determining the meaning of the relations among the parts. Insofar as social transactions depend on understanding the meaning of the state of affairs as a social transaction, then social transactions are complex in that they necessarily include the consideration of multiple disclosures. Now, though much could be said regarding the phenomenological understanding of states of affairs, for the purposes of this article I will discuss the relation between intuitive

fulfillment and habit and the relation between values and essences in determining the meaning of social reality.

Because, for example, the identity of a social situation depends in part on how the participants tend to act socially and are disposed to act socially, some of the intuitive fulfillment of a social situation may be described as “carried into” the situation by the very presence of the particular agent(s) in question (cf. Scalabrino, 2013a). This, of course, points generally to habit as contributing to the intuitive fulfillment that discloses the identity of a situation. That is to say, the habits of individuals in a social situation contribute to determining the meaning of the social situation. Yet, just as the truth of disclosure depends on the actual intuitive fulfillment, the possible lived experience of a situation is constrained as to the various kinds of states of affairs it can be. These constraints regarding kinds point to the presence of essence.

For example, at the moment an agent is experiencing freezing weather on the North Pole, it is not possible for that agent, at that time, to have the lived experience of a beach exemplary of the essence of an Italian island. The agent may have an essentially Italian island in mind; however, the intuitive fulfillment will not provide evidence for the lived experience of such an essence. This constraint works in the other direction, so to speak, as well. That is, though an agent may have intuitive fulfillment potentially providing evidence for the lived experience of some essence, if the agent is not capable of grasping the essence, then the agent will not live the experience of that essence. Though perhaps an agent in a social situation could be taught to understand the situation in a way essentially different from the way(s) it currently understands it, missed opportunities and follies of youth provide ample examples of agents not understanding the state of affairs in which they were situated.

Hence, *the essential ways states of affairs may be intuitively fulfilled point to a multiplicity of ways a social situation may be lived*, i.e. a multiplicity of ways lived experience may disclose the truth of a situation. This is the result of a phenomenological analysis of meaning determination in social transactions, and it may be taken as a point of departure from which to consider the reciprocal nature of habits and values.

In the same way that the framework of this result shows how intuitive fulfillment can allow for the determination of different states of affairs from out of an intuitively constrained set of essences, so too this framework reveals the way in which values contribute to the lived experience of a social situation. Consider the following from von Hildebrand,

It is plainly nonsensical to say of acts of charity or justice that in speaking of their value we only refer to such a point of view of motivation; for *evidently* [emphasis added] the value discloses itself as a property of these acts (Hildebrand, 1953: 79).

Beyond thinking of values as motivations, phenomenological analysis reveals values as essentially related to the acts in which a social transaction is identified as charitable or just. In other words, just as it is the case that if an agent is to reinforce its habitual relation to a specific kind of lived experience, then it must be able to disclose a state of affairs so as to live that kind of experience, so too if an agent is to reinforce its habitual relation to acting in accordance with a value or set of values, then it must be able to determine the meaning of a state of affairs in light of such values. The distinction may be subtle; however, there is a difference between being motivated by values and having the kind of disposition that allows one to determine the meaning of a situation in terms of some value or set of values. In fact, von Hildebrand himself points to “the *disposition* to recognize something superior to one’s arbitrary pleasure and will [emphasis added]” (Hildebrand, 1969: 10). *Here, then, is the reciprocal nature of habits and values.* Recall, as noted above, though the meaning of a social situation may be determined in many *possible* ways, the tendencies of the habit-grounded-dispositions of the participants in the situation limit the set of logically possible meanings. Now we see that this limiting of the set of logically possible meanings involves, beyond habit, the essential values accessible to the person with which to determine the meaning of a situation. Hence, to act in accordance with values, as essential properties of acts, an individual’s habit-ground must condition the horizon of the experience in such a way that a person experiences the state of affairs as one in which the set of possible actions to be performed essentially involves such values. Though Aristotelian virtues and social values may not be isomorphic, values may still be understood as grounded in habit regarding individuals. Recall, also from the above section on Aristotle, values too may be understood as habit-centered. For example, deciding to be charitable and being charitable are different, and this is the case even when sound logic calls for a charitable act. Hence, just as the habitual reinforcement of a disposition to disclose a state of affairs influences future disclosures, acting in accordance with some value or value system reciprocally affects the agent so as to influence the future disclosure of situations as calling for such value-laden acts. Lastly, notice that though the habitual determination of meaning in terms

of values influences the agent's present and future acts, like essences values are intuitively fulfilled in determining the meaning of states of affairs; they are not part of the intuitions related to the environment with which the fulfilling is accomplished. This insight provides an entry into the more mysterious aspects of the reciprocal nature of habit and values. First, we should ask: what is a value? Second, we may come to understand why von Hildebrand characterizes values as "spiritual", and how the presence of values may involve "grace."

We often characterize something as having value, and we may mean this in multiple ways. For example, we may declare a beverage to be valuable, and notice it may be valuable in multiple ways. It may be valuable due to the pleasure it provides us in consuming it, or it may be valuable as a charitable gift to someone. As von Hildebrand maintains, we may understand value as subjectively contingent or as transcendently absolute. A person may be motivated to act, then, in regard to a value, so long as the person is able to determine the meaning of a situation as one in which the value applies. In determining a state of affairs a person is then able to respond to the presence of values, and von Hildebrand refers to this as a value-response (cf. Hildebrand, 2009: 206; cf. Hildebrand, 1973: 47).

On the one hand, values are essential properties of acts (cf. Hildebrand, 1953: 79). This was noted and discussed above. On the other hand, values transcend that of which they are essential properties. For example, it may be a non-essential property of some coffee mug that it is blue. Yet, the property of being blue transcends the coffee mug insofar as there are other objects which participate in the property of being blue. However, there is a difference which is quite important here between values as essential properties and qualities, such as being blue, as accidental properties, and this difference relates to the possibility of self-transcendence in von Hildebrand. That is to say, by responding to absolute values as essential a person is able to transcend a tendency to respond to subjective and relative values as accidental. Finally, this understanding of the difference between absolute and relative values and absolute and relative value-responses allows us to ask: in determining the meaning of a social transaction, how does an absolute value become present as a value to potentially be intuitively fulfilled?

Interestingly, this question would be at home in Book II of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where he wonders how "moral virtue" is acquired. On the one hand, Aristotle and von Hildebrand are in clear agreement regarding the reality of a transcendent pleasure experienced by persons being virtuous, and this is intimately related to von Hildebrand's discussion of

self-transcendence. On the other hand, though there is, of course, value in teaching children to consider what von Hildebrand calls “absolute values” in social transactions, Aristotle’s ethics reminds us that as “a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing just and temperate acts” (Aristotle, 2009: 1105b1-5). Hence, we may now arrive at an answer to the above question by contextualizing values in von Hildebrand’s terms of “spirituality” and “grace.” That the presence of absolute values grants the person to whom they are present the possibility of self-transcendence through a kind of absolute participation, the mysterious nature of their origin may be characterized as a gift, and this points to “grace” (Hildebrand, 1953: 18; cf. Scalabrino, 2014). Finally, recognizing this grace as perfecting the nature of a person toward dwelling in a self-transcendent communion with absolute values, speaks to the “spiritual” nature of the values and persons (cf. Hildebrand, 1953: 167; cf. Scalabrino, 2013b).

**Phenomenology
and the
Difference
between Real
and Abstract
Distinctions**

Now that habit as the primordial ground, from the perspective of the person in relation to values, has been established, the question of how to identify the relation between the agent and habit needs to be addressed. Addressing this relation phenomenologically interestingly hearkens back to a Scholastic notion of the difference between real and conceptual distinction. In perhaps more contemporary language this may be seen as the difference between a real and an abstract distinction. For example, though two properties of a thing may not be distinct in reality, they may be distinct when taken in the abstract. In other words, the circularity of a real ball is not really distinct from the presence of the ball in question. However, taken abstractly circularity may be contemplated as distinct from experience of the ball.

The question under consideration, then, is how to understand the distinction between habit and the lived experience *of the person*. Just as the notion of person may be thought to unify the two terms which are here abstractly distinct, i.e. habit and lived experience, understanding habit and lived experience as not really distinct provides more depth to the understanding of a person in a social transaction and to the understanding of the reciprocal nature of habit and value. This concern, then, to illustrate that habit and lived experience are not really distinct is quite similar to a concern held by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) in relation to the results of phenomenological analysis. For example, in his *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger was concerned “to show that intentionality is a structure of lived

experience as such and not a coordination relative to other realities, [i.e.] something added to the experiences taken as psychic states” (Heidegger, 1985: 29).

The similarity between Heidegger’s concern and ours may help guard against mistakenly considering habit as really distinct from the person having a lived experience of social reality. As his above quote suggests, Heidegger is aware that a phenomenological analysis provides access to aspects of lived experience as if those aspect were separate in reality. However, beyond the abstract awareness of separate aspects of lived experience such as essences, intuitive fulfillment, habits and value-responses, from the perspective of the social reality of a person in a social transaction, such aspects are not really distinct. In other words, to consider habit as really distinct from the person having a lived experience of social reality is to confuse abstract and real distinction. This is to say that the primordial ground of habit influencing the values with which the person determines how to identify the state of affairs and act in a social situation precisely *is* the person in the situation. Further, the reinforcement of the habit of the person is the reinforcement of the presence of the values enacted in the very construction of social reality.

Since an awareness of the difference between real and abstract distinctions will help clarify the concluding parts of this paper, briefly consider one more example from the history of philosophy. Recall one of the telltale signs of the virtuous person in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is the absence of the awareness which accompanies the lived experience of the ethically-incontinent person. This is because the virtuous person is in the habit of being virtuous. How then may we understand such a function of habit in which potential meaning determinations of a social situation are kept absent from the virtuous person’s awareness? Insofar as we may characterize what is absent to the virtuous person as the tendency to indulge in relative values of self-satisfaction, the function of habit in the virtuous person may be seen as contributing to what von Hildebrand called “self-transcendence.”

A brief consideration of Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) characterization of habit memory, then, may provide further clarification regarding the real function of habit in self-transcendence. According to Bergson, the uniqueness of habit memory, i.e. its primordial nature, is such that “it no longer *represents* our past to us, it *acts* it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment” (Bergson, 1929: 93). Here, Bergson may be seen invoking a distinction between a kind of declarative memory, which

preserves bygone images, and a kind of procedural memory, which may be said to “act” insofar as there is not a real distinction between it and its agent. Put negatively, the habit memory of the virtuous person “acts” in such a way that potential meaning determinations remain absent from the person’s horizon of experience. Put positively, the habit memory of the virtuous person “acts” in such a way as to maintain a relation to absolute values as essential for determining the meaning of social reality. In this way, the reciprocal nature of habit and values conditions self-transcendence. It is as if the agent’s presence in a situation unfolds from its habit-ground (cf. Scalabrino, 2012a). Hence, it is by way of analysis that the agent and its habitual way of being seem distinct; yet, in terms of the person in the social situation, the agent is not really distinct from its habit.

Logic-Centered Normativity

With the above phenomenological analysis of an agent in a social situation, the relation between habit and value in determining an agent’s lived experience of the state of affairs of a social transaction has been accomplished. It is now possible to examine how a logic-centered reading of normative social reality diminishes the actual role of habit in relation to social reality (cf. Scalabrino 2012b). The difference between a logic-centered and habit-centered reading of normative social reality will hinge on different understandings of the universality and necessity of the determined meaning of a social situation. Normativity here, of course, refers to the manner of determining the identity of a situation such that the situation would be acknowledged necessarily and universally as such. Robert Brandom has provided what may be seen as a logic-centered reading of normativity. Consider Brandom’s characterization from his *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas*,

the synthesis of a rational self or subject: what is responsible for the [normative] commitments ... has a *rational* unity in that the commitments it comprises are treated as *reasons* for and against other commitments, as normatively *obliging* one to acknowledge some further commitments and *prohibiting* acknowledgement of others [Brandom’s emphases] (Brandom, 2009: 14).

To begin, notice that Brandom’s emphasis on the agent in a social situation as rational is not exclusive to either the logic or habit centered understanding. For example, the virtuous agent for Aristotle is rational (Aristotle, 2009: 1103a1-10). Further, an agent may be rational and still have a primordial habit ground. Next, that a situation has a rational unity

with commitments influencing future actions and future commitments, again, is not exclusive to a logic-centered understanding. The example here being that two different individuals can understand the same situation differently, and yet both may have commitments extending into the future which rationally relate to the determined meaning of the present social situation. For example, this may describe exactly what happens when the vicious and the virtuous do business with one another.

At this point, then, we might ask just how the logic-centered and habit-centered differ. The difference is that the logic-centered understanding takes the identity of the situation to be universal and necessary for all possible participants insofar as a set of possible ways to identify the situation can be listed along with the manner in which each extends through its commitments into the future. This extending into the future, then, from a logic-centered understanding suggests the presence of a kind of essential map of social norms. Lastly, this map of social norms is taken to be a map of social reality. The assumption being that no rational agent would be able to see the situation differently than some way that appears on this map, since this map outlines all the rationally possible ways situations may be identified. Historically changing social norms may then be seen as merely affirming different configurations of this map.

Now, it should not be surprising to find that a logic-centered understanding seems logically valid. However, phenomenological analysis brings us to a different understanding of the necessity and universality of a situation's identity. In fact, the following quote from Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) seems to speak directly to this different understanding.

Necessity as an objective predicate of truth (which is then called a necessary truth) is tantamount to the law-governed validity of the state of affairs in question. [However, a] natural equivocation leads us to call every general truth that itself utters a law a necessary truth. ... It would have been better to call it the explanatory ground of a law, from which a class of necessary truths follows (Husserl, 2001: 146).

Further, Husserl clarifies that the "equivocation consists in the fact that we call laws which are the source of necessity necessary" (Husserl, 1996: 220; quoted in Mulligan, 2004: 397). In other words, the goal is not to try to understand how a rational agent might determine the identity of a situation differently from any of the possible rational determinations available. The goal is to see the rational necessity as crystallizing around the identity of a situation determined in the lived experience of an agent. In this way,

different agents, determining the identity of a situation differently, may both be seen as rational and with rational obligations relating to the identity of the situation as they determined it.

To see the identity of the situation from the logic-centered understanding as a rational determination by a rational agent makes the situation seem as though every social agent as rational should have access to the normative map of social reality. However, as the habit-centered understanding emphasizes, agents in social situations are not identifying the state of affairs by choosing from a series of rational possibilities (like choosing apples at the market), rather the habit ground of each agent brings a disposition to determine states of affairs essentially in accordance with various values. That there is a “law-governed validity of the state of affairs in question”, according to Husserl, points to a rational agent’s ability to understand the *necessary* commitments and obligations extending into the future from the current social situation *without necessitating* that the situation was to be identified as it was. Hence, phenomenological analysis reveals the extension into the future of commitments and obligations to be, though rationally constellated, dependent upon the habit ground of the agent.

How Habits Make Social Reality Present

Notice that the conclusion drawn in the above section is not foreign to Aristotle’s understanding of the influence of an agent’s dispositions in its understanding of a social transaction. That is to say, a state of affairs may be determined differently by different agents, and the difference depends on the values carried into the lived experiences by habit with which the state of affairs, and thereby the meaning, of a situation is determined (cf. Aristotle, 2009: 1109b). From the perspective of a phenomenological analysis the points to synthesize, then, include the habit-centered understanding of social norms and the primordial habit ground of the agent as merely abstractly distinct from its lived experience. *Out of this synthesis a phenomenological understanding of the intersubjective ground of social reality emerges.*

The question affirmatively answered at the beginning of this article asked: Is social reality somehow grounded in the habits of the society’s individuals? The above phenomenological analysis provided support for the affirmative response by revealing a more robust understanding of normativity, arguing for a habit-centered understanding over a logic-centered understanding. In this way, social reality emerges not from the rational individuals of a society relating to the rational commitments and obligations of their social transactions. Rather, social reality emerges from an intersubjective ground to be understood as constituted by the habits of each individual in the

society. The habits, as indicated above, are to be thought in their unity with lived experience as indicating the very persons of the society in question. The persons of a society, then, constitute the normativity of their society by the values their habits sustain. This habit-centered account of normativity is more robust than the logic-centered. For example, the indication of the logic-centered account that normativity entails rational obligations and commitments does not account for the presence of, or difference between, absolute and relative values in the determination of social reality. Hence, following the habit-centered account we may speak of a phenomenologically revealed intersubjective habit ground sustaining a society's norms such that the lived experiences of the persons in the society may be seen as making social reality present. This "making present" is to be understood in terms of phenomenological disclosure as stated above.

To be clear, nothing in this article should be understood as denying an agent's ability to make rational choices. Moreover, that action is grounded in habit does not mean that there is a passive dimension to action. This points back to Husserl's concern, noted above, to not "call laws which are the source of necessity necessary." In other words, through phenomenological analysis we gain access to the conditions for the possibility of experience, and insofar as rational action involves rational consideration of the content of experience to which action is related, then the elements examined through phenomenological analysis are of a prior ontological order from the elements considered in performing a rational action.

What I mean by "prior ontological order" is that phenomenological analysis regards an understanding of what is necessary to have an experience in which rational action may take place. For example, one person may rationally deliberate whether to charge another person interest on something borrowed. To charge interest may be rationalized, and there need not be anything passive about the actions which subsequently entail obligations, etc. However, in regard to the conditions for the possibility of an experience as a social transaction, a person cannot rationally deliberate whether to charge another person interest unless charging interest is a practice of which the person is aware. Yet, this need not be characterized in terms of being ignorant or having knowledge. In the language of von Hildebrand, it is as if in the latter situation the value of charging interest does not condition the horizon of meaning for the person. Hence, the person is neither tempted to nor can have a value-response to a value which is absent from the horizon essentially informing the determination of a social transaction's meaning (cf. Aristotle, 2009: Bk VII, esp. 1146b17-21). Rather, a more robust understanding of normativity and rational choice may

be seen in a way similar to Aristotle's discussion of the role of habit in regard to the virtuous person. That is to say, understanding that an agent's habit ground is more primordial than the rational structure crystallizing around each determined state of affairs, provides a more robust understanding of the state of affairs within which a person conducts a social transaction. Showing your citizens the logic of how they are rationally obligated and committed to a set of actions is less likely to change social reality than would a change to the habits of those citizens.

Conclusion This article provides a phenomenological analysis of social reality. After phenomenologically examining the reciprocal nature of habits and values at work in the disclosure of states of affairs, this article provided a habit-centered reading of social reality. The habit-centered reading was contrasted with a logic-centered reading to emphasize the manner in which the former provides a more robust understanding of normativity. The article culminated, then, by showing how the reciprocal play of habits and values determines social reality in the lived experiences of societal persons. Hence, this article moved from a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature of habits and values to an understanding of the intersubjective ground of normative social reality.

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HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF POSITION-TAKING AND SECOND NATURE

abstract

*I argue that Husserl's concept of position-taking, *Stellungnahme*, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject's position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject's identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between *Stellungnahme* and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity.*

keywords

Second nature, position-taking, Husserl, habit, subjectivity

This paper argues that Husserl's concept of position-taking, *Stellungnahme*, specifically as developed in *Ideas II*, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of a philosophical anthropology¹. Inter- and intra-cultural diversity among individuals and groups, as well as transhistorical variation in human activities, institutions, accomplishments, and even personal characteristics (all of which we take to be telling of who we are), give us reasons to think that our *nature* goes beyond our species-common biological nature. It seems then that *what we are* is not limited to our biological, *first* nature. But what goes beyond *first* nature is not, as I will show, separate from it: they both make up our second nature. How to think more concretely about this unity/duality? I argue that *what we are* is manifest in a particular way in the diversity and complexity of human activities. In thinking about second nature, my interest will be to try to get some clarity about the *level* in which it is possible to locate the union of both a biologically and a non-biological aspect at work in the historically-situated everyday life of human beings, who are social in nature, and to articulate that connection. In everyday life the subject's acts are not isolated peaks². Actions belong together in two senses: they express a certain internal consistency in their motivations and they issue from the same subject. Thus, second nature is looked for in that which connects the sequences of motivations that underlie a person's doings. This connection I identify as dispositional. Position-taking or *Stellungnahme*, I hold, is the right dispositional concept to articulate the notion of second nature.

1 Husserl's works are referenced according to the Husserliana edition, save for Experience and Judgment. Non-enclosed numbers correspond to the English translation cited; page numbers of the German edition are given within angle brackets, where available.

2 I use the terms "subject" and "person" synonymously. They refer to the actual being that is essentially embodied and historical and has an intersubjective dimension. I use sometimes "living subject" for emphasis. My referent is not the pure or transcendental ego (save as a stratum in the multilayered constitution of the subject). My commitment to such a conception of the subject, among other things, puts me apart from a number of Husserl commentators that insist that Husserl accounts first and foremost for a transcendental consciousness as the essence of subjectivity. It also distinguishes my account from recent influential investigations, such as Crowell's recent book (2013), who argues that while Husserl may have seen the necessity to account for a richer subject, in the manner above described, his theoretical commitments rendered him unable to accomplish such project. To put it in Crowell's terms, the type of normativity that is manifest in the pragmatically-embedded life of the subject is beyond the reach of Husserl's phenomenology. I oppose such reading. This paper can be seen as an argument for the presence of such type of normativity in the Husserl.

It conveys the idea that in everyday life a subject does not simply face pre-given things in a pre-given way. Rather, she *orients* herself in relation to things, people, states of affairs, etc. This orienting herself is broad in its operation as it ranges from *basic* levels (e.g. sensory acquaintance with things) all the way up to complex activities, and is always and preeminently active. Since it has been the explicit aim of this special issue—*Habits: Second Nature and Social Reality*—to invite accounts of *habit*, my paper has the intention of offering a counterpart to positions positively centered on that concept.

In §1 I argue that since the concept of motivation is at the core of the phenomenological and ontological priority of active subjectivity that Husserl endorses in *Ideas II*, and motivations can be understood as dispositions, the issue of second nature can be framed in terms of the appropriate dispositional concept. I then offer a list of desiderata for the right dispositional concept, and define and locate two groups of habit-like concepts in relation to those desiderata. In §2 I offer an account of *Stellungnahme*. In doing so, I offer arguments for the primacy of active subjectivity, and for the connections *Stellungnahme*-motivation and, issuing from it, *Stellungnahme*-identity. In §3 I clarify my stance on position-taking and passivity arguing that position-taking has phenomenological and epistemological priority over passivity. I do not identify position-taking with the whole sphere of activity and I do not discount that there are passive bases, both innate and acquired, that are essential to position-taking.

1. Husserl conceives the living subject in its everyday concreteness as the subject that acts, judges, perceives, makes decisions, desires, etc. On this view, the subject is *constituted* by a series of layers or strata. Her actions are *motivated*, that is, they are animated by influences of different sorts: needs of pragmatic engagements with things or people, value considerations, and also biological drives and instincts, and psychic rigid habits that we have acquired.

Our second nature is manifest in our active life, but it is rooted in the biological and in the habitual (Hua 4, 267, <255>). In speaking of the underlying basis of the subject, Husserl says that “in a certain sense there is, in the obscure depths, a root soil” (Hua 4, 291–292, <279>)³. The metaphor points to a hidden ground that is difficult to investigate not only because it is beyond the reach of our awareness, but also because it is deep and its elements are buried. Despite this obscurity, it is essential to the

3 “Es ist gewissermaßen ein Wurzelboden da in dunklen Tiefen” (Hua 4, <279>). See also Supplement XII to Hua 4.

account I offer to see everyday actions as grounded in such multilayered substrate. Although I address second nature through an active concept, the partly passive, underlying sphere must be kept in sight, so that my account is sensitive to the complexity of the subject matter and proves to be compatible with and answerable to the ground on which it is rooted. Husserl's theory of constitution provides a way to investigate the issue of second nature, for it looks for the structure of lived experiences through an inquiry into the *constitution* of the experiencing subject. Before I get there, I would like to propose some criteria to guide the inquiry.

At the core of the active subject are complexes of dispositions, product of physiological and biological dependencies, and of earlier experiences (Hua 4, 143, <136>), and this is why the question of second nature should be framed as an investigation into the most adequate dispositional concept. The right dispositional concept should satisfy two groups of desiderata. First, there is an ontogenetic aspect: the right dispositional structure should be able to *change* alongside biological, personal, and social individual development. A second group relates to variations between different subjects: the right dispositional structure should be plastic enough so as to adapt to biological differences between human beings, including those of subjects with disabilities, and to underlie cultural and intersubjective variations of humans, such as languages and modes of relating to the world affectively, cognitively, or in value terms.

Husserl's mid-to-late philosophy accords an increasing importance to passive structures and processes, habit being their chief representative, so it is just natural to consider them in the present discussion. The idea of habit is, in quite general terms, the idea that some aspects of our experiential engagement with the world become habitual and *ground* our experiential life in general. While I agree that the domain of passivity does play a central role in our experiential life, I do not think that it is the right concept to be at the center of a philosophical anthropology. Let me explore two habit-like formations.

On one extreme we have hard, biologically-based *instincts* and *habitus*, that is, sedimented (sometimes thickly sedimented) cognitive or affective *opinions* (Hua 4, 267, <255>). *Habitus* refers to a type of *knowledge* constituting a horizon of "familiarity and precognizance" that, by means of a certain anticipation, underlies the objects' coming to be experienced as they actually are experienced (Experience and Judgment, 121-123). In other words, *habitus* is "a residue of past life that informs the current perceptions, thought and actions of the ego" (Biceaga 2010, 68; see also Hua 4, 118, <111>). In the process of the explicative thematization of an object,

for instance, this sedimented knowledge is responsible for assigning (or awakening) a sense to different aspects of the object as it is given in time (Experience and Judgment, 112–124). The origin of *habitus* is the repetition of similar instances that fixes a sense and makes it become latent in cognitive and belief expectation (Hua 11, 238–241, <188–191>).

Instinct and *habitus* are passive even when they play a role in activities. Instincts and bodily-based habitualities (e.g. being raised as right-handed even if one ‘is’ left-handed) are closer to pure passivity (Biceaga 2010, 68). But even more complex cases of *habitus*—say *habitus* at play in recognizing a social dynamic—are passive because the person, without much resistance, ‘accepts’ what is suggested by *habitus*. The fact that we can ‘fight’ or ‘overcome’ some of these ‘suggestions’ (perhaps not the instinctual ones), and on occasion intendedly yield to them, only shows that it is possible to more actively relate to them, not that they are not passive.

On other extreme we have customary habits: having a coffee in the morning, crossing one’s arms, putting too much salt in food, etc. Although *habits* are evidence of our second nature in that, for instance, they are not instinctual and can vary from culture to culture and from person to person, they are too concrete and specific, and for that reason are not the type of concept we are after. It should be possible, though, to account for them through the right concept.

It does not seem then that either instincts and *habitus*, or customary habits are the concepts that can successfully articulate the idea of second. Even when closely woven into action, “the ego’s participation [...] is usually minimal and removed from introspective reach” (Biceaga 2010, 69).

Methodologically these passive formations can help delimit the dispositional concept I am after. We can think that the right dispositional concept should be in between these two extremes: the passive formations that underlie our acquaintance with objects (instincts and *habitus*), and specific repetitive behaviors (*habits*) that, while a form of activity, are more like end-products or peaks of action, in which the subject yields to fixed ways of doing things. As to habits, in addition to minimal participation and lack of introspection, they are not productive in the sense a structure of subjectivity would be and are all-too-specific to be the concepts we are looking for: habits do not underlie the wide variety of activities of which they themselves are but instances.

In the next section I will offer an account of position-taking as the most adequate dispositional concept to understand the second nature of persons.


2. The notion of position-taking conveys the idea that in everyday life a subject does not simply face pre-given things in a pre-given way and executes pre-delineated actions upon them. Rather, she first and foremost orients herself in relation to things, others, states of affairs, etc. The general orientation that precedes and gives rise to the situation, and guides the moments of explicit action is a taking of position. Position-taking sets the tone, as it were, for the essentially interpretive acquaintance between subject and things, on which the very definition or thematization of those things depends, and it maintains or changes that tone in ensuing comportments. In this sense, it has a broad range of action. The concept of position-taking is also broad in that it applies to different domains of acquaintance with things (sensory, perceptually, logically, affectively, inferentially, etc.).
Say I am walking in the street and there is a car parked near me. I may notice the car or not. I may only notice the presence of a big object without thematizing it as a car. If I notice it, I may notice it in many ways: noticing its color or not, noticing where it is exactly parked, etc. My way of noticing it or not somehow depends on what I am doing: perhaps I am rushing to get somewhere and my surroundings are not something I have an interest in, except for the purposes of efficiency. My level of awareness of the car is also related to my pragmatic engagement with it: if I barely notice the bulk I may be able to avoid it (and vice versa too), and my noticing it without awareness of model or color may be enough for a more involved pragmatic relation, such as intently standing behind it while another car goes by. In all these cases, I take a position, even if only derivatively, in respect to the car. Thus, when I am in the vicinity of a car, it is not the case that I always encounter *a car as such*, with its many characteristics, and that my perceptions, actions and reactions about it can be defined objectively. This simplified scenario is the type of situation I have in mind.
In inquiring about second nature, the explanandum is the second nature of the whole person, of “the subject of actual life” (Hua 4, Supplement XIII, 382-383, <372-373>). According to Husserl’s theory of constitution, chiefly as developed in *Ideas II*, the person is constituted by multiple levels. These levels are different Ego-formations, ranging (in broad strokes) from a bodily level, to the theoretical-transcendental pure Ego, to the empirical, intersubjective Ego of everyday life. Let me illustrate by focusing on two levels.
The aesthetic body is a system that pairs sensory occurrences with subjective occurrences in the body, and in an important sense determines “what it is that, as world, stands over and against the subject” (Hua 4, 70-80, <65-75>). This corporeal self [*Ichleib*] has the particularity of being a

center of reference in relation to which perceptual happenings take place: perceived things are above, to the left, they are disgusting or agreeable, actable upon or not, etc. (Hua 4, 61, <56>; Hua 16, 1997, 124, <148>).

Another stratum is that of the “pure Ego”, achieved by self-reflection in abstraction from the body (Hua 4, 103, <97>). The pure Ego is the abstract intentional unity in which the same I-feeling is attached to the same flow of consciousness and that is common to all intentional acts.

These abstract formations are at work in the pragmatic involvement of subjects in the world. These strata do not ‘act’ isolatedly or modularly: the workings of the simpler, more basic strata are constitutive of the activities of ‘higher’, more comprehensive levels (Hua 4 Hua 4, 70–71, 269, 292–293 <66, 257, 280>). Let us take the case of perception as an illustration of different levels at work in the actual life of a subject.

Take, for instance, the Müller-Lyer (so-called) illusion (Fig.1). To this day, the Müller-Lyer lines are taken by most as evidence of a universal characteristic featuring both the representational character of perception and its modular character (one can’t see the lines of equal length despite knowing they are so). As some social psychologists have shown, however, there is nothing universal or necessary about the perception of the drawing. Some people, the San foragers of the Kalahari, do not see the illusion. Further, the differences in perceived length between the two lines varies across populations (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010, 62). According to the authors of this study, it may be that the exposure to “‘carpentered corners’ of modern environments may favor certain optical calibrations and visual habits that create and perpetuate this illusion” (2010, 62). Whether it is specifically the exposure to carpentered corners or other complex social influences, what is crucial here is that this case illustrates Husserl’s claim that the bodily dimension does not act in isolation but is influenced by intersubjective and pragmatic constraints. The perceptual element is not simply about what sensations *follow* what sensory worldly occurrences. It is about ways of encountering, taking in, and relating to worldly occurrences: it is a taking of position.



Husserl does not claim that the perceptual is the bodily dimension *alone*, but that the perceptual is *partly* constituted by the sensory, bodily level. Nor does Husserl claim, that the sensory or bodily is *only* biological or physiological. The workings of the body are active in meaningful perception, but personal and intersubjective strata also shape a person's sensitivity or even a person's way of 'using' the senses. I am now in the position to offer a fuller articulation of *position-taking*.

The subject is active, and being active means taking position vis-à-vis things, objects, goals, etc. (Hua 4, 226-238, <215-226>). For Husserl, the genuine sense of subjectivity belongs to the Ego that acts upon things, makes decisions about her life, perceives objects—that one who attends, compares, is attracted or repulsed, etc. (Hua 4, 224-225, <213>; Hua 11, 16-19, <362-364>). The subject that relates to things in the world is not a universal, abstract subject, but rather a being that is individualized in her own constitution as "a person among persons" (Hua 4, Suppl. XIII, 382, <372>). The person is, for these reasons, not conceived of as a substance in which properties or capacities inhere, but rather as an active being in which a complex underlying basis is in action and is made manifest in the way things are dealt with, as well as in the *things* that are dealt with. In exercising faculties and habits the subject takes position and determines relational *stances* regarding things (Hua 4, 265, <253>).

This position-taking of the person is the pragmatic *thematization* of a relation of the subject with aspects of the world (Hua 4, 119-120, <112-113>). This means that position-taking, as a relational structure of subjectivity, does not only refer to individual, isolated position-takings. There is a broader connection between position-takings and the subject, and the key is the notion of motivation: "My thesis, my position-taking, my deciding from motives [...] is something I have a stake in" (Hua 4, 119, <122>)⁴.

The causality of motivation is central for Husserl because the subjective relation with the surrounding world is not a causal relation, governed by causal, physical conditionalities, but one governed by the nexus of motivations, that is, by the type of animating power that guides the *meaningful, pragmatic* relation with things that intentional beings like us have. Husserl refers to motivation also as the "lawfulness of the life of the spirit" (Hua 4, 231, <220>). To say that lawfulness belongs to motivation means that there exists a certain agreement of motives, a type of *consistency*. We can see this consistency, for instance, in the character of a person. If, as I have said, the subject is an ongoing taking of position animated by

4 "Meine These, meine Stellungnahme, mein auf die Motive hin Mich-entscheiden [...] ist meine Sache" (Hua 4 1989, <122>).

consistent motives, the identity of the subject is to be found precisely in *the* consistency evinced in her position-takings and comportments. In Husserl's terms, it is part of the idea of a subject that the subject is the same in all her position-takings, and that in all her position-takings the subject is the same: "As long as I am the one I am, then the position-taking cannot but 'persist', and I cannot but persist in it" (Hua 4, 118–119, <111–112>).

In this case, to say that the identity of the subject is to be found in her consistent position-takings and ensuing comportments means that such position-takings are *expression* of herself (Flynn 2009, 67). The whole person, as a psychophysical unit that exists over time, expresses herself in the bodily, active, ongoing engagement with things in the world. The subject *is*, as a *subject*, nothing else than her position-takings and ensuing comportments. We may say that we find *in a person* a style of being, a mode of acting, a host of tendencies and preferences. We should rather say that it is *in* those things—in her position-takings—where we find the person⁵. This is not to say, though, that in a changing stream of consciousness and lived experiences, the subject is ever fully defined. Husserl says that "the subject develops by living" (Hua 4, 264, <252>), which means that it is more precise to speak of an ongoing, interactive correlation between subject and activities, such that the subject determines those activities and is at the same time influenced and further shaped by those activities themselves (see Hua 4, Supplements VII, X).

It follows also from this framework that the identity of a subject is not strictly an individual issue. Insofar as position-taking features ways of relating towards things, others, and events, and those ways come oftentimes from others (e.g. upbringing and cultural ways of doing things), *Stellungnahme* is partly intersubjectively constituted. Personal character and style are then partly constituted by others, and in this sense Husserl says that "this influence determines personal development, whether or not the person himself subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable

5 Husserl's two main conceptions of expression and the shift from one to the other, from the *Investigations* to *Ideas II*, are explored in detail by Flynn (2009). On the early conception, modeled after the linguistic sign, expression operates with two separate things, one of which expresses the other, the expressed being the essential one. In contrast, the view Husserl endorses in *Ideas II* talks about an *intimation* between a subjective aspect and a bodily manifestation, that is, so 'close' a connection that it is not the case that interiority is expressed in exteriority, but that the "interiority" coexists with "exteriority" (68). The body does not simply indicate subjective states because, first, the body itself is not just materiality—it is not *Körper* but *Leib*, living body—, and second, because the body itself in its being animated—or the subjective aspects being embodied—constitutes a type of unity that only exists in that intimation, which is in this case *the human being herself* as a particular type of reality (67). The extension I propose of the treatment Flynn offers of exteriority and body is that they are properly nowhere to be 'seen' or intuited but in position-takings and ensuing comportments.

of determining the degree of the influence and its character" (Hua 4, 281, <268>)⁶. In the following section I will offer a few closing remarks nuancing the relation between position-taking and passivity.

3. My argument for *Stellungnahme* rests on the consideration that the person is essentially active: it is "the [personal] Ego that in any sense is "active" and *takes a position*" (Hua 4, 225, <213>). On that basis I argue that the active position-taking has priority over passivity, and that this priority is phenomenological and epistemological. Passivity, embodied in instinct, habitus and habit, is necessary for subjectivity to take place, but is subservient to position-takings⁷.

Husserl examines the relation between passive and active aspects in the *Analyses* and says that despite the central role of passivity, consciousness of objects is "*genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts*" (Hua 11, 274, <3>, emphasizes mine). Position-taking is phenomenologically prior to passivity because it pertains to first-person experience, where *meaning* is located; whereas other underlying strata, subpersonal or unconscious, are not meaningful in the first-person sense. Epistemologically, position-taking is prior to passivity because first-person experience is the proper source of knowledge and is also known first and more directly; whereas underlying strata are only known indirectly (some only transcendently) as they reveal themselves in first-person experience.

Position-taking cannot exist without the passive sphere. The subject that acts—that perceives, grasps, remembers, values, etc.—possesses, as it were, a passive ground that makes it possible, in the most fundamental sense,

6 My proposal is broadly compatible with scientific accounts of the origins of human cognition such as Tomasello's (2009). On his view, human cognition is the product of a *historical* and *ontogenetical* development of cognitive skills on the basis of a set of *phylogenetic* characteristics (2009, 10–12).

7 My account of position-takings is *not* an account of the sphere of activity. There is a good reason: there are specific activities that are passive in the relevant sense, which is a certain deciding freely according to motives. When trying to suggest a relativization and softening of the relation activity/passivity, Biceaga argues, for instance, that receptivity is a type of "activity in passivity" which defies the opposition between "passive receptivity as the ego's *undergoing of something* and judicative activity as the ego's *doing something* in response to its being passively affected from without" (2010, xix, emphasis in the original). Thoroughly habitual doings are actions in the obvious sense that the body moves, but they are entirely passive in that the free ego, as it were, hardly intervenes and the action is beyond introspection and even perhaps beyond awareness.

On the other hand, position-taking is not a simple voluntaristic account of actions. In the course, for instance, of a time-extended pragmatic endeavor in which one interacts with several objects for the sake of the whole, like cooking a meal, position-taking refers more to the whole, and the way specific interactions are part of that whole orientation—consistency of motivations—rather than to each individual engagement with an object. This is why the issue of *wanting* to do each individual action is relatively unimportant, and why 'activity' in the traditional conception of 'what is done' is entirely flat-footed, even inadequate, for the present purposes. Nevertheless, it is clear that the whole pragmatic engagement is *active*.

for objects to be objects for consciousness. In a way, the passive sphere is active in the being active of the subject, and this also shows that “activity and passivity are inseparable and mutually dependent” (Biceaga 2010, 2010, xix).

Addressing this complex relation, Husserl writes:

[The fullness of the person is] the Ego as human, the ‘I take a position’, the I think, I value, I act, I complete works, etc. Then there also belongs to me a *basis of lived experiences* and a *basis of nature* (“my nature”) which is manifest in the play of lived experiences. This nature is the lower psychic layer, but it extends even into the sphere of position taking: the position-taking Ego is dependent on its substratum insofar as I, in order to be motivated in my position taking, must have precisely the motivating lived experiences, which stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative dispositions. (Hua 4, 293, <280>)

I would like to finish by going back to the botanic metaphor I invoked at the beginning of §1, in which Husserl referred to the lower levels on which position-taking depends as the obscure depths of roots. There lie the underlying bases, biological and habitual, of the life of the person. I would like to suggest now that the metaphor is not a mere illustration but a genuine way of understanding the complexity of human beings in the constitutional sense. The power of the metaphor has been felt by more than one philosopher. Buber spoke of the spirit as nature’s blossom. In his *Gay Science*, Nietzsche says “Like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, like all life! – not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once” (2001, §371, 236). Nietzsche’s metaphor supplements Husserl’s reference to a deep root soil. The relation between roots and trunk and branches is not only one of groundedness, but also one of productive development. Trunk and branches also exert pressure downwards and drive the roots to new developments, and those new root-configurations becomes renewed ground for even the highest of leaves.

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SPECIAL

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Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: On the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl

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Annotated Bibliography: Writings on the Topic of Habit

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EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONALITY: ON THE CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION OF THE EPISTEMIC HABITUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF IN EDMUND HUSSERL^{*}

abstract

Husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don't have any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by Husserl in the framework of his genetic phenomenology. Referring to some of Husserl's genetic pronouncements, the article investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from one's own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other's experiences or insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form.

**This essay is an enlarged and improved version of a lecture delivered under a similar title at the "Husserl-Arbeitstage" in Cologne in 2011. Elizabeth A. Behnke has translated the German original, which is forthcoming in the Polish journal *Fenomenologia* 12 (2014) under the title "Episodische und nicht-episodische Intentionalität. Zur konstitutiven Funktion der epistemischen Habitualitäten des Wissens und Glaubens bei Edmund Husserl."*

keywords

Intentionality, habituality, horizon, knowledge, testimony

Proceeding from the descriptive analysis of acts (i.e., of intentional lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware) and oriented toward act-intentionality as the prototype of any intentionality whatever, Husserl described, within the framework of static phenomenology, certain act-moments that are indeed intentional, but are not act-moments of which we are prereflectively aware; under the headings of “empty intention” and “meaning (or intending) more” he assimilates the intentionality of these act-moments to the intentionality of acts and describes them as pertaining to the phenomena of *consciousness*. I would like to show that assimilating these moments under those headings is inadequate and that broadening the notions of “meaning” and “intention” to include something that is not itself a phenomenon of consciousness, that is not an act-like meaning or intending, is misleading and superfluous: it is misleading because it leads the reflective glance in the wrong direction, and it is superfluous because with familiar *habitalities* of knowledge and belief we have forms of intentionality that cannot be addressed as forms of act-intentionality, yet play the very same role in the constitution of things and of the world that Husserl ascribed to empty intention and meaning-more. What Husserl was trying to describe “statically,” using the resources of a broadened vocabulary of “consciousness,” as something that is act-like and is thus a type of *conscious* performance turns out “genetically” to be a performance of *non-conscious habitalities* whose intentionality is to be characterized as non-episodic intentionality, in contrast to the episodic intentionality of acts.¹ Using the example of thing-constitution, I will show in the first part of the present essay that a distinction must be made between episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that something like thing-perception is only possible through their functioning

1 What I am calling “episodic intentionality” in this essay corresponds quite precisely to the form of intentionality that Uwe Meixner called “classical intentionality” or “Brentano-Husserlian intentionality” and highlighted as “the core form of intentionality” in contrast to functionalistic and representationalist conceptions of intentionality—see Uwe Meixner (2006), as well as Meixner (2014), especially Chapter III, “On Intending,” pp. 247–360. This form of intentionality determines the thematic and methodic framework of Brentano’s descriptive psychology of “psychic phenomena” and of Husserl’s earlier phenomenology of intentional lived experiences.

together.² In the second, considerably shorter part of this essay, I will show that what holds good for the constitution of things in perception holds good all the more and to an even greater extent for the intentional constitution of the world. Like the intentional constitution of things, the intentional constitution of the world remains incomprehensible without taking into account the constitutive function of the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief: it is essentially due to the intentional horizon-forming performance of these habitualities that we have existing things and an existing world given through empty inner and outer horizons.

1. Thing-
Constitution
in Perception:
Horizon-
Intentionality
as Non-Episodic
Intentionality

1.1 The Original Visual Concept of Horizon and the Phenomenological Concept of Horizon

When we visually perceive such things as houses or tables, we always perceive the *whole* thing, even though we always only “genuinely” see sides of things. We don’t merely perceive the front side that is intuitively presented to us; instead, we perceive the whole thing; what we refer to perceptually is the thing as a whole, appearing from the front side. It is just this reference to the whole thing that is expressed in everyday language when, for example, we are looking at the house in front of us and say, “This house has been empty for years.” The thing intended to in the perception is the entire physical thing as such standing there before us *in person* [*leibhaftig*], even if it is always seen from a particular angle and thus always appears only “one-sidedly.” This is precisely what is peculiar to thing-perception, and is what distinguishes it from both pictorial presentations and descriptions in which a thing existing contemporaneously elsewhere is presentified—namely, in thing-perception, the thing itself is not only given as present now, but also as being there *in person*.³ Yet all that is “genuinely” perceived at any given time—perceived in the narrow sense of what is immediately present purely visually—is the side of the visually appearing thing that is currently facing us, the side we

2 What will be shown in what follows about acts of thing-perception holds good *mutatis mutandis* for any act whatever. All analyses of specific types of acts remain incomplete if habitualities and their constitutive function are not taken into consideration.

3 The latter is the case when, e.g., I am standing in front of the Eiffel Tower in Paris and am looking at this landmark itself; if I am looking at a photograph of it or reading a description of it in a travel guide, it is not given in person, but is merely pictorially or symbolically presentified.

could reproduce with the aid of photography or film. In order to make the fact that the perceived thing is given in person as a whole comprehensible in light of the fact that the seen thing necessarily appears from one side, Husserl introduces the phenomenological concept of *horizon*, or more precisely, of *inner horizon*.

Husserl's phenomenological concept of horizon can be explained as follows by taking an analysis of the original *visual concept of the horizon* as a point of departure. A horizon in the original visual sense is a limited sphere of view, relative to the standpoint of the beholder, within which things appear; it moves along with the beholder, and because it shifts in this way it has a movable boundary line that points (in more or less determinate fashion) toward what is potentially visible beyond the boundary line of the sphere of view. (For instance, at sea the horizon line is a movable boundary line of the sphere of view that points toward further, unlimited stretches of open ocean, or else toward sea bounded by shore, and our expectations of the one or the other can be more or less determinate, depending on how much we currently know about our nautical position.) Since a horizon or sphere of view is always only a sphere of view relative to a current standpoint, any talk of horizons is *subjective* from the start, always also implicitly including the subject in any given case, along with this subject's movable standpoint. And it is this relativity to the subject that makes the concept of horizon a concept suitable for phenomenological descriptions, since in such descriptions the appearing (more generally: what one is conscious of) is always thematized in its relation to the subjectivity for whom something appears (more generally: for whom something is consciously given).

Husserl's *specifically phenomenological concept of horizon* does include the components of subject-relativity, delimitedness, and movability (components drawn from the original visual concept of the horizon), but these components receive another, non-visual sense: the components of the *visual horizon* become components of a horizon of *acceptance* [*Geltungshorizont*]. The subject-relative, delimited, and movable field of view of the visible becomes a movable sphere (a sphere that is therefore open, even though delimited) of what currently holds good [*gilt*] for the subject, and in a double way. On the one hand, it includes acceptances [*Geltendes*] that are *currently* actually holding good within the current lived experiences of intentional consciousness; on the

other hand, it includes acceptances that *habitually* hold good (or better, are in co-acceptance [*Mit-Geltung*]), especially with regard to fixed convictions in which what holds good for us with the sense “existing” or “real” remains in abiding acceptance, comprising, in its totality, what is suggested in the expression “background knowledge.” This specifically phenomenological concept of horizon—which is indispensable for what follows—can be seen in a manuscript that Husserl wrote around 1933 or 1934. Here what he has in view is the horizon-phenomenon, “world holding good for me [*mir geltende Welt*],” and he uses the perceptual field and the visual concept of the horizon as the point of departure from which to determine the *genuinely phenomenological* concept of horizon:

The world holding good for me extends beyond the perceptual field; it has its non-perceptual horizon; [what I have] apart from the latter [is] the perceptual field in its oriented mode of givenness within which all the objects simultaneously perceived in it (the perceptually coexisting objects) have their modes of adumbration as near and far and <within which> a sphere of the outermost still-perceivable distance can be distinguished. This [concept of horizon] [...] in the stratum of visual perception [...] is even the *original concept of “horizon.”* Of course, the latter word is used ambiguously. It also refers to the entire visual field—to the totality of that which lies within the sphere of the horizon. In phenomenology, [however,] we use the word to designate *that which holds good beyond the perceptual field*, and then further *for all similar cases* (fields of memory, etc.). (Hua XXXIX, p. 333f.)⁴

This characterization of the horizon as what holds good beyond the perceptual field (and similar fields of what is intentionally meant) makes it clear that horizon in the specifically phenomenological sense is not something like a background that we are unthematically aware of co-appearing along with the object that we are currently thematically aware of, i.e., the perceptually appearing object standing in the foreground. To equate the “horizon” of consciousness with its “background”

⁴ Below I will show how the horizon-concept in this passage compares with another horizon-concept Husserl uses elsewhere (horizon as the “*induction* that essentially belongs to each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself”—see the second passage from *Experience and Judgment* cited in section 1.2 below).

is to confuse the much more impoverished static concept of the background (which has its original place in the distinction between a salient visual form in the foreground and a visually co-appearing background) with Husserl's richer, dynamic horizon-concept, whose main characteristic is that what *horizontally holds good*—or better, what is *co-accepted*—does not and must not appear: it can neither co-appear on the perceptually appearing object as a determination of it, nor can it appear within the perceptually co-appearing background. What is decisive is that what lies in the horizon and belongs to it as a component is merely *co-accepted* [*gilt mit*] in what appears, and as *co-accepted*, determines the *sense* with which the appearing appears. And within this total sphere of what holds good for me at any given moment, what currently thematically holds good for me—e.g., the thing holding good for me as currently actually perceived and as determined in such and such a way—is merely a small (albeit central) sector of a whole consisting of everything I have in acceptance in a given living present, including everything that “exists” (in the broadest sense) “for me” at all, part of which I am thematically aware of and part of which is unthematic or entirely out of awareness.

1.2.
The
Constitutive
Function of
Horizons
in Thing-
Perception:
Inner Horizons
as Empty
Horizons and
the Habitual
Horizon-
Intentionality
of Knowledge

Husserl gives the following answer to the question of how a real thing is constituted for us in perception as there in person as a whole, how the sense “real thing” is built up in perception: it is by way of an *inner horizon*, i.e., through the intentions that form this horizon and that *intend beyond what is “genuinely” perceived*. In *Experience and Judgment* (a work edited by Ludwig Landgrebe and published posthumously in 1939), Husserl characterizes the concept of inner horizon with reference to a concept of horizon that is essentially different from the one discussed above:

Each real item arising in experience as something new stands within the world-horizon and thus has its inner horizon. It is known in thematic perception by continually being presented as itself there, while at the same time being explicated in its individual features, its “what”-moments, during the stretch of experiencing [...]. For their part, these features too are known as presenting themselves, but precisely with the sense of features through which the real item is displayed as what it is. [...] Everything that shows itself in this way, and is already implicitly

there even before the explication of what is perceived, essentially holds good as that which is genuinely perceived of the real item in this perception. [The real item] itself is *more* than what currently comes to actual cognizance or has already come to cognizance: *it has the sense that its “inner horizon” constantly imparts to it*; the seen side is only a side to the extent that it [reading “es,” not “sie”] has unseen sides that are anticipated in a way that determines the sense. (Husserl 1976, §8, pp. 30f./35; emphasis altered)⁵

Husserl explains the general guiding concept of horizon as follows:

“Horizon” thereby means the *induction* that essentially belongs to each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself. [...] This originary “induction” or anticipation turns out to be [...] a mode of “intentionality”—precisely the mode that anticipatorily intends beyond a core of givenness [...]. (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 28/32f.); cf. Hua XXXIX, p. 137)⁶

Both the characterization given here of the inner horizon as concerning the possibility of explicating the thing’s being-thus⁷ and the general characterization of the horizon-concept that this

5 Passages from Husserl (1976) quoted in the present essay have been newly translated, but for the convenience of the reader, page references will also be provided to the published English translation, Husserl (1973). Drummond (1990) emphasizes the sense-bestowing function of the horizon in many places, e.g., p. 213: “The horizon, then, by virtue of the noematic senses it correlates with the present noematic sense, contributes to the concrete sense the object has for us [...]”; cf. p. 226. Drummond’s thesis of the primacy of the act-horizon such that “references from noema to noema [...] are possible only because the acts of which these noemata are the correlates are intentionally united” (p. 216) rests, in my opinion, on a construction; what can be brought to light descriptively is rather the contrary: noemata intentionally unified as horizons. At best one can only speak of act-horizons with reference to the extremely narrow compass of the horizons comprising the temporal “window” of the living present, i.e., horizons in which an act is constituted in retention and protention. The horizons lying beyond this are horizons of habitualities, or rather, horizons of habitually accepted noematic contents that are “sense-determining” for the currently explicit noematic sense.

6 Here it must be left open to what extent Landgrebe’s edited text for the Introduction to Husserl (1976), and especially the text most relevant for the present essay (§8), actually corresponds to Husserl’s intentions. This can only be settled by having the original version of all of the Husserl manuscripts Landgrebe used in composing the Introduction at one’s disposal in order to be able to judge whether Landgrebe’s arrangement and combination of portions of text drawn from these manuscripts is in fact justified. A helpful synopsis of manuscripts used for most of the main text of this work is provided in Lohmar (1996). Unfortunately, no such synopsis is available for the Introduction. Meanwhile, however, we can point to the publication of at least two of Husserl’s original texts from 1934, portions of which Landgrebe incorporated into the Introduction (see Hua XXXIX, Beilage VIII, Text Nr. 15); these permit us to read the passages he drew upon in their original context.

7 “Hence the inner horizons concern concrete objects in their substrate-structure; they are the horizons of what is to be explicated, of the being-thus” (Hua XXXIX, p. 104).

entails have weaknesses.

One weakness lies in falsely equating the horizontal “intending beyond” with an “anticipating,” i.e., with the anticipation of something temporally subsequent. That to equate these is false follows from a fact that can be brought to light in reflection, namely, that determinations (qualities or parts) that are ascribed to the thing, through the “intending-beyond” perception, as belonging to the thing right now are *not anticipated*, i.e., anticipated as something *future*, but are *appresented*, i.e., posited as something *co-present*. As co-present thing-determinations, the horizontally intended determinations are present, just as the entire thing intended is (as well as what is currently “genuinely” perceived of it). At best, what could be *anticipated* is its *future givenness* in future acts of “genuine” perception. The horizon-intentionality characteristic of inner horizons, an intentionality that posits co-present thing-determinations as co-present “implicitly,” is accordingly not anticipating, but appresenting.

A second weakness of the above characterizations of the concepts of horizon and inner horizon arises because what is appresented or posited as co-present are *not sides* or *views* of the thing relative to the subject, but *objective thing-determinations* such as, for instance, the shape and color of the facade of a house I am seeing from the back side, or of its inside, which is hidden from me at the moment. These objective thing-determinations, which would become visible if I were to enter the house or go around to the front side, are the thing-determinations that are co-intended, and co-posed as present, in horizontal intending-beyond. The formula for the constitution of things by means of inner horizons accordingly reads: *presentation through appresentation*.⁸ This solution of the problem of the in-person givenness of perceptual things as a whole can also be found in Husserl. In a text from the 1930s with the title “Appresentation and presentation with respect to individual things and with respect to the whole world,”

8 Cf. the following related formulation found in Hua XXXIX, Text Nr. 15: “Now perception as perception of the thing, of this thing, is *perception through apperception*, through horizontal co-acceptance [*Horizontmitgeltung*] as determining the ontic sense. This co-acceptance is ‘indeterminately general.’ Itself-appearing is appearing as determined. What is anticipated in an ‘indeterminate’ manner, in a vague, equivocal, ‘general’ way, is what would appear in a possible [*vermöglich*] continuation of the perception, in a synthetic itself-appearing and as something that itself appears” (p. 141, emphasis added). [The last two sentences of the German original: “Sich selbst zeigen ist sich bestimmt zeigen. Antizipiert ist in ‘unbestimmter’ Weise, in vager, vieldeutiger, ‘allgemeiner’ Weise: sich in vermöglicher Fortführung der Wahrnehmung selbst Zeigendes in einem synthetischen Sich-selbst-Zeigen und <sich> selbst Zeigenden.”]

he writes: “Each perception of something transcendent can only present its transcendent object by means of appresentation” (Hua XXXIX, p. 142). And since Husserl also characterizes the appresenting inner horizon that is functioning constitutively here as a so-called *empty horizon*, he can say in the same text: “Insofar as [...] [empty horizons] are essential for thing-perception, and insofar as a thing can only be present in person at all through their help, they make present [*sind sie gegenwärtigend*] rather than merely presentifying [*vergegenwärtigend*]” (Hua XXXIX, p. 142).

What exactly are these empty horizons? And how is the horizon-intentionality that forms them and functions in them to be characterized? Husserl speaks of empty intentions as having the function of appresenting. But what are these appresenting empty intentions? Are they merely acts of a particular type? Are they latent acts co-performed alongside other acts? Or are they moments of acts, non-selfsufficient parts of acts that themselves have nothing act-like about them? In what does the peculiar constitutive performance of empty horizons consist, and how can we make this performance comprehensible?

Within the empty intentions forming the horizons of thing-perceptions, something would be *emptily* intended insofar as what is “horizontally” intended, and is thereby co-accepted in the objective sense (e.g., the inside of a house I’m familiar with and am perceiving from the outside), is *not* presentified *intuitively*. As a rule, no matter what side I am seeing the house from, no phantasy or memory images of its interior hover before me. Husserl emphasizes the *non-intuitiveness of what is horizontally co-intended* when he writes of thing-experience as follows:

Its experiencing intending has an *open horizon of possible experiences of the same thing* in which whatever is not yet genuinely given would come to genuine givenness. They are not experiences that actually hover before me in advance as intuitively presentified, or even as particular individual experiences of any sort. It is nevertheless a horizon of consciousness, a mode <of> *implicitly intending beyond what is genuinely experienced*. This is a “vague,” “non-intuitive” mode such that the sense intended in this intending-beyond is brought to demonstrative display in specific actual or possible [*vermöglich*] experiences, whether they are able to be freely <generated> or occur on their own; this [demonstrative display] is accompanied by

the evidence that [these experiences] were encompassed in the indeterminate generality [of that horizon of consciousness] in a peculiar way, i.e., vaguely, non-intuitively, indistinctly, yet co-intended. (Hua XXXIX, p. 112)

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl characterizes what is implicitly horizontally co-intended beyond what is genuinely experienced as “what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the *cogitatum*” (Hua I, §20, p. 85).⁹ The non-intuitiveness of what is horizontally co-intended and included in the sense of the *cogitatum*—a non-intuitiveness that Husserl emphasized—is also not offset by a symbolic reference, a symbolic intending-beyond, through linguistic or non-linguistic signs establishing a symbolic relation to what is not “genuinely” perceived of the thing (e.g., the inside of a house seen from the outside), since both of these types of signs are usually lacking in my perceptual consciousness. And in any case, no sort of symbolic consciousness of what is not genuinely perceived of the thing can be descriptively brought to light in reflection on normal prelinguistic thing-perception. But if the appresenting empty intentions consist neither in intuitive nor in symbolic presentifications of what is co-present, how is their performance to be understood, namely, the performance of appresenting something as determinate as, e.g., the familiar interior of a familiar house and not appresenting something completely indeterminate instead? For if all that was appresented was something completely indeterminate, with only the “genuinely” seen side of the house determined, then there would be no perception of a house as a concrete physical thing, and certainly no perception of it as a familiar individual material thing with a familiar interior.

The difficulties in understanding Husserl’s talk of the doubly empty horizon-intentions (i.e., empty both with regard to the intuitive and with regard to the symbolic) can be resolved if one recognizes that Husserl’s conception of inner horizons as formed by *empty intentions* remains trapped in the vocabulary of “consciousness” and accordingly replaces this construction with the Husserlian conception of *acceptance-horizon* [*Geltungshorizont*]

⁹ Passages from Hua I quoted in the present essay generally follow the published English translation, which includes the Hua I page numbers in the margin.

introduced above—and indeed, with a conception of an acceptance-horizon that is the *correlate of knowledge and belief*, hence the correlate of *habitualities*, and not of a particular sort of act or act-like act-moments called “empty intentions.” By habitualities Husserl understands “abiding Ego-properties” or “habitual determining properties” (Hua I, §32, 101) that have been passively or actively *acquired*; to a certain extent, these have an intentional character, since they have intentional “contents” (such as convictions and willed decisions in particular), and to a certain extent they have a non-intentional character (e.g., a person’s typical way of walking or of behaving in conflicts). What is important in our context are habitualities that have an intentional character, and above all those one could call *epistemic* habitualities.¹⁰

As Husserl recognized by the beginning of the 1920s at the latest but probably already realized during the preceding decade,¹¹ only part of the sphere of intentionality consists of acts or intentional lived experiences; another part consists of *intentional habitualities* of various kinds whose intentionality differs from that of so-called acts. As will be shown below, acts too always

10 The *epistemic* habitualities (including knowledge and belief) comprise only one part of the multifarious sphere of habitual intentionality; habitualities of *willing* and *valuing* in particular also belong to this sphere and co-contribute in their own way to the constitution of the concretely experienced lifeworld. In a text from 1926 on decision as a habituality of willing, Husserl says (Hua XXXIV, pp. 105f.): “A decision I make to go on a journey in eight days is not solely a momentary lived experience, [...] but my decision to go on *this* journey at *that* date. The decision to take a course of treatment every day for a year is a general decision, and in its generality it is ‘valid’ [“*gültig*”] for a year through all the individual activities I carry out, always recurring in being re-awakened as the same decision for me, the same person who is now acting in accordance with what I willed. For a year. Likewise, however, there are also infinite decisions in a true and literal sense. These include any decision for a vocation, a willed resolve that signifies an abiding general attitude of willing for the rest of one’s life [...]”

11 That Husserl already had habitualities in view under the title of “psychic dispositions” in the years following 1910 can be seen from the following remark from *Ideas I* (Hua III/1, §85, p. 195/206): “Belonging together with [the tendency toward a ‘psychology without a psyche’] is the fact that under the heading of the psychic—especially of the currently actual psychic in contrast to the corresponding ‘psychic dispositions’—one preferably thinks of lived experiences in the unity of the empirically posited stream of lived experiences.” For the sake of consistency of terminology, passages from Hua III/1 quoted in the present essay will depart in some respects from the published English translation, whose page numbers will also be provided. That Husserl paid attention to habitualities (and especially to intentional habitualities) could be due to the influence of Adolf Reinach; according to Wolfgang Künne (1986, p. 175), Reinach was “the first phenomenologist to draw a clear line between a lived experience such as judging and a state such as being convinced,” doing so in an essay that appeared in 1911 (Reinach 1911). Whether or not this historical claim is true may be able to be clarified on the basis of Husserl’s *Nachlass*. But it seems less probable when one considers that Brentano (1874) already speaks of “unconscious habitus and dispositions” or “habitual dispositions”, even though he excludes them from the sphere of the *eo ipso* conscious “psychic phenomena” (Book 1, Ch. III, §6; Book 2, Ch. II, §2). This would have to have been Husserl’s initial literary source for his distinction between intentional lived experiences and habitualities.

have components of habitual intentionality, and would hardly be possible without them. If we limit talk of *intentions* to acts of consciousness, i.e., to intentional lived experiences, while taking appresenting empty horizons as *horizons of acceptance*, and indeed, as *horizons of what is habitually known and believed*, then there is no difficulty in understanding the emptiness or non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-accepted as the non-intuitiveness of what is merely *co-known* and *co-believed*. Nor is it difficult to understand how what is known and believed contributes to the unitary objective sense of any perceived thing characterized by in-person givenness, standing there for consciousness as a physical thing as a whole and not merely one side of it. Thus when we look, for example, at the door of an individual closet familiar to us—e.g., our own clothes closet—we know how what is inside it looks, or if we see an individual yet typical clothes closet we are not familiar with, we apprehend it as “a” clothes closet and know in general what *such* a thing typically looks like inside.¹²

Both types of knowledge—*knowledge of an individual*, which concerns a specific clothes closet familiar to us, and the general (and usually rather rough) *typical knowledge* of any clothes closet whatever—have their *sense-determining* “efficacy” when we are perceiving clothes closets. But both types of knowledge play their role as *knowledge*, and knowledge is not an act: it is not an ephemeral episode within the stream of consciousness, but something *habitual*. Thus knowledge is something abiding in contrast to the flowing lived experiences, and as something belonging to the I, it is transcendent to the stream of consciousness, just as the stream’s I is transcendent to the stream and is the same I at various temporal locations within the stream.¹³ What is habitually

12 What holds good here for the example of a perceived clothes closet also holds good for any perceived thing whatsoever: “Each thing as a currently perceived thing in ontic acceptance [*Daseinsgeltung*] is ‘appereived typically’ in terms of its species and genus, and for their part the species and genus enter into the ont-<ic> horizon as types that only now receive their ‘determined’ particularization as what is proper to an ‘individual’” (Hua XXXIX, pp. 140f.). When an unknown individual is apprehended according to its type, it receives a certain concomitant character of *familiarity*: “Even when the object is initially seized upon and is at first purely and simply contemplated, it does already have its horizons, which are co-awakened right away—first of all, an inner horizon [...]. The object stands there with a character of familiarity from the very beginning; it is apprehended as an object of a certain type that is already known in some way, even if in vague generality. Seeing the object awakens protentional expectations regarding its being-thus, its as yet unseen back side, etc.—regarding whatever individual properties that examining it in more detail would yield” (Husserl 1976, §22, p. 114/104f.).

13 John Locke already had the distinction between episodic and non-episodic forms of knowledge in view with his distinction between *actual knowledge* and *habitual knowledge*—see *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 4, Ch. I, §§8 and 9.

known by a subject, which is sometimes termed “background knowledge,”¹⁴ is *not a matter of conscious awareness*, and is not a part of the actual or manifest content of consciousness in the pregnant sense. Yet it determines this content in a peculiar fashion insofar as it essentially co-determines its core—the objective sense of the currently appearing object. The actual content of consciousness (e.g., “my clothes closet, appearing to me right now in such and such a way”) is indeed essentially co-determined by knowledge, but this co-determining knowledge is something habitual belonging to the I, and as such is not an actual, fleeting content of consciousness. Thus in the case of actual, episodic thing-perception, the content of consciousness is *empty* with respect to the components of knowledge that are implicitly functioning constitutively without our being consciously aware of them either intuitively or symbolically. However, this emptiness is really no surprise; instead, it is a natural and a *necessary consequence of the habitual and non-episodic nature of knowledge*. As a content co-determined by knowledge and therefore by something habitual, the intentional content of consciousness is accordingly characterized by an “emptiness” that Husserl conceived in terms of a specific sort of intentions proper to it—namely, empty intentions functioning in the inner horizon. If in explaining the emptiness of inner horizons we resort not to empty intentions but instead to the habituality of knowledge and its contribution to the constitution of perceptual things, we can dispense with the descriptively inadequate construction of “empty intentions” in the sense of acts performed alongside other acts.

What has been said here about Husserl’s concept of empty intention also holds good for Husserl’s terms “co-intending” [*Mitmeinung*] and “meaning-more” [*Mehrmeinung*]; when these terms refer to acts of co-intending and meaning-more, they

14 Smith (2007) speaks of a “background of tacit understanding,” or for short, of the “relevant background” of a situation (p. 208). However, he neither brings out the habitual knowledge and belief that this background consists of, nor sees that what is most essentially constituted in these epistemic habitualities is what Husserl calls “horizon,” and more specifically “acceptance-horizon”; for Smith (p. 287), what the “horizon of an act of consciousness” means is “the range of possibilities for the intended object that are left open by the act’s noematic sense together with relevant background ideas that are implicit or presupposed in the core sense.” Smith already defended this position in the important work he co-authored with Ronald McIntyre, (Smith and McIntyre 1982). In John R. Searle’s conception of intentionality, the background of habitual intentionality plays an important role under the title of a “network.” This is a holistic network of non-conscious “intentional states” such as convictions, wishes, hopes, etc., and according to Searle, it is these, along with a non-conscious background of abilities or “know-how” as well as general pre-intentional assumptions—all of which he terms “background” for short—that first make individual conscious states (and acts) possible as such. See Searle (1983), pp. 19–21, 65–71, and Ch. V.

are just other expressions for the concept of empty horizon-intention, and are used in the *Cartesian Meditations* to characterize the constitutive function of horizon-intentionality. All they basically do is to broaden concepts like “meaning” and “intention”—concepts belonging to the vocabulary concerned with consciousness (a vocabulary that arose from the analysis of acts)—without truly grasping and adequately characterizing the phenomena of habitual intentionality that such terms address, phenomena that are indeed already in view in a certain way when such terms as co-intending and meaning-more are used. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl is still talking about a particular type of meaning and intending when he speaks in §20 of “meaning more” and “*intending-beyond-itself*” in articulating the “fundamental [insight]” that “as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [*Meinung seines Gemeinten*], but that, at any moment, this something meant [*dieses Vermeinte*] is more—something meant with something more—than what is meant at that moment ‘explicitly’” (Hua I, p. 84). Husserl explicitly characterizes this general state of affairs as a state of affairs in accordance with an eidetic law: “This *intending-beyond-itself*, which is implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of it” (Hua I, p. 84).

The hidden “noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone [...] we have one intentional object, and [in each case] this definite one, continuously meant—have it, so to speak, before us as [determined] thus and so” (Hua I, p. 84), which Husserl calls “hidden constitutive performances” here (Hua I, p. 84) and are what he has in view under the title of “meaning more” [*Mehrmeinung*], are not, however, phenomena of episodic act-intentionality, as the reference to “noetic multiplicities of consciousness” suggests. Instead, they are actually phenomena of non-episodic horizon-intentionality: they are neither acts nor act-like co-meanings or co-intendings, but intentional *habitalities*. These *habitalities* are beliefs [*Meinungen*] that one *has*; as such, they function appresentationally in intentional acts of thing-perception and make an essential contribution to the perceptual constitution of things as wholes, since what is going on in thing-perception is a *global positing of the thing as a whole*

without secretly “co-intending” any qualities, pieces, or moments that are not directly visible. In any case, such “co-intending” in the sense of hidden acts or act-like intentions cannot be descriptively brought to light. It is otherwise with the *habitual co-intendings that count as knowledge* [*Wissen*]; in any given case they are in implicit co-acceptance [*Mitgeltung*] within the global thing-acceptance [*Dinggeltung*], and thus determine the objective sense of the currently intended thing. The sense-constitutive *co-accepting* of the knowledge both of general types and of individuals does indeed depend upon an actual performance of an act of thing-perception in order to enter into a constitutive function co-determining the sense at all. But this co-accepting is not itself an act-like co-intending implied in the act of perception: on closer inspection, the alleged horizontal *co-intending* of what does not “genuinely” appear is a horizontal *having in co-acceptance* [*In-Mitgeltung-Haben*], and as I have attempted to show, a having in co-acceptance in the mode of habitual knowledge, which is a form of non-episodic intentionality.

Despite the fact that Husserl’s talk of empty intentions, meaning more, and co-intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary of a static phenomenology of consciousness, he did have the habitual, constitutively functioning horizon-intentionality of acquired knowledge in view throughout, and thereby the sphere of non-episodic intentionality per se (to be sure, without making it fruitful for the “official” theory of horizon in the *Cartesian Meditations*, for which horizons are “predelineated possibilities”¹⁵). This can be seen in numerous *Nachlass* manuscripts from the

15 See Hua I, §19, p. 82: “The horizons are ‘predelineated’ possibilities. We say also: We can ask any horizon what ‘lies in it,’ we can explicate or unfold it, and ‘uncover’ the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the *objective sense meant implicitly* in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. [...] The predelineation [of the potentialities of conscious life] itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its *indeterminateness*, it has a *determinate structure*.” It is this completely insufficient and even misleading characterization of the horizon that Smith and McIntyre appeal to when—contrary to the position I defend, and contrary to numerous statements in Husserl—they do not take up the currently co-accepted “background beliefs” into the horizon itself, and merely allow the horizon to “predelineate”: “These beliefs play an essential role in the predelineation of an act’s horizon; they (or their Sinne) ‘motivate’ the possibilities making up the horizon by prescribing what would and would not count, for the subject, as further ‘determination’ of the object as it is given in the present act” (Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. 249f.). That for Husserl the horizon constitutive for the objective sense is not only a horizon of predelineated potentialities but essentially consists of the intentional contents of background beliefs is shown in, for instance, the following statement from *Experience and Judgment*: “The object [...] is given for consciousness [*ist bewusst*] along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of *acquired knowledge*” (Husserl 1976, §25, p. 138/122f.).

1920s and 1930s. But even in published works of this period such as *Cartesian Meditations* and *Experience and Judgment*, there are clear indications of the constitutive role of epistemic habitualities, and in particular of the constitutive role of the habituality of knowledge. In *Experience and Judgment* he writes, for instance, as follows with regard to the knowledge of types that functions constitutively in the experience of things:

A cognitive performance concerned with individual objects of experience is never carried out as if the latter were initially pregiven as substrates that were still entirely indeterminate. For us the world is always already a world in which cognition has already done its work in the most various ways: it is undoubtedly the case that there is no experience (in the sense of a first, unmodified thing-experience) that seizes upon this thing for the first time, taking cognizance of it, without already “*knowing*” more of it than what is thereby cognitively grasped. Whatever any experience may experience in the genuine sense whereby something comes into view as “it, itself,” each experience necessarily has *eo ipso* a *knowledge* and *co-knowledge* with respect to this very thing—namely, of something proper to it that has not yet come into view. This *foreknowledge* is contentually indeterminate or incompletely determined, but never completely empty, and if it were not *co-accepted* [*wenn es nicht mitgelten würde*], the experience would not be an experience of this one thing at all. (Husserl 1976, §8, pp. 26f./31f.; see also Hua XXXIX, p. 126)

And with reference to the “*habitual possession*” (Husserl 1976, §67, p. 331/275; §68, p. 340/282; §79, p. 380/313) of object-determinations acquired through explication and constitutive for the objective sense, he writes:

[The object] has taken on forms of sense that were originally constituted in acts of explication, forms of sense [that are now taken on as] *habitual knowledge*. [...] The object [...] is [henceforth] given for consciousness along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of acquired knowledge: the sediment of the active sense-bestowing in which [the object] previously received a determination is now a component part of the apprehension-sense of the perception [...]. (Husserl 1976, §25, pp. 137f./122f.)

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl relates the object-constitutive habitualities of the I both to constituted objects and to the constituted surrounding world:

This, my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions make up my surrounding world, so far as I am acquainted with it at the time, with its horizons of objects with which I am unacquainted—that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this formal object-structure. (Hua I, §33, p. 102)¹⁶

Although Husserl did not take the intentional phenomenon of habitual knowledge (and its contribution to the constitution of things and of the world) sufficiently into account at the level of *static* phenomenology, and although this phenomenon is more concealed than revealed in his theory of empty intentions, at the level of *genetic* phenomenology he did clearly establish the constitutive contribution of the habitual and incorporate it into his theory of empty horizons.¹⁷ As I would like to show in what follows, what holds good for the habituality of knowledge in the constitution of objective sense similarly holds good for the habituality of belief: as a mode of habitually taking-for-true, belief essentially contributes to the constitution of things and of the world, and must accordingly receive appropriate consideration in a transcendental-phenomenological description of intersubjective thing- and world-constitution. In phenomenology, as far as I know, hardly any attempts have been made so far to approach this issue.

1.3. The Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief: the Constitutive Function of Belief

Before I discuss the constitutive function of belief, I would like to offer some overdue explication of the concepts of “knowledge” and “belief”—concepts I have used up until now in their vague, everyday language signification, trusting that they would be generally understood.

¹⁶ One has the impression that in the *Cartesian Meditations*, constitutive analyses from static phenomenology are presented immediately alongside constitutive analyses from genetic phenomenology.

¹⁷ Taking Husserl's later work as a point of departure, Alfred Schutz investigated the role of knowledge (and especially our knowledge of types) in our lifeworldly experiencing, acting, and knowing; penetrating analyses are to be found in a work written between 1947 and 1951 (Schutz 1970).

I am not using the expression “knowledge” in the sense of the standard analysis of propositional knowledge (“knowledge is justified true belief”), a sense that Edmund Gettier has placed in question.¹⁸ The standard analysis can serve as an explication of one of the everyday language concepts of knowledge; however, I am using the expression “knowledge” in another sense of the word, likewise occurring in everyday language and arising from a contrast between knowledge and belief (in a non-religious sense to be discussed shortly). In what follows, “knowledge” will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, *on the basis of one’s own evidence*, i.e., on the basis of one’s own experiences or one’s own insights, be these insights empirical or a priori. (This concept of knowledge corresponds, by the way, with the etymology of the German “wissen,” to know, as “having seen”; the same holds true for the Greek “eidenai.”) In contrast, “belief” will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, *on the basis of trusting the knowledge of someone else one trusts*.¹⁹

I take my guiding concepts of belief and knowledge from Josef Pieper’s philosophical treatise *On Belief*.²⁰ There Pieper, following Thomas of Aquinas, explicates “belief” as a three-placed predicate: “Believing always means: believing someone about something. The one who believes in the strict sense of the word accepts a state of affairs as actually obtaining on the basis of the testimony of someone else [...]” (Pieper 1962, p. 31).²¹ In this characterization of the concept Pieper emphasizes the following two interconnected elements: “on the one hand, agreeing with a [judgment about a] state of affairs, taking it for true; on the other hand, agreeing with a person, trusting [this person]” (p. 31), since “the basis [...] upon which one believes ‘something’ is that one believes ‘someone’” (p. 32). The following remarks by Pieper are also illuminating and fruitful for the problem of thing- and

18 Gettier (1963). See also, e.g., Grundmann (2008), pp. 86–109.

19 A further concept of knowledge in everyday language encompasses both of the concepts of knowledge and belief just explicated: “knowing that p” means “being informed that p.” This more general (and more contentually impoverished) concept of knowledge leaves open what source the “information” comes from and cannot be used for my purposes, since what I am concerned with is precisely what the source of being informed is.

20 Pieper (1962) was reprinted in Pieper (1997). Page references in the present essay are to the German edition (Pieper 1962).

21 For the purposes of the present essay, the other current determination of belief as “taking [something] as true on a basis that is indeed objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient” (Kant 1968, p. 67) is also unusable as an explication of the word “belief.”

world-constitution in the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief: “To believe means: to participate in the knowledge of someone who knows” (p. 49). Since such participation is a type of grasping reality, then someone who believes someone else who knows “is able to grasp more reality” (p. 52) than is possible when one relies only upon what one has experienced oneself or knows only on the basis of one’s own insights—and apart from cases of pathological mistrust, we do not normally rely solely upon our own experiences and insights in everyday life. Instead, ever since early childhood we participate to an ever larger extent and in many different ways in a knowledge that we have not acquired for ourselves and that we ourselves do not genuinely possess.²² It is further essential for belief in the sense thematized here that the one who believes is *subjectively certain* of what he or she believes (cf. Pieper 1962, p. 60). This too is relevant for our problem of constitution, since whoever believes someone about something is relying upon the truth of what has been said, taking it “at face value.” For such a person, things are the way the believed, trusted other says they are. *Thus for the one who believes, a state of affairs the other presents as obtaining does indeed obtain.* In this respect belief has the same epistemic effect as knowledge: it makes reality accessible, and for the believing subject, it constitutes *what exists* in the pregnant sense, i.e., objects and states of affairs that are intersubjectively demonstrable as existing.²³ It should therefore now be clear that belief in the sense of “taking objects as existing and states of affairs as obtaining” *on the basis of the testimony of others* has a crucial object- and world-constituting function, since apart from the relatively small compass of taking-for-true in the mode of knowledge (in the sense explicated above, i.e., taking-for-true on the basis of one’s own experience and insight), it is above all taking-for-true in the mode of belief that has objects that

22 Here we may point to the epistemological problem of knowledge on the basis of the testimony of others, a problem that has been intensively discussed among analytically oriented epistemologists ever since Coady (1992); cf. Laskey and Sosa (2006).

23 In the case of knowledge and belief as specific forms of having-in-acceptance, it must be noted that with Husserl, “holding good” or “acceptance” (*Geltung*) is not the same as “validity” (*Gültigkeit*). Everything valid is indeed accepted as holding good, but not everything accepted as holding good has the status of validity. In this sense, as Husserl says in an as yet unpublished manuscript, “To hold good is not yet to be valid in the pregnant sense. [...] Validity, truth [...] is a child of critique” (“Geltend ist aber noch nicht im prägnanten Sinn gültig. [...] Die Gültigkeit, die Wahrheit [...] ist ein Kind der Kritik”—Ms. B I 10/56). In the present translation, “gültig” is translated as “valid”; the terms “*gelten*” and “*Geltung*” are always rendered using some version of the locutions “holding good” and “acceptance.”

exist and states of affairs that obtain as intentionally correlated with it, and that has a *world* holding good as existing as its total intentional correlate.

That belief has a thing- and world-constitutive function is familiar to everyone from everyday life. If we learn from people we believe that our neighbor is incurably ill with cancer, then on our next encounter we will see this neighbor with different eyes; the sense in which this person immediately appears to us in perception has become different. Hence what we have here is belief, in the sense just explicated, in its constitutive function of determining the objective sense. It is similar in more primitive cases of “*enrichment of meaning*” and “*continuing development of meaning*” (Hua VI, p. 161/158). What Husserl describes in the following quotation, although without using the word “belief” (he speaks instead of “co-judging, as it were”), is a simple case of *constitution through belief*, a case in which the appresentation of a thing-quality is accomplished through taking over and believing something communicated and through the subsequent involuntary habitualization of what is thus taken over:

If someone says to me that the back side of the thing is red, then I apply the predicate “red” to it, co-judging, as it were; [...] then what the thing attains for me is both the closer determination of the back side as red and the conceptual content of this determination, although not on the basis of my own experience determining the thing. (Hua XXXIX, p. 425)

The thing *holds good* for me *henceforth*—up until a possible correction of my conviction compels me to new knowledge—as a thing whose back side is red. My belief, my habitual taking what is said by another as true, thus determines the inner horizon of the thing, and thereby implicitly determines the total sense of the thing in the mode of a habitual intentionality.

Using the vocabulary of *Ideas I*, Husserl could characterize the habitual intentionalities of knowledge and belief as *noeses*, and indeed, as *habitual noeses*.²⁴ As habitual noeses, the noeses of knowledge and belief are non-episodic noeses. But in contrast

²⁴ Husserl introduced the concept of noesis as the concept correlative to that of noema in *Ideas I* (1913), but it seems that all he thematized there were noeses that as performances of intentional sense-bestowing had the character of currently lived (or livable) intendings, intendings we are explicitly conscious of (Hua III/1, cf. §§85, pp. 87f.).

to episodic noeses (e.g., judgments performed in speech acts of assertion or perceptual observations of processes), I have *no consciousness* of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. It is even a criterion of habitual noeses that we can legitimately ascribe them to someone asleep or unconscious, whereas we cannot ascribe episodic noeses to a sleeping or unconscious person. Thus, for example, I can legitimately claim that a sleeping person knows that Paris is the capital of France or that $2 \times 2 = 4$, just as I can legitimately claim that this person knows how to swim or to play the piano. When someone knows or believes this or that, this person is not prereflectively aware of this knowledge or belief (along with the known or believed-in state of affairs); the person has no lived experience of this knowledge or belief: to use the language of Brentano, it is not the content of an accompanying “inner consciousness.”²⁵ What characterizes acts (intentional lived experiences)—namely, that they are *lived*, that we are *prereflectively aware* of them as such—does not apply to the habitualities of knowledge and belief. When I know that Paris is the capital of France or that $2 \times 2 = 4$, I do not have a lived experience of knowing these states of affairs. In contrast, when I am watching a bird sitting in a tree, I am immediately conscious of perceiving something; when I add 143 and 922 “in my head,” I am immediately aware that I am doing so. When I carry out such *episodic* noeses, someone can ask me, “What are you doing right now?” or “What were you doing a moment ago?” (using the word “doing” in the broadest sense), and I can provide the answer on the basis of my prereflective awareness of the acts carried out, saying, for instance, “Right now I am watching the bird in that tree over there” or “I just added 143 and 922 ‘in my head.’” It is similar for the episodic psychic states that I am aware of (feelings, moods), states about which someone can ask me, “How are you feeling right now?” But this kind of question cannot be posed in principle about *habitual* noeses.

25 Cf. Brentano's exposition in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Brentano 1874), Book 2, Ch. II, III. Given the sharp distinction Brentano draws between inner perception and inner observation (Book 1, §2), the only thing Brentano can mean by “inner perception” or “inner consciousness” is what has more recently been termed prereflective self-awareness. Gallagher and Zahavi allege that when Brentano speaks of inner consciousness, he means something other than “prereflectively, my experience is not itself an object for me” or “I do not occupy the position of an observer, spectator, or in(tro)spector who attends to this experience”—see Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), p. 53; however, this interpretation has no foundation in the text of the abovementioned two chapters on inner consciousness in Brentano's main work.

That it belongs to the essence of habitual noeses of knowledge and belief that they are *not present for lived experience or prereflective awareness* does not alter their status as *intentional*, for they are both characterized by the same feature that acts or intentional lived experiences also exhibit: namely, by *mineness* [*Jemeinigkeit*] and by having an *intentional objectivity* (an object in the narrower sense or a state of affairs), a *theme*, something that they are “about” (in discussions of intentionality in English-speaking philosophy of mind, this latter specific quality of intentionality has tentatively been termed “aboutness”). The habitualities of knowledge and belief are distinguished by mineness insofar as they have an intentional subject, i.e., the subject who knows or believes something.

They are distinguished by so-called “aboutness” or “directedness”²⁶ toward an intentional objectivity insofar as they are related to an objectivity (an object in the narrower sense or a state of affairs)—one that as an *intentional objectivity* has the distinguishing feature that nothing real has to correspond to it: the object *purely and simply* as intended need not exist, the state of affairs *purely and simply* as intended need not obtain.²⁷ We can nevertheless thematize the intended objectivity *as such* (i.e., the currently intended objectivity as intended), analyzing and describing the manner in which it is intended without paying the slightest attention to the question of the reality of what has been purely and simply intended. If we use the term “*noema*” to designate not only what is intended as such in the case of episodic noeses but also what is intentionally meant as such in a non-episodic manner in knowledge and belief (i.e., the habitually

26 The metaphorical talk of “being directed” toward something (an objectivity in the broadest sense) is only good for a first, rough characterization of intentionality, and proves inadequate for numerous types of episodic intentionality. However, we cannot use the metaphor for the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief either, as if a subject were “directed” toward known or believed-in objectivities (states of affairs); here the metaphor of “aboutness” is more appropriate. In these and in all other cases of *intentional relatedness* toward something, both locutions (“directedness” and “aboutness”) point to the formal quality whereby intentional relations are *asymmetrical* relations: something (and indeed, always a “subject”) is related to something (an “object”) in a certain way, not the other way around.

27 As Husserl says in §90 of *Ideas I*, “every intentional lived experience [...] has its ‘intentional Object,’ i.e., its objective sense. [...] The situation defining [this] sense for us [is] the circumstance [...] that the non-existence (or the conviction of non-existence) of the objectivated or thought of Object pure and simple pertaining to the objectivation in question (and therefore to any particular intentional lived experience whatever) cannot rob any objectivation of its ‘being objectivated’ as such” (Hua III/1, pp. 206f./217f.).

accepted as such), then with knowledge and belief we have noeses that do indeed have an intended objectivity (a habitually intended state of affairs as such), but as *habitual* noeses do not have the character of being carried out in prereflective awareness. In light of such *non-conscious* noeses, Husserl's concept of noesis becomes problematic; the question arises whether we need the concept of noesis at all—indeed, whether it has any descriptive contents at all. Either the habitualities of knowledge and belief are noeses, or they are not. In the first case, if they *are* noeses, then it is not essential for noeses to be lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware, so “noesis” becomes equivalent to “having a noema”—e.g., the noesis of being convinced is nothing other than having a conviction, and visual perceiving is nothing but having a visual perceptual appearance. But in the second case, if they are *not* noeses, then there is no universal “correlation” of noesis and noema characterizing the entire field of intentionality in general, and the correlation must accordingly be limited to the sphere of intentional lived experiences. With the former case, we are close to dispensing with the concept of noesis entirely and characterizing the multiform field of intentionality *purely noematically*, i.e., limiting all descriptive analyses of acts and habitualities to analyses of noemata.²⁸ In the latter case, we have the by no means trivial task of descriptively exhibiting the actuality of noeses in the sphere of intentional lived experiences and giving the concept of noesis a precise signification. If one wants to retain both the concept of noesis and the so-called noetic-noematic correlation as a universal correlation—which is what I would like to advocate—then one must allow non-conscious habitual noeses on the one hand while showing on the other hand how episodic and non-episodic (habitual) noeses can be descriptively brought to light. This would call for attaining greater determinateness and a definitive content not only for the concept of the noesis, but also for the notoriously controversial notion of the noema.

1.4.
“Consciousness”
and
“Knownness”

I am conscious of a judgment or a perception I actually carry out, and such consciousness is “inner perception” in Brentano's sense, i.e., I am prereflectively aware of performing such an act, and in

28 Hans-Ulrich Hoche has been advocating dispensing with the noema ever since publishing his *Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib* (Hoche 1973). He is particularly convincing in his latest book (Hoche 2007), especially in his extensive essay on “Consciousness” (pp. 129–95), which from a methodological point of view provides a successful synthesis of the methods of phenomenology and of linguistic analysis.

each case I can in principle provide descriptions of it through subsequent reflection founded on retention or recollection. As shown above, however, it is completely different in the case of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. Among these (and certainly not the least of these) we find knowledge of our own current “circumstances” (in the broadest sense), especially the knowledge of where I am in space and time right now. At the moment, for instance, I know that while I am composing this text I am in my office at the philosophical institute in Aachen. But I am not explicitly conscious of this knowledge, in contrast, for example, to the numerous acts of thinking and writing I am performing while I’m working on this section of the essay—I am prereflectively aware of the latter acts as I carry them out, and thus I can recall them and thematize them in acts of reflection. To this (non-conscious) knowledge of one’s own current circumstances there also belongs the knowledge of social circumstances and relationships. Thus I know, e.g., that I am at a party when I am discussing a philosophical problem with another guest at the party, or that I am talking to my superior when I am making a request to the head of the institute, and this sort of knowledge of my circumstances is also characterized by non-episodic intentionality. I am indeed not conscious of my habitual noeses (along with their noemata), but they are nevertheless undoubtedly “there” and determine the sense of the currently appearing objectivity (more generally: the objectivity I am currently conscious of). But there is more to it than that. These non-conscious noeses also *effectively determine my action*: they are at work (and their efficacy can be descriptively brought to light) in all cases of action in which the actor automatically takes habitually accepted contents (of knowledge or belief) into account. And apart from the “actions” of newborns, this is true for *all* actions. Even when the actor is giving no thought whatever to these contents (and thus is not “conscious” of them in the narrower sense of being explicitly aware of them), they are mentally, as it were, “in view” [*in Sicht*] insofar as the actor is taking them into consideration in “circumspective” [*umsichtig*] action.²⁹ Thus, for example, we are habitually keeping

29 What Heidegger describes in §§22 and 23 of *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger 1927) as the familiar spatial surrounding world “circumspectively” [*umsichtig*] articulated into “places” and “regions” is a phenomenon that cannot be made comprehensible without turning to the habitual intentionality of knowledge and belief. In a genetic perspective, all forms of familiarity and acquaintance turn out to be manifestations of habitual intentionality.

in mind that we are at a museum when we speak in muted tones and refrain from munching on the sandwiches we've brought along or lighting up a cigarette. We know, or as we can also loosely say, we are "aware" that we are in a museum, and we act accordingly without bringing the fact that we are in the museum to explicit awareness (whether continually or discretely).

What holds good both for praxis in the usual sense and for the situated knowledge relevant to the action concerned also holds good for perception, which Husserl called a "primal praxis" [*Urpraxis*] underlying all other practice.³⁰ When we are perceiving a house, for example, whatever we know about an individual house familiar to us or about houses in general is also habitually mentally "in view," and this knowledge has its effect in the primal praxis of perception, co-determining the individually and typically determined sense that the perceived objectivity has for us as well as co-determining the way we behave toward it. This is what lends an individually or merely typically familiar thing (we know this specific house or this type of house³¹) its character of "familiarity" [*Bekanntheitscharakter*]. But what is *known* (*gewusst*) about a house in this manner (and thereby functions in determining the sense of what we are perceiving) has nothing to do with anything explicitly conscious (*bewusst*). It is *not a manifest content of consciousness*—all we are explicitly conscious of here is the perceptually intended house as a whole, even though it does have a certain implicit character of individual or typical familiarity. And the moment that determines the perceived house as "familiar" is the moment in which the habitual noesis of the relevant knowledge "exerts its efficacy."

Insofar as knowledge and belief are horizon-intentionalities that essentially co-participate in the constitution of any (individually or typically) familiar perceptual thing we encounter, they are a phenomenon of habitual intentionality for which we could coin the German term "*Gewusstsein*" (literally, being-known), following the model of the German word "*Bewusstsein*" (consciousness—

30 See Hua XXXIX, Beilage XXVI, pp. 382–84.

31 Here and elsewhere in the present essay I am disregarding the everyday language distinction between two German verbs meaning "to know," "*kennen*" and "*wissen*." We say that we know objects (especially persons and places) in the sense that we "recognize" them (*kennen*), but not that we know them in the sense of possessing knowledge about them (*wissen*). However, I am taking the concept of knowledge (*Wissen*) in a broad sense that also includes recognizing and being familiar with objects. (Note that the English version of this essay also makes no distinction between being explicitly "conscious" of something and being explicitly "aware" of it.)

literally, being-conscious). How could this be expressed in English? We might turn to the neologism “knownness,” but not as a predicate that merely expresses the status of something known irrespective of the way in which it is known. Instead, what “knownness” points to here is first of all a specific manner of being-known that is not a matter of our being explicitly conscious of something. In addition, however, our concept of “knownness” refers to something that is not only already known, but comes into play by implicitly “informing” our lived experience in a currently given case, exerting its efficacy by contributing to the constitution of the sense of the situation or object itself. Thus in the present essay, the term “knownness”—a term that can play a useful role in the theory of constitution and that will be understood in a broad sense including implicitly being-believed-in—designates the habituality of taking states of affairs as obtaining, and doing so in the modes of knowledge and belief in such a way that what is known or believed in is *relevant to the situation of the action and/or sense-determining, here and now, for what one is currently explicitly and thematically aware of* through an intentional lived experience.

Hence it is this actual, living, sense- and action-determining reference to what we are currently thematically conscious of in any given case that distinguishes the *contents of “knownness”* from sheer *contents of knowledge*. Knowledge can also be “dead,” completely irrelevant for the current situation and the objectivities given for consciousness (and most of our individual stock of knowledge is irrelevant for the currently actual situation!); in contrast, the contents of knownness are, in accordance with our concept of knownness, distinguished by being situationally relevant and by their immediate sense-reference to what is currently thematic for consciousness. But if, along with Husserl, we understand the expression “consciousness” in the narrowest sense, contents of knownness are not contents of *consciousness*, even if they contribute to (and in this sense co-comprise) the sense of the objectivity or action that we are explicitly aware of. When I am admiring the closet door I am looking at, I already “know” that it leads to something “inside”—I don’t have any sense that what I am looking at is a dummy door—yet I am not “conscious of” this interior: it is not the object of an intentional lived experience (and although I “know” that I

could explore what is inside the closet in new acts, I only “know” this because, and to the extent to which, I “know” that it has an “inside” in the first place). In the narrowest sense of the words “conscious” and “consciousness,” contents of knownness are “*non-conscious*.” Thus with regard to these contents we find ourselves in the epistemic state that Husserl terms “non-consciousness,” since “what is ‘conscious’ in the narrowest sense means [...] what I am occupied with, what pertains to the unity of the being-occupied-with—and this itself once again has a central mode, <that> of having consciousness of, being conscious of, in the narrowest sense of all, [referring to] what lies in the center, the original point of [our] being-occupied-with-[something]” (Hua XLII, p. 38). Thus contents of knownness are non-conscious in both the narrow and the narrowest sense of the word “conscious.” However, they are also non-conscious in the broader sense of “conscious” in which this term is applied to the perceptual field that I always have as an awake I, a field that includes everything that is merely affectively present and “ready” to be perceived.³² Compared with these three significations of “conscious,” then, habitual contents of knownness are *non-conscious*, whether they arise from one’s own experiences and insights or rest on the testimony of others. As indicated above, however, in a certain manner they are nevertheless “there” as contents co-accepted in the contents of consciousness pertaining to the current thing-perception—they “too” are “there” [*mit da*] as contents co-determining the currently actual objective *sense*. The intentional consciousness currently intending its thematic object is “saturated” and “permeated,” as it were, with knownness, and would hardly be thinkable in its current concrete intentionality without this knownness. Suppose, for instance, that we attempted to remove all contents of knownness—everything having to do with what is individually or typically known or believed—from the perceptual consciousness we have when looking at our wristwatch, stripping away the individual and typical character of familiarity pertaining to “my watch,” “any watch whatever,” “any cultural thing whatever,” “any thing whatever”; such a denuded perception would not even deserve the name “thing-perception.” Husserl therefore says the following about the contentually more or less determinate (but never empty) constitutively co-

32 Cf. Hua XLII, p. 55.

functioning individual and typical “knowledge and co-knowledge” of a thing: “if it were not *co-accepted*, then the experience would not be an experience of this one thing at all” (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 27/32; emphasis added).

Such thought experiments attempting to omit something known or believed can help to determine whether or not something is currently co-accepted—whether something belongs to a specific actual content of consciousness as a relevant “knownness,” or whether it is situationally irrelevant knowledge that remains “dead” at the moment. Lived experiences of disappointment have a similar function. If, for example, I am putting on the shirt I had laid out to wear on my trip and discover, to my annoyance, that there is a button missing, this demonstrates after the fact that when I was getting my travel clothes ready, I had “presumed” that all of the buttons were there—thus that a state of affairs did indeed “obtain”—without ever having explicitly intended this state of affairs or having become thematically aware of it. However, the habitual presumption that has been situationally “activated” as relevant here in the form of “taking this state of affairs as obtaining” is nothing other than “knownness” in the sense discussed, and the state of affairs held to obtain is nothing other than its knownness-content.

2. **On the Constitution of the World in the Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief: The Knownness of the World** Up to this point, I have attempted to show that the perceptual consciousness of things mingles episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that such habitualities as knowledge and belief play an important—and indeed necessary—constitutive role in such consciousness. In what follows, I would like to provide a sketch of the role these epistemic habitualities play in the constitution of the world of realities as a whole, suggesting how they are co-effective in “bringing the world’s being and being-thus to constant acceptance for me” (“für mich Sein und Sosein der Welt zu beständiger Geltung zu bringen”—Ms. B I 14/37b). This broader problem of constitution can be put into words in the following question: what makes it possible for us to be “conscious” of a *world as a whole* in every moment of our waking life while we are intentionally occupied with this and that, so that we are therefore “conscious” of our waking life as a living-in-the-world? Here too, Husserl’s answer makes good use of the concept of horizon in the form of the outer horizon and of the world-horizon as the outermost outer horizon.

A text from 1933 offers the following illuminating characterizations of the concept of horizon in general and of the concepts of both inner horizon and outer horizon, with the latter lying halfway, as it were, to the concept of world-horizon:

The *horizontality*—the non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently specifically aware of, or the horizon of latent, non-conscious, and yet co-accepted sense pertaining to the patent, intuitively fulfilled sense, and indeed, as co-determining <the> sense of the patent objectivity—is, however, a *double horizontality*. On the one hand, it concerns the substrate-structure of the intuitively presented real item insofar as the latter [...] has its [inner] horizon of explication; [...] <on the other hand>, the concrete objects stand within *outer horizons*, within their intuitive fields, which in their ontic sense themselves have [...] *sense-determinations* “from the outside.” (Hua XXXIX, pp. 102–104)

What Husserl here calls “horizon” is the sense-determining, co-accepted “non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently specifically aware of,” and this corresponds to what has previously been said about the habitual horizon-intentionalities of knowledge and belief, whose knowledge- and belief-contents are non-conscious, but—as co-accepted contents—are nevertheless sense-determining for the conscious or patent objective sense. In the passage just quoted, Husserl characterizes the outer horizon as the field of intuitive but unthematic objects surrounding the object that is currently thematically intuitive. Whenever we are related to an object of this field through an act of perception, we are automatically and “passively” (non-actionally) co-related to this co-appearing field. Beyond this passively co-appearing perceptual field given in horizontal awareness we find an enveloping field of which we are not conscious, yet toward which we are always “intending beyond” (as Husserl terms it in his vocabulary of consciousness). But such intending-beyond toward what is no longer perceived is a *habitual* intending-beyond in the form of knowledge and belief. And as a habitual, universal horizon-intention, it ultimately reaches beyond all currently intuitive fields to the *world* constantly co-accepted as the total unity of realities. As the quotation above puts it, each intuitive individual thing receives “sense-determinations ‘from the outside,’” i.e., from the habitually known and believed-in world. In addition, however, the currently co-conscious,

indeterminately delimited perceptual field as a whole receives the sense of being *something from the world* or a *sector of the world*. Speaking of being “conscious” or “aware” of something in a loose sense of these expressions, Husserl writes as follows about this sense—a sense that all appearing things (as well as qualities of and relations between things) have, *as appearing*, in common: “[we are] conscious of all of [...] the real items we are currently aware of as real objects (qualities, relations, etc.) *from the world*, as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon” (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 29/33). Husserl characterizes this peculiar sense-determination quite similarly in another text in which (once again using his extended vocabulary of consciousness) he says of the “total world-field” (“*totale[n] Weltfeld*”) that it “is in acceptance for consciousness by virtue of an indeterminately general co-intending that constantly gives the sector as such the sense of [being a] sector” (“*bewusstseinsmäßig in Geltung ist, vermöge einer unbestimmt allgemeinen Mitmeinung, die ständig dem Ausschnitt als solchem den Sinn eines Ausschnittes gibt*”—Ms. E III 11/2a). This sense of being a sector, of “being something from the world”—this sense with which everything real appears to us, a sense that lends anything and everything, even the most fleeting and private stirrings of our souls, the sense of *worldliness*—is, however, not a phenomenon of consciousness. Instead, as an effect of horizon-intentionality, and as a phenomenon of habitual knowledge and belief, it is a *phenomenon of knownness* in the sense explicated above. At every moment of our waking lives we *know* of the world as the totality of spatiotemporal realities constantly encompassing us, and we know this in the form of a *habitual* “indeterminately general co-intending.” But this means that in all experience of real items, we also have an implicit knowledge of each appearing real item, each appearing plurality of real items, and each field of real items within which something real appears as salient as being *sectors* of the world.³³ When Husserl says that the “world [...] [is] pregiven as *holding good horizontally*” (“*Welt [...] vorgegeben [ist] als horizonthaft geltende*”—Ms. A VII 12/81a, emphasis added), he is using neutral terminology to characterize this universal descriptive state of affairs. The use of the locution “holding good horizontally” offers the possibility of doing descriptive justice both to the sectoriality

33 This implicit knowledge of “the world” can take very different forms and varies not only from culture to culture, but within a person’s lifespan, as well as within the history of smaller and larger human communities. The world comes to awareness [*bewusst*] or is known [*gewusst*] differently for humans with a mythical image of the world and humans whose worldview is shaped by modern science. The different knowledge of (and belief about) the world co-determines in each case what the world currently holds good as and how it is co-accepted in experience and action.

already mentioned and to the fact that “any experience of something belonging to the world [is] at the same time [implicitly] an experience (although an unthematic one) of the world as a totality” (“jede Erfahrung von Weltlichem, obschon unthematisch, [implizit] zugleich totale Welterfahrung [ist]”—Ms. A VII 12/79b), thus avoiding the vague and awkward talk of “co-intending” or “co-consciousness,” as well as the ambiguous sense in which the noun “co-intending” (*Mitmeinung*) can refer either to the noetic side (*Mitmeinen* as the act of co-intending) or to the noematic side (*Mitgemeinte* as its co-intended correlate). Because the “noetic” or subjective “correlate” of ongoing and enduring ontic acceptance [*Seinsgeltung*] is not a current episodic intending or having-in-consciousness but a habitual having-in-acceptance, and because knowledge and belief are both fundamental epistemic modes of having-in-acceptance, the subjective “correlate” of the sense-formation holding good for me as “existing world” is a knowing or believing. As habitual horizon-intentionalities, knowledge and belief are the “passive” (non-actional), non-episodic subjective performances thanks to which we have a world at all, and indeed, have it as the “existing total unity of realities existing in themselves” (Hua XXXIX, p. 83) that is necessarily co-accepted with ontic certainty in the experience of real items.³⁴ But as the habitually known or believed-in universal unity of sense and acceptance, the world of realities—a world that we are not explicitly aware of in experiencing individual mundane realities—is still not something that we are somehow “co-aware” of, not something “co-intended” in act-like fashion as is the case with, say, the co-perceived background co-appearing with a seen thing. The language of “knowledge” and “belief” is suitable for the phenomenon of habitually having-in-acceptance, and allows us to call the phenomenon we are actually dealing with (i.e., the epistemic phenomenon of habitual intentionality) by its true name without tempting us to overextend the vocabulary of “intending” or to reach for such ambiguous expressions as “co-intending” or “meaning more.” With the help of the terms “knowledge” and “belief,” then, we can give unequivocal expression to the intentional performances that make *the world* present to us at every moment of our waking life as the totality of realities that are habitually held in constant ontic acceptance—and that constantly make us, *ourselves* habitually present to ourselves as beings existing in the world

34 The being of the world is certain because “as the totality of individual entities standing in co-acceptance starting from any [particular] individual entity, the total horizon cannot be modalized. The type of ontic certainty [*Seinsgewissheit*] of the world that is founded in the modalizable certainty pertaining to individual [entities] is the apodictic basis for all modalizations, etc.” (Hua XXXIX, p. 128).

at every moment of our waking life.³⁵ These intentional performances consist precisely in the “*appresenting*” performances of knowledge and belief, which as habitualities are necessarily non-conscious, but which as *sense-determining* intentional performances lend all spatiotemporal realities—and thereby us, ourselves—the sense of being *mundane*, of being *something in the world*. In a manuscript from the 1930s, Husserl expresses this state of affairs as follows:

Whatever I may be thematically occupied with, it is known to me as something *existing in the world*. With anything and everything, I have ontic certainty of the world. I have this a priori with every single experience, with every single perceptual field, with every single theme, with everything, as a horizon of continual, permanent certainty running through shifting themes. (Hua XXXIX, p. 73)³⁶

The permanence of a world holding good as existing for an I is the “correlate” of the permanence of the habitualities that this I has developed or acquired, since the I at the center of the countless performances of intentional life is a *concrete subject* for whom the world “constantly” exists—and is such a subject only as a “*substrate of habitualities*” rather than as “*an empty pole of identity*” (Hua I, §32, pp.

35 Here it can merely be mentioned that by being known in empty horizons as the universe of what is present and co-present, the world is also known as a world with a *world-past* and a *world-future*. Husserl emphasizes the role of empty intentions in the constitution of the world as a temporal formation in a manuscript from 1932: “As soon as we are directed toward things we speak of what exists in their surroundings but is not seen. Thus in its infinity, in its indeterminate determinability, the surrounding world is given at any moment as the surrounding world relative to our own lived body, and is given originaliter. As [it is] for the present, so [is it] also similar for <the> future through the accompanying expectations and for <the> past through the empty retentions. What is constituted through all of these forms of empty intentions is thus not only the delimited unitary thing or a ‘genuinely’ perceived part of the surrounding world, but the entire world in an indeterminate spatial present stretching into the past and into an indeterminate future” (Hua XXXIX, p. 143).

36 It may be remarked in passing that this state of affairs—i.e., the fact that the world I experience at every waking moment as “a world holding good for me as existing” is a formation of habitual knowledge, belief, and knowiness—determines the methodical sense of the *phenomenological epochē*: I cannot refrain from *knowledge* of the world and of entities in the world, I cannot abandon this conviction, because all I can refrain from is the performance of *acts*; however, convictions such as knowledge and belief are not acts, but something *habitual*. As Husserl says in numerous places, all I can refrain from is *making use* of my world-knowledge and world-belief, for “having a conviction and making use of this conviction within a sphere of judgment, letting an ontic ground be given through the conviction, are two different things” (Hua Mat IV, p. 74). It lies within our freedom to make no use of our convictions; we can decide to make no use of them, and as phenomenologists, we can maintain this decision in our descriptive work, thus refraining from all prescientific and scientific judgments that explicitly or implicitly posit the existence of the world or of items in the world. Through this refraining (*epochē*) we *reduce* the sphere of possible judgments to the sphere of possible phenomenological judgments, i.e., to the sphere of possible judgments about pure phenomena—phenomena purified of naive positing of entities: “*phenomena of being*” [“*Seinsphänomene*”], phenomena in which entities still appear, but only as *entities holding good for me (us) as existing*.

100f.). What holds good for individual objects constituted as existing also holds good for the world constituted as existing as a whole: the “abiding existence and being-thus [is] a correlate of the habitualit[ies] constituted in the Ego-pole [itself] by virtue of [its] position-taking[s]” (Hua I, §33, p. 102). It is by virtue of such position-takings and of countless acquired and “firmly developed” habitualities that “a Nature [...], a cultural world, a [human] world with [its] social forms, and so forth” exists for an I (Hua I, §37, pp. 109f.). Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological principle “that nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the *actual and potential performance of my own consciousness*”³⁷ is accordingly to be supplemented by adding, “or by virtue of the intentional performance of non-conscious *habitalities*,” since habitualities essentially belong to the performances of the “effective intentionality” thanks to which entities—and finally, the world as a whole—exist for me at all. As the constitution of an *objective* world existing through and for a concrete subject endowed with habitualities, world-constitution necessarily has an *intersubjective* dimension: the objective world, which has the sense, “world for everyone,” rests upon communication and tradition, and thereby upon taking over and “believing” the knowledge of others. Nature in particular (in the sense of what holds good for us as objective nature) is an *intersubjective unity of sense and acceptance* whose subjective correlate is empirical knowledge that is intersubjectively confirmed and accepted as valid [*gültig*], i.e., knowledge procured by natural science—more concretely, knowledge that natural scientists convey to us and that we “believe” and take over for our own stock of knowledge.³⁸ The world holding good for

37 Hua XVII, §94, p. 241/234. Husserl expresses the same principle in two further places in the same section: “No being nor being-thus for me, whether as actuality or as possibility, but as *accepted by me* [*mir geltend*]” (Hua XVII, p. 241/234); “Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something that [...] has received its *whole* being-sense for me from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality” (Hua XVII, p. 241/234).

38 As early as 1917 Husserl already mentions the role that “believing in” knowledge taken over from others plays in the intersubjective constitution of the world; writing in “Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (a paper never published during his lifetime), he says: “[...] to a great extent (although not always), I do not content myself with merely empathizing with [other persons]; rather, I ‘take over’ their experiences, their judgments, their theories—i.e., I do not merely ascribe these to others as opinions and convictions these others hold, but simultaneously award them the value of being accepted by me. Along with my experience via empathy—my experience that the other is experiencing thus and such—I carry out a ‘co-experience,’ participating in their positing even where I am not simultaneously experiencing the same objectivities that I have ascribed to them as actual experiential givens. It is the same when I believe in and take up any descriptive statements that others make about something I myself have not seen. Thus to a great extent it is through this kind of co-positing that I adopt and am informed by many of the position-takings I have experienced via empathy, especially with regard to others’ judgments and conclusions about the world, with regard to their world-knowledge of any type” (Hua XXV, p. 180).

each individual is accordingly not merely a sense-formation whose subjective correlate is each individual's own *knowledge*, but is also, and above all, a sense-formation that is the correlate of *belief* in the sense of accepting the truth of something communicated by others. The world intersubjectively valid [*gültig*] as existing (be it a prescientific lifeworld or a world objectively determined by the natural and cultural sciences) rests above all upon the knowledge of others, a knowledge we take over from others whose truth we trust—especially, in our modern world based on epistemic division of labor, from those who are experts in their field and as such have reliable knowledge about this or that aspect of the world. As laypersons (which we all are with regard to nearly all scientific disciplines, and most of us are with respect to all of them), we trust these experts and their corroborated procedures for attaining secure, dependable, intersubjectively definitive knowledge. *In this way our knowledge of the world is broadened through belief.* Thus when on the basis of such belief we habitually take a state of affairs as obtaining, this is an essential, or even *the* most essential, *noetic-noematic* component in the constitution of the objective world holding good for us as objective. For in such believing—which is not unlike the blind faith of the celebrated/notorious charcoal burner³⁹—we do indeed believe in science (unless we are extremely skeptical of it), and we let science tell us what the world is and what “holds it together at the heart [*im Innersten zusammenhält*].”⁴⁰

39 Josef Pieper writes as follows concerning certain insulting language that Luther let loose upon the world (and concerning the thereby unjustly disparaged matter in question): “The ‘implicit faith’ [*das ‘unausdrücklich einbeschließende Glauben’*] (termed *fides implicita* by the Scholastics) is something recognized and practiced everywhere else. To be sure, in theology the concept of *fides implicita* has become controversial”; referring to Martin Luther’s 1533 text *Warnungsschrift an die zu Frankfurt am Main, sich vor Zwinglischer Lehre zu hüten*, Pieper continues, “there is only a short step from the concept of implicit faith to Luther’s derogatory term, ‘blind faith’ [*Köhlerglaube*, literally: the charcoal burner’s faith]. Thus when the charcoal burner [*Köhler*] on the bridge to Prague responded to a Doctor of Divinity who asked him what he believed by saying that he believed what the church believes, it seems to me that this much-maligned man’s answer is not at all something ridiculous and despicable, but rather something exceptionally wise, apt, and accurate—and as already mentioned, it is something taken as perfectly natural everywhere else. In my opinion, if I were to be asked about the structure of the universe or of matter, I would respond by referring to modern physics: I may only have a vague knowledge of its results, but (in a way that may be difficult to define precisely) I nevertheless truly participate in these results *because* I am allying myself with men like Planck, Bohr, de Broglie, and Heisenberg” (Pieper 1962, pp. 101f.).

40 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I*, verse 382f.: “Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält.”

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